Collapse related alerts into one incident, process-lineage first with a
time-window fallback. Each alert batch's flagged PIDs are walked up the
/proc PPid chain into a lineage set (excluding pid 0/1 so everything
doesn't correlate through init); batches whose lineage sets intersect —
sharing a process or a common ancestor like the web server or SSH
session — join the same incident. PID-less batches (FIM drift, package
tamper, hidden modules) fall back to the most recently active open
incident within incident_window.
snapshot.capture now computes lineage and records each snapshot into a
JSON incident index (incidents.json), writing incident_id into both the
report JSON (report level, so the per-alert schema is untouched) and the
text header. New commands:
incident list incidents newest-first, with signatures
incident show <id> summary + time-ordered snapshot timeline
incident export <id> JSON bundle: record + inlined snapshots
The lineage/assign cores are pure functions; record() serializes the
index under a lock (capture runs from sweep + eBPF threads) and is
best-effort so an index problem never loses a snapshot. 17 new tests
(lineage, assign, record, and an end-to-end capture→group→CLI path).
Config: incident_tracking / incident_window / incident_lineage_depth.
Docs + sample config updated; closes the last v0.8 roadmap item.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Red-team harness: every detector now has a named drill with an expected
signature/sid, shown by `sentinel-redteam --list`. Add the missing
`egress` drill (the one detector without one) — explicit-only, since it
is the sole drill that emits real outbound traffic. After firing, the
harness runs `enodia-sentinel check` and reports PASS/MISS per poll
detection, turning it into a shared regression check.
Add docs/RUNBOOKS.md: confirm/preserve/contain/recover playbooks for
reverse shells & egress, persistence, trojaned binaries / package
tampering, hidden listeners & rootkits, and sensor tampering — each tied
to the real signatures, sids, and commands. Linked from README and the
OPERATIONS alert workflow.
Both close the remaining smaller v0.8 roadmap items.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add `enodia-sentinel status [--json]` — a local health and alert
summary: daemon running state, heartbeat freshness, per-severity alert
counts, last alert time, and eBPF state. Reuses web.daemon_status (the
same data behind /api/status), so the CLI and dashboard never diverge.
Exit code reflects health (0 = running and fresh, 1 = down or stale), so
it doubles as a cron/monitoring probe. Three CLI tests drive it against a
temp log_dir; no daemon or root needed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add `enodia-sentinel posture check` — a config-hygiene audit that finds
the conditions making a host easy to attack, complementing the live
detectors. Checks: SSH root/password/empty-password login (Include-aware,
first-wins sshd resolution), passwordless and group/world-writable
sudoers, world-writable or non-root PATH directories, loose permissions
on sensitive files (/etc/shadow, /etc/passwd, ...), and downgraded
package-signature policy (reusing pkgdb.siglevel_alert).
Findings reuse the Alert type, so they serialize through the existing
JSON/triage pipeline (`posture check --json`). Each check is a pure
evaluator over injected content/stat facts plus a thin system reader, so
the 18 new tests need no root or live /etc. Posture is command-driven and
never runs in the daemon loop, per the v0.8 exit criterion.
SIDs 100040-100047 (classtype host-posture). Sample config and docs
(COMMAND_REFERENCE, OPERATIONS, ROADMAP, SPECIFICATION) updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add docs/ (SPECIFICATION, ROADMAP, OPERATIONS, COMMAND_REFERENCE,
THREAT_MODEL) describing the current v0.7 agent and the phased path from
local HIDS to a host security platform. Reframe README, package metadata,
and CLI/module descriptions from "intrusion-detection daemon" to "Linux
host security platform", and surface the v0.7 signed-package verify
(pkgdb_pkgverify*) and anti-rootkit (rootcheck_*) knobs in the sample
config. Also wrap the pacman.conf read in pkgdb.siglevel_alert in a
context manager to avoid a leaked file handle.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
