Expand rootkit monitoring and Claude docs

CLAUDE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+# CLAUDE.md
+
+Guidance for Claude or Claude Code agents working on Enodia Sentinel.
+
+## Project Shape
+
+Enodia Sentinel is a zero-runtime-dependency Linux host security platform. The
+core agent is pure Python standard library and should stay that way unless a
+dependency has clear security/operator value that cannot reasonably be achieved
+with stdlib.
+
+Primary functions:
+
+- Detect: poll detectors plus optional eBPF exec rules.
+- Verify: FIM, package DB anchor, signed-package verification, rootcheck.
+- Investigate: text/JSON snapshots, incidents, HTTPS management console.
+- Respond: dry-run plans first; any state-changing action must be explicit,
+  logged, and tested.
+- Assure: heartbeat, watchdog, self-integrity, future external anchors.
+
+Start with:
+
+- `README.md` for product overview and architecture.
+- `docs/SPECIFICATION.md` for the product model and acceptance criteria.
+- `docs/ROADMAP.md` for sequenced work.
+- `docs/COMMAND_REFERENCE.md` for CLI contracts.
+- `docs/OPERATIONS.md` and `docs/RUNBOOKS.md` for operator workflows.
+- `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md` for security boundaries and non-goals.
+
+## Engineering Rules
+
+- Keep the daemon stdlib-only and useful without a dashboard, collector, or
+  network.
+- Prefer read-only detection and dry-run response until schemas and audit logs
+  are tested and documented.
+- Every new detector, rootcheck, response action, or event rule needs a stable
+  `sid`, `signature`, `classtype`, tests, and operator documentation.
+- Do not add stealth, self-hiding, persistence tricks, or automatic destructive
+  remediation.
+- Preserve the bash prototype/red-team harness as the behavioral oracle for core
+  signatures.
+- If you add config keys, update `config/enodia-sentinel.toml`, README, and the
+  relevant docs.
+
+## Current Architecture
+
+- `enodia_sentinel/cli.py` is the command entry point.
+- `daemon.py` runs sweep/cooldown/background tasks.
+- `system.py` builds one cached injectable view of processes and sockets.
+- `detectors/` contains pure poll detectors.
+- `events/` contains optional eBPF exec monitoring and declarative rules.
+- `snapshot.py` writes forensic `.log` and `.json` evidence.
+- `incident.py` groups snapshots by process lineage and time window.
+- `respond.py` builds read-only response plans from incident evidence.
+- `web.py` serves the HTTPS-only management console and JSON APIs.
+- `rootcheck.py` performs anti-rootkit cross-view checks:
+  hidden processes, hidden modules, hidden TCP/UDP ports, promiscuous
+  interfaces, known LKM rootkit module names, and kernel/module taint.
+- `posture.py` performs advisory host hygiene checks.
+
+## Development Commands
+
+```bash
+python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v
+python3 -m enodia_sentinel.cli check
+python3 -m enodia_sentinel.cli rootcheck
+python3 -m enodia_sentinel.cli posture check --json
+python3 -m enodia_sentinel.cli incident list
+python3 -m enodia_sentinel.cli respond plan <incident-id> --json
+python3 -m enodia_sentinel.cli web
+```
+
+The web dashboard is HTTPS-only. In development it auto-generates a self-signed
+certificate under `log_dir`; tests use an unverified TLS context for that local
+certificate.
+
+## Testing Notes
+
+- Unit tests are stdlib `unittest`; `pytest` is optional, not required.
+- Most detectors are pure functions over injectable `SystemState`.
+- Rootcheck tests monkeypatch system views instead of depending on live `/proc`,
+  `/sys`, or `ss`.
+- Web tests bind a local HTTPS socket and may require permission in sandboxed
+  environments.
+- Run the full suite before committing:
+
+```bash
+python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v
+```
+
+## Documentation Checklist
+
+When changing behavior, update the relevant set:
+
+- `README.md` for visible product/architecture behavior.
+- `docs/COMMAND_REFERENCE.md` for CLI/API-visible commands.
+- `docs/OPERATIONS.md` for routine operator workflow.
+- `docs/RUNBOOKS.md` for alert response guidance.
+- `docs/SPECIFICATION.md` for product/data-model changes.
+- `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md` for trust-boundary/security-model changes.
+- `docs/ROADMAP.md` for planned or completed roadmap movement.
+- `config/enodia-sentinel.toml` for config knobs.
+

README.md

@@ -101,11 +101,11 @@ enodia_sentinel/
 ├── config.py         dataclass config (TOML + env overrides)
 ├── netutil.py        public-IP / CIDR logic (stdlib ipaddress)
 ├── alert.py          Alert / Severity (with Snort-style sid + classtype)
-├── web.py            read-only dashboard: stdlib http server + JSON API + auth
+├── web.py            HTTPS read-only management console + JSON API + auth
 ├── static/           the self-contained dashboard SPA
 ├── fim.py            file integrity monitoring (hash baseline + pacman verify)
 ├── pkgdb.py          package-DB integrity + signed-package verification
-├── rootcheck.py      anti-rootkit cross-view (hidden procs/modules/ports)
+├── rootcheck.py      anti-rootkit cross-view, module names, kernel/module taint
 ├── selfprotect.py    self-integrity footprint + dead-man's-switch heartbeat
 ├── triage.py         false-positive classification
 ├── provenance.py     package-ownership lookups (pacman/dpkg/rpm)
@@ -251,10 +251,11 @@ sudo systemctl enable --now enodia-sentinel-web
 - **Bearer-token auth** (constant-time check); the token is auto-generated and
   saved on first run and printed in the startup line. Open
   `https://<tailscale-ip>:8787/?token=…`.
-- **Read-only management**: incidents, timelines, alert inventory, event tail,
+- **Read-only management**: incidents, timelines, alert inventory, posture
-  and dry-run response plans. No commands are executed from the browser. JSON
+  findings, event tail, and dry-run response plans. No commands are executed
+  from the browser. JSON
   API at `/api/status`, `/api/incidents`, `/api/respond/plan/<id>`,
-  `/api/alerts`, `/api/alerts/<id>`, `/api/events`.
+  `/api/posture`, `/api/alerts`, `/api/alerts/<id>`, `/api/events`.
 
