Expand monitoring for credential theft and covert protocols
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CLAUDE.md
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CLAUDE.md
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@ -54,10 +54,24 @@ Start with:
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- `respond.py` builds read-only response plans from incident evidence.
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- `web.py` serves the HTTPS-only management console and JSON APIs.
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- `rootcheck.py` performs anti-rootkit cross-view checks:
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hidden processes, hidden modules, hidden TCP/UDP ports, promiscuous
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interfaces, known LKM rootkit module names, and kernel/module taint.
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hidden processes, hidden modules, hidden TCP/UDP/raw/special-protocol sockets,
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raw ICMP/SCTP-style channels, promiscuous interfaces, known LKM rootkit module
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names, and kernel/module taint.
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- `posture.py` performs advisory host hygiene checks.
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## Current Threat Mapping
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Recent local sample families used for defensive coverage:
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- Gonzalo-style implant/rootkit behavior: direct input-event keylogging,
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credential harvesting, LD_PRELOAD/tool tampering, persistence writes, raw ICMP
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and SCTP-style knock/listener paths, deleted/fileless execution, and hidden
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sockets/modules.
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- Peopleswar-style C2 behavior: TLS C2 listener/check-in traffic, command queue
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responses, and API/listener ports. Sentinel should prefer behavior coverage
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(`new_listener`, `egress`, `stealth_network`, rootcheck, credential/input
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detectors) over brittle sample-name matching unless adding explicit IOCs.
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## Development Commands
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```bash
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@ -100,4 +114,3 @@ When changing behavior, update the relevant set:
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- `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md` for trust-boundary/security-model changes.
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- `docs/ROADMAP.md` for planned or completed roadmap movement.
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- `config/enodia-sentinel.toml` for config knobs.
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