feat(go): add bounded hot-path enrichment

go-agent/internal/enrich/enrich.go

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+// Package enrich builds bounded, no-I/O post-alert context from data already
+// captured for a snapshot. Filesystem hashing, package ownership, and integrity
+// collectors are intentionally excluded from this hot-path stage.
+package enrich
+
+import (
+	"regexp"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/netutil"
+)
+
+const (
+	maxAlerts     = 128
+	maxProcesses  = 64
+	maxIndicators = 128
+)
+
+var (
+	ipv4Pattern = regexp.MustCompile(`(?:[0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}`)
+	pathPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`/[^\s,\])]+`)
+)
+
+type Process struct {
+	PID      int
+	Comm     string
+	Exe      string
+	PPID     int
+	PPIDComm string
+}
+
+// Build returns the stable Python enrichment keys without invoking any slow
+// collectors. Input and indicator caps keep attacker-controlled details from
+// causing unbounded snapshot work or output.
+func Build(alerts []model.Alert, processes []Process, lineage []int) map[string]any {
+	return map[string]any{
+		"source":        "enodia-sentinel-go",
+		"processes":     processContext(processes),
+		"remotes":       remoteContext(alerts),
+		"files":         fileCandidates(alerts),
+		"recent_writes": []string{},
+		"lineage":       lineageContext(processes, lineage),
+		"integrity":     map[string]any{},
+	}
+}
+
+func processContext(processes []Process) []map[string]any {
+	if len(processes) > maxProcesses {
+		processes = processes[:maxProcesses]
+	}
+	result := make([]map[string]any, 0, len(processes))
+	for _, process := range processes {
+		chain := []map[string]any{}
+		if process.PPID > 0 {
+			chain = append(chain, map[string]any{
+				"pid": process.PPID, "comm": process.PPIDComm, "ppid": 0,
+			})
+		}
+		result = append(result, map[string]any{
+			"pid": process.PID, "comm": process.Comm,
+			"exe": cleanPath(process.Exe), "package_owner": nil,
+			"exe_sha256": nil, "parent_chain": chain,
+		})
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func remoteContext(alerts []model.Alert) []map[string]any {
+	values := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, alert := range cappedAlerts(alerts) {
+		for _, value := range ipv4Pattern.FindAllString(alert.Detail, -1) {
+			if len(values) >= maxIndicators {
+				break
+			}
+			values[value] = true
+		}
+	}
+	keys := sortedKeys(values)
+	result := make([]map[string]any, 0, len(keys))
+	for _, value := range keys {
+		classification := "reserved"
+		address, ok := netutil.ParseAddr(value)
+		if !ok {
+			classification = "invalid"
+		} else if netutil.IsPublicIP(value) {
+			classification = "public"
+		} else if address.IsLoopback() {
+			classification = "loopback"
+		} else if address.IsPrivate() {
+			classification = "private"
+		} else if address.IsLinkLocalUnicast() {
+			classification = "link-local"
+		}
+		result = append(result, map[string]any{"ip": value, "classification": classification})
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func fileCandidates(alerts []model.Alert) []map[string]any {
+	values := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, alert := range cappedAlerts(alerts) {
+		for _, text := range []string{alert.Detail, alert.Key} {
+			for _, value := range pathPattern.FindAllString(text, -1) {
+				if len(values) >= maxIndicators {
+					break
+				}
+				values[cleanPath(strings.TrimSuffix(value, ":"))] = true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	keys := sortedKeys(values)
+	result := make([]map[string]any, 0, len(keys))
+	for _, value := range keys {
+		// Existence/ownership is unknown until the deferred collector runs.
+		result = append(result, map[string]any{
+			"path": value, "exists": nil, "mode": nil, "uid": nil,
+			"gid": nil, "package_owner": nil,
+		})
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func lineageContext(processes []Process, lineage []int) []map[string]any {
+	known := map[int]string{}
+	for _, process := range processes {
+		known[process.PID] = process.Comm
+		if process.PPID > 0 && known[process.PPID] == "" {
+			known[process.PPID] = process.PPIDComm
+		}
+	}
+	values := append([]int(nil), lineage...)
+	sort.Ints(values)
+	if len(values) > maxProcesses*4 {
+		values = values[:maxProcesses*4]
+	}
+	result := make([]map[string]any, 0, len(values))
+	for _, pid := range values {
+		comm, present := known[pid]
+		result = append(result, map[string]any{"pid": pid, "comm": comm, "present": present})
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func cappedAlerts(alerts []model.Alert) []model.Alert {
+	if len(alerts) > maxAlerts {
+		return alerts[:maxAlerts]
+	}
+	return alerts
+}
+
+func sortedKeys(values map[string]bool) []string {
+	result := make([]string, 0, len(values))
+	for value := range values {
+		if value != "" {
+			result = append(result, value)
+		}
+	}
+	sort.Strings(result)
+	return result
+}
+
+func cleanPath(value string) string { return strings.ReplaceAll(value, " (deleted)", "") }