 ## Phone push notifications
 
@@ -366,13 +367,21 @@ compare the answers.** A discrepancy is the hiding artifact.
 | `/sys/module` (initstate=live) vs `/proc/modules` | a loaded LKM hidden from the module list | 100023 |
 | `/proc/net/tcp` vs `ss` | a listening port a hooked `ss` won't report | 100024 |
 | `/sys/class/net/*/flags` | an interface in promiscuous mode (a sniffer) | 100025 |
+| known LKM rootkit module names | Diamorphine/Reptile/Adore-style module artifacts | 100028 |
+| `/sys/module/*/taint` | out-of-tree/proprietary/unsigned loaded modules needing review | 100029 |
+| `/proc/sys/kernel/tainted` | global kernel taint: forced loads/unloads, unsigned modules, warnings | 100030 |
+| `/proc/net/udp` vs `ss -u` | a UDP socket a hooked `ss` won't report | 100031 |
 
 ```bash
 enodia-sentinel rootcheck     # one-shot cross-view scan
 ```
 
 The daemon runs it on a slow background cadence (`rootcheck_interval`) and routes
-any finding into the normal alert/snapshot/push pipeline. **Honest limits:** this
+any finding into the normal alert/snapshot/push pipeline. If you intentionally
+run tainted vendor/DKMS modules, add exact names to `rootcheck_module_allow`.
+Known rootkit module names are never suppressed by that allowlist.
+
+**Honest limits:** this
 runs in user space, so it reliably catches userland (`LD_PRELOAD`) rootkits and
 the common `/proc`-hiding LKMs, but a kernel rootkit that hooks *every* path
 consistently can still evade it. It raises the bar and catches the common cases;
@@ -488,8 +497,9 @@ v0.7 — closes the tamper-evidence loop with the **independent anchor**:
 signed-package verification (compares on-disk files to the `.MTREE` in the signed
 cache package, surviving a rewritten checksum DB) plus a `SigLevel`-downgrade
 check, and an **anti-rootkit cross-view** layer (hidden processes, modules,
-ports, and promiscuous interfaces — each caught by asking the same question two
+TCP/UDP ports, promiscuous interfaces, known LKM rootkit names, and
-ways and diffing the answers).
+kernel/module taint — each caught by asking independent views and diffing the
+answers).
 
 v0.6 — adds **tamper-evidence**: out-of-band package-DB integrity
 (catches rewritten checksums), self-integrity of Sentinel's own footprint, and a

config/enodia-sentinel.toml

@@ -87,10 +87,14 @@ pkgdb_pkgverify_sample = 40       # packages verified per pass (rotates)
 # --- anti-rootkit cross-view --------------------------------------------
 # Ask the same question two ways and diff the answers: kill(0) vs /proc for
 # hidden processes, /sys/module vs /proc/modules for hidden LKMs, /proc/net/tcp
-# vs ss for hidden listeners, and interface flags for promiscuous sniffing.
+# vs ss for hidden TCP/UDP listeners, interface flags for promiscuous sniffing,
+# known rootkit module names, per-module taint, and global kernel taint.
 rootcheck_enabled = true
 rootcheck_interval = 300          # seconds between cross-view sweeps
 rootcheck_pid_cap = 65536         # upper PID to brute-force via kill(0)
+# Legitimate tainted modules you accept (exact module names), e.g. a vendor GPU
+# or virtualization driver. Known rootkit module names are never suppressed here.
+rootcheck_module_allow = []
 
 # --- incident grouping ---------------------------------------------------
 # Collapse related alerts into one incident: process-lineage first (shared PID

docs/COMMAND_REFERENCE.md

@@ -76,7 +76,11 @@ Runs anti-rootkit cross-view checks once:
 - PIDs alive via `kill(pid, 0)` but missing from `/proc`.
 - Live modules in `/sys/module` but missing from `/proc/modules`.
 - Listening TCP ports in `/proc/net/tcp*` but missing from `ss`.
+- UDP ports in `/proc/net/udp*` but missing from `ss -u`.
 - Network interfaces in promiscuous mode.
+- Known rootkit module names.
+- Tainted loaded modules (`/sys/module/*/taint`) and global kernel taint
+  (`/proc/sys/kernel/tainted`).
 
 Exit code:
 
@@ -261,6 +265,10 @@ HTTPS is mandatory. If `web_tls_cert` / `web_tls_key` are not configured,
 Sentinel creates a self-signed pair under `log_dir`; add a browser exception for
 that certificate or replace it with a private/local CA certificate.
 
+The console exposes incidents, alert snapshots, posture findings, event tail,
+and dry-run response plans. It remains read-only; response commands are displayed
+for review but not executed from the browser.
+
 Expected use: `enodia-sentinel-web.service`.
 
 ### `triage`

docs/OPERATIONS.md

@@ -66,11 +66,15 @@ Expected healthy output:
   acknowledged.
 - `pkgdb-check`: package DB consistent with anchor.
 - `pkgdb-verify`: sampled files match signed cache packages.
-- `rootcheck`: no hidden processes, modules, ports, or sniffers.
+- `rootcheck`: no hidden processes/modules/ports, sniffers, known rootkit
+  modules, or unexplained kernel/module taint.
 - `posture check`: no SSH/sudo/PATH/permission/signature hygiene findings, or
   only ones you have consciously accepted (e.g. password auth on a host that
   needs it).
 
