The tray applet shipped with a .desktop file but the GUI dashboards had
none, so desktop users had no menu entry for them.
Unlike the tray entry, these carry no autostart key: a dashboard window
should open when the operator asks for it, not at login. Tests assert the
Exec names match the pyproject console scripts and that neither entry can
regain an autostart key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JX86xeoBJVBb16qHkDf53K
The GUI frontends landed with README/CLI/operations docs but no packaging
coverage. Add a PACKAGING.md section with the command/script/requirement
table for both frontends, note why stdlib tkinter is still an optdepend
rather than a hard dependency, and record that packaging must not grant the
GUIs privileges beyond the operator's own account.
Add the matching PKGBUILD optdepends (`tk`, `pyside6`), plus
`python-pystray`/`python-pillow` for the tray applet, which were never
listed when it shipped. Also add `gui/` to the CLAUDE.md architecture notes
and state snapshot.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JX86xeoBJVBb16qHkDf53K
Answers two hard questions: "what guards the hashes FIM trusts?" and "how do we
make the sensor itself hard to silently disable?" — within the honest limit that
a root attacker who shares your privileges can't be fully stopped on-box, only
made loud.
- pkgdb.py: guards the package DB that `pacman -Qkk` trusts. Anchors a
fingerprint of /var/lib/pacman/local (refreshed ONLY by the pacman hook) and
cross-checks pacman.log; a DB change with no logged transaction is flagged
pkgdb_tamper (CRITICAL, sid 100021) — catches an attacker rewriting a stored
checksum to mask a modified binary. Verified end-to-end against a simulated
hash-overwrite.
- selfprotect.py: Sentinel's own binaries/config/units/hook are always in the
FIM watch set (self-integrity); a heartbeat is written each loop; an external
`watchdog` command polls a remote dashboard and pushes if the sensor goes
silent or unreachable — silence becomes the alarm.
- daemon: heartbeat + slow-cadence pkgdb check; DB anchor re-anchored in
build_fim_baseline so the pacman hook refreshes it after each transaction
- web: /api/status now reports heartbeat_age/stale; dashboard shows it
- cli: pkgdb-check, watchdog (--url/--token/--max-age, bypasses min-severity)
- config: pkgdb_verify/_interval, heartbeat_max_age
- README: threat model (trust-anchor problem) + hardening layers (immutability,
signed-package + external anchor); reframes "anti-rootkit" as tamper-evidence
- tests: +8 (DB fingerprint, anchor/transaction logic, pacman.log parse,
heartbeat + watchdog verdicts). 80/80 pass
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Detects binary/config tampering by content hash — catching a malicious swap
even when mtime is preserved (the gap in mtime-based persistence checks). Two
engines split by file ownership:
- fim.py hash baseline: SHA-256 (+ mode/uid/gid/size) of security-critical
files the package manager doesn't track (/usr/local, /etc configs, systemd
units, SSH keys). The baseline refreshes ONLY via fim-update / the pacman
hook, so a flagged change stays flagged until acknowledged (Tripwire
semantics). Alerts: fim_modified 100017 / fim_added 100018 / fim_removed 100019.
- package verification: `pacman -Qkk` checks package-owned binaries against the
distro's own signed checksums — no baseline to maintain, implicitly current
because the package DB updates on every upgrade. fim_pkg_modified 100020.
Auto-update on system updates: a pacman PostTransaction hook runs
`enodia-sentinel fim-update` after every install/upgrade/remove, so legitimate
package changes never alert — no manual `tripwire --update`.
- daemon: backgrounded FIM scan + optional pkg-verify on slow cadences, feeding
the normal alert/snapshot/push pipeline; baseline loaded/built at startup
- cli: fim-baseline / fim-update / fim-check [--packages]
- config: fim_enabled, fim_paths, fim_scan_interval, fim_pkg_verify[_interval]
- packaging: ship + install the pacman hook (Makefile + PKGBUILD)
- tests: +7 (hashing, diff incl. mtime-preserving tamper, pacman -Qkk parse).
72/72 pass. Verified end-to-end: a content swap with preserved mtime is caught.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both zero-dependency (stdlib http.server + urllib), consistent with the
project's no-dependency-tree stance for a security daemon.
Web dashboard (enodia_sentinel/web.py + static/dashboard.html):
- read-only JSON API over the log dir: /api/status, /api/alerts,
/api/alerts/<id>, /api/events
- bearer-token auth (constant-time; header or ?token=), required on non-
loopback binds, auto-generated + persisted (0600) when unset
- binds the host's Tailscale IP by default (auto-detected), reachable from the
tailnet but not the LAN/internet
- self-contained dark SPA: severity cards, live alert list, full snapshot
viewer; 10s auto-refresh
- path-traversal-safe alert lookup; `enodia-sentinel web` subcommand; daemon
now writes a pidfile so the dashboard can show live status
- hardened enodia-sentinel-web.service (read-only, no caps)
Phone push (enodia_sentinel/notify/):
- pluggable backends — ntfy, Pushover, generic webhook — each separating a pure
build() (unit-tested, no network) from send()
- a backend turns on when its config keys are set; pushes gated by
notify_min_severity; severity → per-service priority/tags
- fired from snapshot.capture on worker threads, errors swallowed
- desktop notify-send retained
Tests: +16 (9 web incl. a real-server 401/200 auth test, 7 notify request-build
cases). 55/55 pass. Live end-to-end verified: daemon → alert → API → page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes polling's blind spot (processes that exit between sweeps) with a real
eBPF probe and a declarative, data-driven detection engine — inspired by Snort
(rule language, signature IDs) and OSSEC (host-IDS framing).
