0eb5077551
Closes polling's blind spot (processes that exit between sweeps) with a real
eBPF probe and a declarative, data-driven detection engine — inspired by Snort
(rule language, signature IDs) and OSSEC (host-IDS framing).
New events/ subpackage:
- bcc_source.py : eBPF C tracing execve (filename, argv[1..2], ppid, uid,
parent comm) over a perf buffer, loaded via bcc; lazy import
+ available()/try-except so it fails closed to poll-only when
bcc/root/BTF are absent — a broken probe never downs the daemon
- exec_event.py : the ExecEvent type
- rules.py : ExecRule (sid/msg/severity/classtype + path/exec/parent/argv
conditions) and ExecRuleEngine; 4 shipped rules (fileless exec
100001, reverse-shell argv 100002, web/DB→shell RCE 100003,
curl|sh 100004); operators add more via exec_rules_file TOML
- monitor.py : runs the source on a thread, routes events through the engine
Integration:
- daemon starts the monitor, shares a lock-guarded cooldown with the sweep
loop, and feeds event alerts into the same snapshot pipeline
- Alert gains Snort-style sid + classtype; retrofitted onto all 7 poll
detectors; snapshots and JSON now carry them
- config: ebpf_exec_monitor (default on, degrades), exec_rules_file
- systemd: opt-in ebpf.conf drop-in (relaxes MemoryDenyWriteExecute + widens
caps for bcc's JIT) so the base unit stays hardened for poll-only
- sentinel-redteam: ebpf_exec drill (short-lived /tmp exec + /dev/tcp argv the
poller can't see); footer now uses the Python CLI
Tests: +14 cases for the rule engine (each default rule match/non-match, rule
validation, parent-exclude). 39/39 pass. Graceful non-root degradation verified.
NOTE: the eBPF C follows bcc's execsnoop pattern but could not be run here
(BPF needs root); it wants a root smoke-test on a real host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
31 lines
1 KiB
TOML
31 lines
1 KiB
TOML
[build-system]
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requires = ["setuptools>=61"]
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build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
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[project]
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name = "enodia-sentinel"
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version = "0.3.0"
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description = "Host intrusion-detection daemon — signature-based detection of reverse shells, LD_PRELOAD rootkits, fileless malware, and persistence tampering"
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readme = "README.md"
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requires-python = ">=3.11"
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license = { text = "GPL-3.0-or-later" }
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authors = [{ name = "Enodia" }]
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keywords = ["security", "ids", "hids", "detection", "linux", "forensics"]
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classifiers = [
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"License :: OSI Approved :: GNU General Public License v3 or later (GPLv3+)",
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"Operating System :: POSIX :: Linux",
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"Programming Language :: Python :: 3",
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"Topic :: Security",
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]
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# Zero runtime dependencies — stdlib only, by design (a system security
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# daemon should not pull in a dependency tree it has to trust and update).
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dependencies = []
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[project.scripts]
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enodia-sentinel = "enodia_sentinel.cli:main"
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[project.optional-dependencies]
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dev = ["pytest"]
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[tool.setuptools.packages.find]
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include = ["enodia_sentinel*"]
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