+The HTTPS dashboard shows the same posture findings under the Posture tab for
+quick remote review.
+
 ## Alert Workflow
 
 When Sentinel fires:
@@ -125,7 +129,7 @@ When Sentinel fires:
 | `fim_modified` | Verify package ownership, package checksum, and whether the change followed an upgrade. |
 | `pkgdb_tamper` | Treat as high-confidence tampering until a legitimate package transaction explains it. |
 | `pkg_signature_mismatch` | Treat as a potentially trojaned package-owned file. |
-| `hidden_*` rootcheck alerts | Compare live tools, preserve evidence, and consider offline analysis. |
+| `rootkit_*` / `kernel_tainted` alerts | Compare live tools, review module provenance, preserve evidence, and consider offline analysis. |
 
 ## Baseline Hygiene
 

docs/ROADMAP.md

@@ -95,6 +95,13 @@ Exit criteria:
 
 Purpose: reduce blind spots and connect related signals.
 
+- Generalize the exec-rule engine into a typed host-event rule engine:
+  `exec`, `tcp_connect`, `bind`, `listen`, `accept`, `file_write`,
+  `chmod/chown`, `setuid/setgid`, `capset`, and module-load events.
+- Keep rules declarative and Snort-like:
+  `sid`, `msg`, `severity`, `classtype`, `event`, and match fields such as
+  process name, parent process, argv regex, path prefix, peer IP/port, UID/GID,
+  package ownership, and lineage.
 - Add eBPF event sources:
   `tcp_connect`, `bind`, `accept`, module load, privilege transitions, and
   writes to watched persistence paths.
@@ -102,13 +109,60 @@ Purpose: reduce blind spots and connect related signals.
 - Correlate multi-stage behavior:
   web service spawns shell, shell downloads payload, payload adds persistence,
   listener appears, and FIM changes.
-- Add configurable correlation windows and severity escalation rules.
+- Add configurable correlation windows and severity escalation rules, including:
+  - `exec_rule.web-rce` + suspicious egress + persistence within 10 minutes →
+    CRITICAL multi-stage intrusion.
+  - `new_listener` + `new_suid` in the same lineage/window → CRITICAL backdoor
+    with privilege-escalation artifact.
+  - `fim_modified` or `pkg_signature_mismatch` + `pkgdb_tamper` → CRITICAL
+    suspected trojaned binary with checksum cover-up.
+  - web/database service spawning shell + tool transfer (`curl|wget|sh`) →
+    CRITICAL likely RCE payload staging.
+- Add high-signal living-off-the-land detections:
+  `curl|wget | sh`, Python/perl/bash reverse-shell argv variants,
+  `systemctl enable` from unusual ancestry, `chmod +s` outside package
+  transactions, interpreter egress to unusual public ports, and execution from
+  writable directories.
+- Add first-seen and rarity tracking for local network behavior:
+  first public destination per process name, first listening port per binary,
+  interpreter connections to non-standard ports, and long-lived low-byte
+  connections when socket sampling can support it.
 - Keep polling as the oracle and fallback.
 
 Exit criteria:
 
 - Short-lived network and persistence actions are visible.
 - Related alerts collapse into one incident with a readable timeline.
+- Multi-stage correlation raises one higher-confidence incident without hiding
+  the underlying raw alerts.
+
+## v1.1.1: IDS Quality and Rule Operations
+
+Purpose: make detection coverage easier to audit, tune, and extend without
+turning Sentinel into a noisy rules dump.
+
+- Add `enodia-sentinel rules list` and `rules show <sid>` for built-in and
+  configured rules.
+- Add `enodia-sentinel rules test <event-json>` so operators can validate custom
+  event rules against captured or fixture events.
+- Generate rule documentation from source defaults: SID, signature, classtype,
+  event type, match fields, expected false positives, and drill coverage.
+- Require a fixture or safe red-team drill for every built-in SID, including
+  event-only and correlation SIDs.
+- Add compatibility tests for rule JSON/event schema evolution.
+- Extend triage so false-positive suggestions are tied to SID/classtype and can
+  emit TOML snippets for allowlists, correlation windows, or severity overrides.
+- Add post-alert enrichment consistently across detections:
+  package owner, executable hash, parent/ancestor chain, remote IP
+  classification, file mode/owner, recent writes by same lineage, and current
+  FIM/package/rootcheck status.
+
+Exit criteria:
+
+- Operators can inspect, test, document, and tune detection rules without
+  reading Python source.
+- Every shipped IDS rule has reproducible fixture/drill coverage and stable
+  operator documentation.
 
 ## v1.2: Fleet Mode
 

docs/RUNBOOKS.md

@@ -165,7 +165,9 @@ the transaction completes; a persistent mismatch is the real finding.
 ## Runbook 4 — Hidden listener / rootkit
 
 **Triggers:** `rootkit_hidden_process` (100022), `rootkit_hidden_module` (100023),
-`rootkit_hidden_port` (100024), `promiscuous_interface` (100025), and
+`rootkit_hidden_port` (100024), `promiscuous_interface` (100025),
+`rootkit_known_module` (100028), `rootkit_tainted_module` (100029),
+`kernel_tainted` (100030), `rootkit_hidden_udp_port` (100031), and
 `new_listener` (100013) for an unexplained open port.
 
 These come from cross-view checks: the same question asked two ways, answered
@@ -182,8 +184,16 @@ differently, because something is hiding.
 - `new_listener`: identify the owning process and whether its binary is
   package-owned. A hidden port that `rootcheck` sees but `ss` does not is far more
   serious than a forgotten service.
+- `rootkit_hidden_udp_port`: check whether a legitimate UDP service owns the
+  port; a port present in `/proc/net/udp*` but absent from `ss -u` suggests tool
+  output may be hooked.
 - A `rootkit_hidden_module` names a live kernel module absent from
   `/proc/modules` — strong evidence of an LKM rootkit.
+- A `rootkit_known_module` finding names a module associated with public LKM
+  rootkits; treat it as a high-confidence compromise until proven otherwise.
+- A `rootkit_tainted_module` or `kernel_tainted` finding may be legitimate
+  vendor/DKMS software, but unsigned/out-of-tree or force-loaded modules should
+  be explained and allowlisted only after review.
 
