Expand monitoring for credential theft and covert protocols

This commit is contained in:
Luna 2026-06-13 03:30:36 -07:00
parent 3e5f8fc3f7
commit cb334c0c94
17 changed files with 675 additions and 25 deletions

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@ -54,10 +54,24 @@ Start with:
- `respond.py` builds read-only response plans from incident evidence.
- `web.py` serves the HTTPS-only management console and JSON APIs.
- `rootcheck.py` performs anti-rootkit cross-view checks:
hidden processes, hidden modules, hidden TCP/UDP ports, promiscuous
interfaces, known LKM rootkit module names, and kernel/module taint.
hidden processes, hidden modules, hidden TCP/UDP/raw/special-protocol sockets,
raw ICMP/SCTP-style channels, promiscuous interfaces, known LKM rootkit module
names, and kernel/module taint.
- `posture.py` performs advisory host hygiene checks.
## Current Threat Mapping
Recent local sample families used for defensive coverage:
- Gonzalo-style implant/rootkit behavior: direct input-event keylogging,
credential harvesting, LD_PRELOAD/tool tampering, persistence writes, raw ICMP
and SCTP-style knock/listener paths, deleted/fileless execution, and hidden
sockets/modules.
- Peopleswar-style C2 behavior: TLS C2 listener/check-in traffic, command queue
responses, and API/listener ports. Sentinel should prefer behavior coverage
(`new_listener`, `egress`, `stealth_network`, rootcheck, credential/input
detectors) over brittle sample-name matching unless adding explicit IOCs.
## Development Commands
```bash
@ -100,4 +114,3 @@ When changing behavior, update the relevant set:
- `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md` for trust-boundary/security-model changes.
- `docs/ROADMAP.md` for planned or completed roadmap movement.
- `config/enodia-sentinel.toml` for config knobs.