go-agent/internal/enrich/enrich_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package enrich
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
+)
+
+func TestBuildAddsBoundedProcessRemotePathAndLineageContext(t *testing.T) {
+	result := Build([]model.Alert{{
+		SID: 100010, Signature: "reverse_shell", Key: "persist:/etc/cron.d/dropper",
+		Detail: "pid=42 peer=[8.8.8.8:4444] wrote /tmp/dropper (deleted)",
+	}}, []Process{{PID: 42, Comm: "bash", Exe: "/tmp/dropper (deleted)", PPID: 10, PPIDComm: "nginx"}}, []int{42, 10})
+	processes := result["processes"].([]map[string]any)
+	if len(processes) != 1 || processes[0]["exe"] != "/tmp/dropper" ||
+		processes[0]["package_owner"] != nil || processes[0]["exe_sha256"] != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("processes=%#v", processes)
+	}
+	chain := processes[0]["parent_chain"].([]map[string]any)
+	if len(chain) != 1 || chain[0]["pid"] != 10 || chain[0]["comm"] != "nginx" {
+		t.Fatalf("chain=%#v", chain)
+	}
+	remotes := result["remotes"].([]map[string]any)
+	if len(remotes) != 1 || remotes[0]["ip"] != "8.8.8.8" || remotes[0]["classification"] != "public" {
+		t.Fatalf("remotes=%#v", remotes)
+	}
+	files := result["files"].([]map[string]any)
+	if len(files) != 2 || files[0]["path"] != "/etc/cron.d/dropper" || files[1]["path"] != "/tmp/dropper" {
+		t.Fatalf("files=%#v", files)
+	}
+	lineage := result["lineage"].([]map[string]any)
+	if len(lineage) != 2 || lineage[0]["pid"] != 10 || lineage[0]["comm"] != "nginx" {
+		t.Fatalf("lineage=%#v", lineage)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuildClassifiesPrivateAndInvalidAddresses(t *testing.T) {
+	result := Build([]model.Alert{{Detail: "peers 10.1.2.3 and 999.1.2.3"}}, nil, nil)
+	remotes := result["remotes"].([]map[string]any)
+	if len(remotes) != 2 || remotes[0]["classification"] != "private" || remotes[1]["classification"] != "invalid" {
+		t.Fatalf("remotes=%#v", remotes)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuildCapsAttackerControlledIndicators(t *testing.T) {
+	alerts := make([]model.Alert, 300)
+	for index := range alerts {
+		alerts[index].Detail = "/tmp/path " + "1.2.3.4"
+	}
+	result := Build(alerts, nil, nil)
+	if len(result["remotes"].([]map[string]any)) > maxIndicators || len(result["files"].([]map[string]any)) > maxIndicators {
+		t.Fatal("indicator caps were not applied")
+	}
+}