 **Contain**
 
@@ -197,8 +207,10 @@ differently, because something is hiding.
   reliably clean a host whose kernel is hooked. Preserve the disk image first.
 
 **False positives:** PID exit races (Sentinel re-verifies hidden PIDs to reduce
-these) and a legitimately promiscuous interface (a sniffer/monitoring tool you
+these), a legitimately promiscuous interface (a sniffer/monitoring tool you
-run). Confirm the owning process before escalating.
+run), and expected tainted vendor/DKMS modules. Confirm the owning process or
+module provenance before escalating; use `rootcheck_module_allow` only for
+modules you intentionally trust.
 
 ---
 

docs/SPECIFICATION.md

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ Sentinel includes several integrity layers:
 | Package DB anchor | Detects out-of-band edits to `/var/lib/pacman/local`. |
 | Signed-package anchor | Compares on-disk files to `.MTREE` hashes from cached signed packages. |
 | Heartbeat | Writes daemon liveness for local dashboard and external watchdog use. |
-| Rootcheck | Cross-view checks for hidden processes, hidden modules, hidden ports, and promiscuous interfaces. |
+| Rootcheck | Cross-view checks for hidden processes, hidden modules, hidden TCP/UDP ports, promiscuous interfaces, known rootkit modules, and kernel/module taint. |
 
 ### Evidence Capture
 

docs/THREAT_MODEL.md

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Sentinel is designed to help against:
 | Local privilege escalation | New SUID helper, dropped setuid shell, writable path abuse | Detect new SUID/SGID and critical writable-directory placement. |
 | Fileless or short-lived execution | Deleted executable, memfd payload, fast `curl|sh` | Detect deleted executables and eBPF exec rules where available. |
 | Package/file tampering | Trojaned binary, rewritten package DB checksums | Detect FIM drift, package DB tamper, and signed-package mismatches. |
-| Common rootkit hiding | LD_PRELOAD tricks, `/proc` hiding, module-list hiding, hidden listener | Detect LD_PRELOAD and cross-view inconsistencies. |
+| Common rootkit hiding | LD_PRELOAD tricks, `/proc` hiding, module-list hiding, hidden TCP/UDP sockets, tainted modules | Detect LD_PRELOAD, cross-view inconsistencies, known LKM names, and kernel/module taint. |
 | Sensor tampering | Stop daemon, edit config, remove hook, modify baseline | Detect self-integrity changes and stale heartbeat via external watchdog. |
 
 ## Trust Boundaries

enodia_sentinel/cli.py

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
     pv.add_argument("--sample", type=int, default=0,
                     help="packages to verify (0 = config default; rotates)")
     sub.add_parser("rootcheck",
-                   help="anti-rootkit cross-view: hidden procs/modules/ports")
+                   help="anti-rootkit cross-view and kernel/module taint checks")
     st = sub.add_parser("status", help="print daemon health/alert summary")
     st.add_argument("--json", action="store_true", help="emit status as JSON")
     inc = sub.add_parser("incident",
@@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ def _cmd_rootcheck(cfg: Config) -> int:
     from . import rootcheck
     alerts = list(rootcheck.run(cfg))
     if not alerts:
-        print("Rootcheck: no hidden processes, modules, ports, or sniffers found.")
+        print("Rootcheck: no hidden processes/modules/ports, sniffers, "
+              "known rootkit modules, or kernel taint found.")
         return 0
     for a in sorted(alerts, key=lambda x: -x.severity):
         print(f"[{a.severity}] {a.signature:<22} {a.detail}")

enodia_sentinel/config.py

@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ class Config:
     rootcheck_enabled: bool = True
     rootcheck_interval: int = 300            # seconds between cross-view sweeps
     rootcheck_pid_cap: int = 65536           # upper PID to brute-force via kill(0)
+    # Legitimate out-of-tree/proprietary/unsigned modules accepted by operator
+    # policy (e.g. vendor GPU or virtualization drivers).
+    rootcheck_module_allow: tuple[str, ...] = ()
 
     # incident grouping (collapse related alerts by process lineage, then time)
     incident_tracking: bool = True

enodia_sentinel/rootcheck.py

@@ -28,9 +28,41 @@ SID_HIDDEN_PROC = 100022
 SID_HIDDEN_MODULE = 100023
 SID_HIDDEN_PORT = 100024
 SID_PROMISC = 100025
+SID_KNOWN_ROOTKIT_MODULE = 100028
+SID_TAINTED_MODULE = 100029
+SID_KERNEL_TAINTED = 100030
+SID_HIDDEN_UDP_PORT = 100031
 
 IFF_PROMISC = 0x100
 
+KNOWN_ROOTKIT_MODULES = frozenset({
+    "adore", "adore-ng", "azazel", "diamorphine", "ipsecs_kbeast",
+    "kbeast", "knark", "reptile", "suterusu", "syslogk",
+})
+
+TAINT_FLAGS = {
+    0: "proprietary-module",
+    1: "forced-module-load",
+    2: "unsafe-smp",
+    3: "forced-module-unload",
+    4: "machine-check",
+    5: "bad-page",
+    6: "user-tainted",
+    7: "kernel-died-recently",
+    8: "acpi-override",
+    9: "kernel-warning",
+    10: "staging-driver",
+    11: "firmware-workaround",
+    12: "out-of-tree-module",
+    13: "unsigned-module",
+    14: "soft-lockup",
+    15: "live-patched",
+    16: "auxiliary-taint",
+    17: "randstruct-plugin",
+}
+
+HIGH_RISK_TAINT_BITS = frozenset({1, 3, 7, 12, 13})
+
 