New events/ subpackage:
- bcc_source.py : eBPF C tracing execve (filename, argv[1..2], ppid, uid,
parent comm) over a perf buffer, loaded via bcc; lazy import
+ available()/try-except so it fails closed to poll-only when
bcc/root/BTF are absent — a broken probe never downs the daemon
- exec_event.py : the ExecEvent type
- rules.py : ExecRule (sid/msg/severity/classtype + path/exec/parent/argv
conditions) and ExecRuleEngine; 4 shipped rules (fileless exec
100001, reverse-shell argv 100002, web/DB→shell RCE 100003,
curl|sh 100004); operators add more via exec_rules_file TOML
- monitor.py : runs the source on a thread, routes events through the engine
Integration:
- daemon starts the monitor, shares a lock-guarded cooldown with the sweep
loop, and feeds event alerts into the same snapshot pipeline
- Alert gains Snort-style sid + classtype; retrofitted onto all 7 poll
detectors; snapshots and JSON now carry them
- config: ebpf_exec_monitor (default on, degrades), exec_rules_file
- systemd: opt-in ebpf.conf drop-in (relaxes MemoryDenyWriteExecute + widens
caps for bcc's JIT) so the base unit stays hardened for poll-only
- sentinel-redteam: ebpf_exec drill (short-lived /tmp exec + /dev/tcp argv the
poller can't see); footer now uses the Python CLI
Tests: +14 cases for the rule engine (each default rule match/non-match, rule
validation, parent-exclude). 39/39 pass. Graceful non-root degradation verified.
NOTE: the eBPF C follows bcc's execsnoop pattern but could not be run here
(BPF needs root); it wants a root smoke-test on a real host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace MIT with the full GNU GPLv3 text, update license metadata in
pyproject.toml (+ trove classifiers) and PKGBUILD, and add
SPDX-License-Identifier headers to all Python modules and shell scripts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Port the bash prototype to a structured, testable Python codebase while
preserving the same control loop and the seven detection signatures. The bash
implementation stays in src/ as the regression oracle.
Highlights:
- enodia_sentinel/ package (stdlib only — no runtime deps):
- detectors/ : one pure function per signature, detect(state, cfg)->Alerts
- system.py : SystemState — one cached /proc + ss snapshot per sweep,
fully injectable so detectors are unit-testable
- daemon.py : sweep loop, in-process cooldown dedup, threaded snapshot
capture, and a SUID filesystem scan moved OFF the loop
thread onto a slow background cadence
- snapshot.py: forensic text + JSON sidecar with per-signature IR guidance
- config.py : dataclass config via TOML + env overrides
- netutil.py : public-IP / CIDR logic via stdlib ipaddress
- tests/ : 25 stdlib-unittest cases (no root, no /proc, no ss needed)
- TOML config, launcher wrapper, Makefile (pip-free install), hardened
systemd unit (env-resolved ExecStart), updated PKGBUILD, rewritten README
Performance: per-sweep cost ~200 ms (shared cached state); the multi-second
SUID walk no longer blocks detection. scandir-based walk replaces os.walk.
Verified on Arch: all 7 detectors fire on red-team drills (reverse_shell,
ld_preload, deleted_exe, new_listener, new_suid confirmed live end-to-end),
no false positives on a clean sweep, 25/25 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Poll-based host intrusion-detection daemon modeled on freeze-watcher's
sample→trigger→snapshot→classify loop, with security signatures instead
of performance ones:
- reverse_shell (interpreter with a network socket on stdio)
- ld_preload (/etc/ld.so.preload or LD_PRELOAD in writable dirs)
- deleted_exe (process running from a deleted/memfd binary)
- new_listener (listening port absent from startup baseline)
- new_suid (new SUID/SGID binary; critical in writable dirs)
- persistence (cron/systemd/authorized_keys/rc-file changes)
- suspicious_egress (interpreter holding an outbound public connection)
Each capture writes a forensic snapshot with per-signature incident-
response guidance. Includes a safe, self-cleaning red-team harness
(sentinel-redteam), hardened systemd unit, config, Makefile, and Arch
packaging.
Tested on Arch: detectors fire on drills, no false positives on a clean
sweep, sweep cost optimized from ~15s to ~1s via batched syscalls and a
gated filesystem-wide SUID scan.
This bash implementation is retained as the regression oracle for the
forthcoming Python rewrite.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