 # --- pure diff cores (unit-tested without a live system) ------------------
 
@@ -49,6 +81,30 @@ def find_hidden_ports(procnet_ports: set[int], ss_ports: set[int]) -> set[int]:
     return procnet_ports - ss_ports
 
 
+def find_hidden_udp_ports(procnet_ports: set[int], ss_ports: set[int]) -> set[int]:
+    """UDP ports in /proc/net/udp that ss does not report."""
+    return procnet_ports - ss_ports
+
+
+def _norm_module(name: str) -> str:
+    return name.lower().replace("-", "_")
+
+
+def find_known_rootkit_modules(modules: set[str]) -> set[str]:
+    known = {_norm_module(m) for m in KNOWN_ROOTKIT_MODULES}
+    return {m for m in modules if _norm_module(m) in known}
+
+
+def decode_kernel_taint(value: int) -> list[str]:
+    return [label for bit, label in sorted(TAINT_FLAGS.items())
+            if value & (1 << bit)]
+
+
+def taint_severity(value: int) -> Severity:
+    risky = any(value & (1 << bit) for bit in HIGH_RISK_TAINT_BITS)
+    return Severity.HIGH if risky else Severity.MEDIUM
+
+
 # --- system views ---------------------------------------------------------
 
 def proc_pids() -> set[int]:
@@ -110,6 +166,36 @@ def sys_live_modules() -> set[str]:
     return out
 
 
+def module_taints() -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Read per-module taint markers from /sys/module/*/taint.
+
+    Values are kernel-provided letters such as P/O/E for proprietary,
+    out-of-tree, or unsigned modules. Built-ins often do not expose this file.
+    """
+    out: dict[str, str] = {}
+    base = "/sys/module"
+    try:
+        for m in os.listdir(base):
+            try:
+                with open(os.path.join(base, m, "taint")) as fh:
+                    taint = fh.read().strip()
+            except OSError:
+                continue
+            if taint and taint != "0":
+                out[m] = taint
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+    return out
+
+
+def kernel_taint() -> int:
+    try:
+        with open("/proc/sys/kernel/tainted") as fh:
+            return int(fh.read().strip())
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        return 0
+
+
 def _procnet_listen_ports(path: str) -> set[int]:
     ports: set[int] = set()
     try:
@@ -130,6 +216,28 @@ def procnet_listen_ports() -> set[int]:
     return _procnet_listen_ports("/proc/net/tcp") | _procnet_listen_ports("/proc/net/tcp6")
 
 
+def _procnet_udp_ports(path: str) -> set[int]:
+    ports: set[int] = set()
+    try:
+        with open(path) as fh:
+            next(fh, None)  # header
+            for line in fh:
+                parts = line.split()
+                if len(parts) < 2:
+                    continue
+                local = parts[1]                # HEX_ADDR:HEX_PORT
+                port = int(local.rsplit(":", 1)[1], 16)
+                if port:
+                    ports.add(port)
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        pass
+    return ports
+
+
+def procnet_udp_ports() -> set[int]:
+    return _procnet_udp_ports("/proc/net/udp") | _procnet_udp_ports("/proc/net/udp6")
+
+
 def ss_listen_ports(state: SystemState) -> set[int]:
     ports: set[int] = set()
     for s in state.listening_sockets():
@@ -139,6 +247,17 @@ def ss_listen_ports(state: SystemState) -> set[int]:
     return ports
 
 
+def ss_udp_ports(state: SystemState) -> set[int]:
+    ports: set[int] = set()
+    for s in state.sockets:
+        if s.state not in {"UNCONN", "ESTAB"}:
+            continue
+        tail = s.local.rsplit(":", 1)
+        if len(tail) == 2 and tail[1].isdigit():
+            ports.add(int(tail[1]))
+    return ports
+
+
 def promiscuous_interfaces() -> list[str]:
     out: list[str] = []
     base = "/sys/class/net"
@@ -184,7 +303,9 @@ def run(cfg: Config, state: SystemState | None = None) -> Iterator[Alert]:
             pids=tuple(sorted(confirmed)[:20]),
             sid=SID_HIDDEN_PROC, classtype="rootkit-hidden-process")
 
-    hidden_mods = find_hidden_modules(proc_modules(), sys_live_modules())
+    proc_mods = proc_modules()
+    sys_mods = sys_live_modules()
+    hidden_mods = find_hidden_modules(proc_mods, sys_mods)
     for m in sorted(hidden_mods):
         yield Alert(
             severity=Severity.CRITICAL, signature="rootkit_hidden_module",
@@ -192,6 +313,36 @@ def run(cfg: Config, state: SystemState | None = None) -> Iterator[Alert]:
             detail=f"kernel module live in /sys/module but hidden from /proc/modules: {m}",
             sid=SID_HIDDEN_MODULE, classtype="rootkit-hidden-module")
 
+    all_modules = proc_mods | sys_mods
+    known = find_known_rootkit_modules(all_modules)
+    for m in sorted(known):
+        yield Alert(
+            severity=Severity.CRITICAL, signature="rootkit_known_module",
+            key=f"rk:knownmod:{m}",
+            detail=f"known LKM rootkit module name loaded or visible: {m}",
+            sid=SID_KNOWN_ROOTKIT_MODULE, classtype="rootkit-known-module")
+
+    allowed = {_norm_module(m) for m in getattr(cfg, "rootcheck_module_allow", ())}
+    for m, taint in sorted(module_taints().items()):
+        if _norm_module(m) in allowed or m in known:
+            continue
+        yield Alert(
+            severity=Severity.HIGH, signature="rootkit_tainted_module",
+            key=f"rk:taintmod:{m}",
+            detail=(f"kernel module has taint marker '{taint}' "
+                    f"(out-of-tree/proprietary/unsigned module): {m}"),
+            sid=SID_TAINTED_MODULE, classtype="rootkit-tainted-module")
+
+    kt = kernel_taint()
+    if kt:
+        flags = decode_kernel_taint(kt)
+        yield Alert(
+            severity=taint_severity(kt), signature="kernel_tainted",
+            key=f"rk:ktaint:{kt}",
+            detail=(f"kernel taint value {kt} ({', '.join(flags) or 'unknown'}) — "
+                    "may indicate unsigned/out-of-tree modules, forced loads, or kernel faults"),
+            sid=SID_KERNEL_TAINTED, classtype="kernel-integrity")
+
     hidden_ports = find_hidden_ports(procnet_listen_ports(), ss_listen_ports(state))
     if hidden_ports:
         yield Alert(
@@ -201,6 +352,15 @@ def run(cfg: Config, state: SystemState | None = None) -> Iterator[Alert]:
                     "(tool may be hooked): " + ", ".join(map(str, sorted(hidden_ports)))),
             sid=SID_HIDDEN_PORT, classtype="rootkit-hidden-port")
 
+    hidden_udp = find_hidden_udp_ports(procnet_udp_ports(), ss_udp_ports(state))
+    if hidden_udp:
+        yield Alert(
+            severity=Severity.HIGH, signature="rootkit_hidden_udp_port",
+            key=f"rk:hidudp:{min(hidden_udp)}",
+            detail=("UDP port(s) in /proc/net/udp not reported by ss "
+                    "(tool may be hooked): " + ", ".join(map(str, sorted(hidden_udp)))),
+            sid=SID_HIDDEN_UDP_PORT, classtype="rootkit-hidden-port")
+
     for iface in promiscuous_interfaces():
         yield Alert(
             severity=Severity.MEDIUM, signature="promiscuous_interface",

enodia_sentinel/static/dashboard.html

@@ -40,11 +40,12 @@
   .section-title{display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:space-between;
     padding:13px 14px 8px;color:var(--muted);font-size:11px;letter-spacing:.12em;
     text-transform:uppercase}
-  .metrics{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(4,1fr);gap:10px;margin-bottom:16px}
+  .metrics{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(5,1fr);gap:10px;margin-bottom:16px}
   .metric{background:var(--panel);border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:8px;padding:12px}
   .metric b{display:block;font-size:24px;line-height:1;color:#fff}
   .metric span{display:block;color:var(--muted);font-size:11px;margin-top:8px;text-transform:uppercase}
   .metric.crit b{color:var(--red)} .metric.high b{color:var(--amber)} .metric.med b{color:var(--blue)}
+  .metric.posture b{color:var(--accent)}
   .list{padding:0 8px 14px}
   .item{border:1px solid transparent;border-bottom-color:var(--line);padding:10px;
     cursor:pointer;border-radius:7px;margin-bottom:4px}
@@ -118,10 +119,12 @@
     <div class="tabs">
       <button class="active" data-tab="incident">Incident</button>
       <button data-tab="alerts">Alerts</button>
+      <button data-tab="posture">Posture</button>
       <button data-tab="events">Events</button>
     </div>
     <section id="incidentTab"></section>
     <section id="alertsTab" hidden></section>
+    <section id="postureTab" hidden></section>
     <section id="eventsTab" hidden></section>
   </main>
 
@@ -134,7 +137,7 @@
 <script>
 const TOKEN = new URLSearchParams(location.search).get("token") || "";
 const HDR = TOKEN ? {Authorization:"Bearer "+TOKEN} : {};
-const state = {incidents:[], alerts:[], selected:null, incident:null, plan:null, tab:"incident"};
+const state = {incidents:[], alerts:[], posture:null, selected:null, incident:null, plan:null, tab:"incident"};
 
 async function api(path){
   const r = await fetch(path,{headers:HDR});
@@ -150,10 +153,10 @@ function fmt(t){return (t||"?").replace("T"," ").slice(0,19)}
 
 async function refresh(){
   try{
-    const [status, incidents, alerts, events] = await Promise.all([
+    const [status, incidents, alerts, posture, events] = await Promise.all([
-      api("/api/status"), api("/api/incidents"), api("/api/alerts"), api("/api/events")
+      api("/api/status"), api("/api/incidents"), api("/api/alerts"), api("/api/posture"), api("/api/events")
     ]);
-    state.incidents = incidents; state.alerts = alerts; state.events = events.events || [];
+    state.incidents = incidents; state.alerts = alerts; state.posture = posture; state.events = events.events || [];
     renderStatus(status); renderLists();
     if(!state.selected && incidents.length) await openIncident(incidents[0].id);
     else if(state.selected) await openIncident(state.selected, false);
@@ -169,9 +172,11 @@ function renderStatus(st){
   document.getElementById("ebpf").textContent = "eBPF "+(st.ebpf || "unknown");
   const counts = st.counts || {};
   const metrics = document.getElementById("metrics"); metrics.innerHTML = "";
-  [["CRITICAL","crit"],["HIGH","high"],["MEDIUM","med"],["TOTAL",""]].forEach(([k,c])=>{
+  [["CRITICAL","crit"],["HIGH","high"],["MEDIUM","med"],["TOTAL",""],["POSTURE","posture"]].forEach(([k,c])=>{
-    const m=el("div","metric "+c); m.append(el("b",null,String(k==="TOTAL" ? st.total_alerts||0 : counts[k]||0)));
+    const value = k==="TOTAL" ? st.total_alerts||0 : k==="POSTURE" ? state.posture?.count||0 : counts[k]||0;
-    m.append(el("span",null,k==="TOTAL" ? "alerts" : k)); metrics.append(m);
+    const label = k==="TOTAL" ? "alerts" : k==="POSTURE" ? "findings" : k;
+    const m=el("div","metric "+c); m.append(el("b",null,String(value)));
+    m.append(el("span",null,label)); metrics.append(m);
   });
 }
 
@@ -212,7 +217,8 @@ async function openIncident(id, mark=true){
 async function openAlert(name){
   state.tab = "alerts"; setTabButtons();
   const box = document.getElementById("alertsTab");
-  box.hidden = false; document.getElementById("incidentTab").hidden = true; document.getElementById("eventsTab").hidden = true;
+  box.hidden = false; document.getElementById("incidentTab").hidden = true;
+  document.getElementById("postureTab").hidden = true; document.getElementById("eventsTab").hidden = true;
   box.innerHTML='<div class="empty">loading snapshot</div>';
   try{
     const a = await api("/api/alerts/"+encodeURIComponent(name));
@@ -261,8 +267,10 @@ function renderTab(){
   setTabButtons();
   document.getElementById("incidentTab").hidden = state.tab !== "incident";
   document.getElementById("alertsTab").hidden = state.tab !== "alerts";
+  document.getElementById("postureTab").hidden = state.tab !== "posture";
   document.getElementById("eventsTab").hidden = state.tab !== "events";
   if(state.tab === "incident") renderIncident();
+  if(state.tab === "posture") renderPosture();
   if(state.tab === "events") renderEvents();
 }
 function setTabButtons(){
@@ -273,8 +281,37 @@ function renderEvents(){
   box.innerHTML = '<div class="card"><h3>Event tail</h3><pre></pre></div>';
   box.querySelector("pre").textContent = (state.events||[]).join("\n") || "No events.";
 }
+function renderPosture(){
+  const box = document.getElementById("postureTab");
+  const report = state.posture || {findings:[], counts:{}};
+  box.innerHTML = "";
+  const summary = el("div","card");
+  summary.append(el("h2",null,"Host posture"));
+  const counts = report.counts || {};
+  summary.append(tags([
+    "critical "+(counts.CRITICAL||0),
+    "high "+(counts.HIGH||0),
+    "medium "+(counts.MEDIUM||0)
+  ]));
+  if(!report.findings || !report.findings.length){
+    summary.append(el("div","fine","No SSH, sudo, PATH, sensitive-file, or package-signature posture findings."));
+    box.append(summary);
+    return;
+  }
+  summary.append(el("div","fine",String(report.count)+" advisory finding(s). These are read-only hygiene checks, not live containment actions."));
+  box.append(summary);
+  report.findings.forEach(f=>{
+    const row = el("div","card");
+    const top = el("div","top"); top.append(sev(f.severity)); top.append(el("span","id",f.signature));
+    row.append(top);
+    row.append(tags(["sid "+(f.sid||0), f.classtype||"host-posture"]));
+    row.append(el("code","cmd",f.detail || ""));
+    box.append(row);
+  });
+}
 function showError(msg){
   document.getElementById("incidentTab").innerHTML = '<div class="err">'+msg+'</div>';
+  document.getElementById("postureTab").innerHTML = '<div class="err">'+msg+'</div>';
   document.getElementById("plan").innerHTML = '<div class="err">'+msg+'</div>';
 }
 document.querySelectorAll(".tabs button").forEach(b=>b.onclick=()=>{state.tab=b.dataset.tab; renderTab();});

enodia_sentinel/web.py

@@ -252,6 +252,23 @@ def response_plan(cfg: Config, incident_id: str) -> dict | None:
     return respond.build_plan(bundle, cfg)
 
 
+def posture_report(cfg: Config, runner=None) -> dict:
+    """Return advisory host posture findings for the management console."""
+    if runner is None:
+        from . import posture
+        runner = posture.run
+    findings = sorted(runner(cfg), key=lambda a: (-a.severity, a.signature))
+    counts: dict[str, int] = {}
+    for f in findings:
+        sev = str(f.severity)
+        counts[sev] = counts.get(sev, 0) + 1
+    return {
+        "count": len(findings),
+        "counts": counts,
+        "findings": [f.to_dict() for f in findings],
+    }
+
+
 # --- HTTP layer ------------------------------------------------------------
 
 class _Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
@@ -299,6 +316,8 @@ class _Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                        200 if alert else 404)
         elif path == "/api/events":
             self._json({"events": tail_events(cfg)})
+        elif path == "/api/posture":
+            self._json(posture_report(cfg))
         elif path == "/api/incidents":
             self._json(list_incidents(cfg))
         elif path.startswith("/api/incidents/"):

tests/test_rootcheck.py

@@ -28,6 +28,21 @@ class TestDiffCores(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(
             rootcheck.find_hidden_ports({22, 80, 31337}, {22, 80}), {31337})
 
+    def test_hidden_udp_ports_in_procnet_not_in_ss(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            rootcheck.find_hidden_udp_ports({53, 5353, 4444}, {53, 5353}), {4444})
+
+    def test_known_rootkit_module_names_normalized(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            rootcheck.find_known_rootkit_modules({"ext4", "diamorphine", "adore-ng"}),
+            {"diamorphine", "adore-ng"})
+
+    def test_kernel_taint_decoding_and_severity(self):
+        value = (1 << 12) | (1 << 13)
+        self.assertEqual(rootcheck.decode_kernel_taint(value),
+                         ["out-of-tree-module", "unsigned-module"])
+        self.assertEqual(rootcheck.taint_severity(value), Severity.HIGH)
+
 
 class TestSsPortsFromState(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_extracts_listening_ports_from_injected_state(self):
@@ -38,6 +53,15 @@ class TestSsPortsFromState(unittest.TestCase):
         state = SystemState(sockets=socks)
         self.assertEqual(rootcheck.ss_listen_ports(state), {22, 631})
 
+    def test_extracts_udp_ports_from_injected_state(self):
+        socks = [
+            Socket("UNCONN", "0.0.0.0:53", "0.0.0.0:0", 10, "dnsmasq", 1),
+            Socket("ESTAB", "127.0.0.1:5353", "127.0.0.1:1", 11, "mdns", 2),
+            Socket("LISTEN", "0.0.0.0:22", "0.0.0.0:0", 12, "sshd", 3),
+        ]
+        state = SystemState(sockets=socks)
+        self.assertEqual(rootcheck.ss_udp_ports(state), {53, 5353})
+
 
 class TestRunIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
     """Drive run() with every system view monkeypatched to a known state."""
@@ -47,7 +71,8 @@ class TestRunIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
         self._saved = {}
         for name in ("proc_pids", "alive_pids", "proc_modules",
                      "sys_live_modules", "procnet_listen_ports",
-                     "promiscuous_interfaces"):
+                     "procnet_udp_ports", "promiscuous_interfaces", "module_taints",
+                     "kernel_taint"):
             self._saved[name] = getattr(rootcheck, name)
 
     def tearDown(self):
@@ -60,7 +85,10 @@ class TestRunIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
         rootcheck.proc_modules = lambda: views.get("proc_modules", set())
         rootcheck.sys_live_modules = lambda: views.get("sys_live_modules", set())
         rootcheck.procnet_listen_ports = lambda: views.get("procnet_ports", set())
+        rootcheck.procnet_udp_ports = lambda: views.get("procnet_udp_ports", set())
         rootcheck.promiscuous_interfaces = lambda: views.get("promisc", [])
+        rootcheck.module_taints = lambda: views.get("module_taints", {})
+        rootcheck.kernel_taint = lambda: views.get("kernel_taint", 0)
 
     def test_clean_system_yields_nothing(self):
         self._patch(proc_pids={1, 2}, alive_pids={1, 2},
@@ -72,18 +100,47 @@ class TestRunIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
         self._patch(
             proc_pids={1}, alive_pids={1},
             proc_modules={"ext4"}, sys_live_modules={"ext4", "diamorphine"},
-            procnet_ports={22, 31337}, promisc=["eth0"])
+            procnet_ports={22, 31337}, procnet_udp_ports={53, 4444},
+            promisc=["eth0"])
         state = SystemState(sockets=[
-            Socket("LISTEN", "0.0.0.0:22", "0.0.0.0:0", 10, "sshd", 1)])
+            Socket("LISTEN", "0.0.0.0:22", "0.0.0.0:0", 10, "sshd", 1),
+            Socket("UNCONN", "0.0.0.0:53", "0.0.0.0:0", 11, "dnsmasq", 2),
+        ])
         alerts = {a.signature: a for a in rootcheck.run(self.cfg, state)}
         self.assertIn("rootkit_hidden_module", alerts)
         self.assertEqual(alerts["rootkit_hidden_module"].severity, Severity.CRITICAL)
         self.assertIn("diamorphine", alerts["rootkit_hidden_module"].detail)
+        self.assertIn("rootkit_known_module", alerts)
         self.assertIn("rootkit_hidden_port", alerts)
         self.assertIn("31337", alerts["rootkit_hidden_port"].detail)
+        self.assertIn("rootkit_hidden_udp_port", alerts)
+        self.assertIn("4444", alerts["rootkit_hidden_udp_port"].detail)
         self.assertIn("promiscuous_interface", alerts)
         self.assertEqual(alerts["promiscuous_interface"].sid, rootcheck.SID_PROMISC)
 
+    def test_tainted_module_and_kernel_taint(self):
+        self._patch(
+            proc_pids={1}, alive_pids={1},
+            proc_modules={"ext4", "vendor_gpu"},
+            sys_live_modules={"ext4", "vendor_gpu"},
+            module_taints={"vendor_gpu": "OE"},
+            kernel_taint=(1 << 12) | (1 << 13))
+        alerts = {a.signature: a for a in rootcheck.run(self.cfg, SystemState(sockets=[]))}
+        self.assertIn("rootkit_tainted_module", alerts)
+        self.assertEqual(alerts["rootkit_tainted_module"].sid,
+                         rootcheck.SID_TAINTED_MODULE)
+        self.assertIn("kernel_tainted", alerts)
+        self.assertEqual(alerts["kernel_tainted"].severity, Severity.HIGH)
+
+    def test_module_allowlist_suppresses_tainted_module(self):
+        self.cfg.rootcheck_module_allow = ("vendor_gpu",)
+        self._patch(
+            proc_pids={1}, alive_pids={1},
+            proc_modules={"vendor_gpu"}, sys_live_modules={"vendor_gpu"},
+            module_taints={"vendor_gpu": "OE"})
+        alerts = {a.signature: a for a in rootcheck.run(self.cfg, SystemState(sockets=[]))}
+        self.assertNotIn("rootkit_tainted_module", alerts)
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/test_web.py

@@ -82,6 +82,20 @@ class TestDataLayer(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(plan["incident_id"], iid)
         self.assertEqual(plan["mode"], "dry-run")
 
+    def test_posture_report_shape(self):
+        def runner(_cfg):
+            yield Alert(Severity.HIGH, "ssh_root_login", "k",
+                        "root SSH login enabled", sid=100040,
+                        classtype="host-posture")
+            yield Alert(Severity.MEDIUM, "sudo_nopasswd", "k2",
+                        "passwordless sudo", sid=100043,
+                        classtype="host-posture")
+
+        report = web.posture_report(self.cfg, runner=runner)
+        self.assertEqual(report["count"], 2)
+        self.assertEqual(report["counts"], {"HIGH": 1, "MEDIUM": 1})
+        self.assertEqual(report["findings"][0]["signature"], "ssh_root_login")
+
 
 class TestNetworkHelpers(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_is_loopback(self):
@@ -153,6 +167,12 @@ class TestAuth(unittest.TestCase):
         resp = self._get("/api/alerts?token=secret-token")
         self.assertEqual(resp.status, 200)
 
+    def test_posture_endpoint(self):
+        resp = self._get("/api/posture", token="secret-token")
+        data = json.loads(resp.read())
+        self.assertIn("findings", data)
+        self.assertIn("count", data)
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()