enodia-sentinal/enodia_sentinel/events/bcc_source.py
Luna 0eb5077551 Add event-driven eBPF execve layer with a Snort-style rule engine
Closes polling's blind spot (processes that exit between sweeps) with a real
eBPF probe and a declarative, data-driven detection engine — inspired by Snort
(rule language, signature IDs) and OSSEC (host-IDS framing).

New events/ subpackage:
- bcc_source.py : eBPF C tracing execve (filename, argv[1..2], ppid, uid,
                  parent comm) over a perf buffer, loaded via bcc; lazy import
                  + available()/try-except so it fails closed to poll-only when
                  bcc/root/BTF are absent — a broken probe never downs the daemon
- exec_event.py : the ExecEvent type
- rules.py      : ExecRule (sid/msg/severity/classtype + path/exec/parent/argv
                  conditions) and ExecRuleEngine; 4 shipped rules (fileless exec
                  100001, reverse-shell argv 100002, web/DB→shell RCE 100003,
                  curl|sh 100004); operators add more via exec_rules_file TOML
- monitor.py    : runs the source on a thread, routes events through the engine

Integration:
- daemon starts the monitor, shares a lock-guarded cooldown with the sweep
  loop, and feeds event alerts into the same snapshot pipeline
- Alert gains Snort-style sid + classtype; retrofitted onto all 7 poll
  detectors; snapshots and JSON now carry them
- config: ebpf_exec_monitor (default on, degrades), exec_rules_file
- systemd: opt-in ebpf.conf drop-in (relaxes MemoryDenyWriteExecute + widens
  caps for bcc's JIT) so the base unit stays hardened for poll-only
- sentinel-redteam: ebpf_exec drill (short-lived /tmp exec + /dev/tcp argv the
  poller can't see); footer now uses the Python CLI

Tests: +14 cases for the rule engine (each default rule match/non-match, rule
validation, parent-exclude). 39/39 pass. Graceful non-root degradation verified.

NOTE: the eBPF C follows bcc's execsnoop pattern but could not be run here
(BPF needs root); it wants a root smoke-test on a real host.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-31 07:16:53 -07:00

139 lines
4.4 KiB
Python

# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
"""eBPF execve event source, built on bcc.
Loads a small eBPF program that fires on every ``execve``, capturing the
executed path, the first couple of arguments, the uid, and the parent. Events
are delivered to user space over a perf buffer and decoded into ``ExecEvent``.
This is intentionally fail-safe: if bcc isn't installed, the kernel lacks BPF,
or we aren't root, ``available()`` returns False and the daemon simply runs with
its poll-based detectors. A broken probe must never take the daemon down.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from collections.abc import Callable
from .exec_event import ExecEvent
# eBPF C. bcc rewrites pointer dereferences (e.g. task->real_parent->tgid) into
# bpf_probe_read calls, so this stays close to bcc's own execsnoop example.
_BPF_PROGRAM = r"""
#include <uapi/linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#define ARGLEN 160
struct data_t {
u32 pid;
u32 ppid;
u32 uid;
char parent_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
char filename[ARGLEN];
char arg1[ARGLEN];
char arg2[ARGLEN];
};
BPF_PERF_OUTPUT(events);
int syscall__execve(struct pt_regs *ctx,
const char __user *filename,
const char __user *const __user *__argv,
const char __user *const __user *__envp)
{
struct data_t data = {};
struct task_struct *task = (struct task_struct *)bpf_get_current_task();
data.pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
data.ppid = task->real_parent->tgid;
data.uid = bpf_get_current_uid_gid() & 0xffffffff;
bpf_get_current_comm(&data.parent_comm, sizeof(data.parent_comm));
bpf_probe_read_user_str(&data.filename, sizeof(data.filename), filename);
const char __user *argp = NULL;
bpf_probe_read_user(&argp, sizeof(argp), &__argv[1]);
if (argp)
bpf_probe_read_user_str(&data.arg1, sizeof(data.arg1), argp);
argp = NULL;
bpf_probe_read_user(&argp, sizeof(argp), &__argv[2]);
if (argp)
bpf_probe_read_user_str(&data.arg2, sizeof(data.arg2), argp);
events.perf_submit(ctx, &data, sizeof(data));
return 0;
}
"""
def available() -> tuple[bool, str]:
"""Return (ok, reason). ok=True means the probe can be loaded."""
if os.geteuid() != 0:
return False, "not running as root (BPF requires CAP_BPF/root)"
try:
import bcc # noqa: F401
except ImportError:
return False, "python bcc (python-bpfcc) not installed"
if not os.path.exists("/sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux") and not os.path.isdir(
"/lib/modules/%s/build" % os.uname().release
):
return False, "no kernel BTF or headers for BPF compilation"
return True, "ok"
class BccExecSource:
"""Loads the eBPF probe and pumps decoded ExecEvents to a callback."""
def __init__(self, on_event: Callable[[ExecEvent], None]) -> None:
self._on_event = on_event
self._bpf = None
self._running = False
def start(self) -> None:
from bcc import BPF
self._bpf = BPF(text=_BPF_PROGRAM)
fnname = self._bpf.get_syscall_fnname("execve")
self._bpf.attach_kprobe(event=fnname, fn_name="syscall__execve")
self._bpf["events"].open_perf_buffer(self._handle, page_cnt=64)
self._running = True
def poll(self, timeout_ms: int = 200) -> None:
if self._bpf is not None:
self._bpf.perf_buffer_poll(timeout=timeout_ms)
def stop(self) -> None:
self._running = False
if self._bpf is not None:
try:
self._bpf.cleanup()
except Exception:
pass
self._bpf = None
@property
def running(self) -> bool:
return self._running
def _handle(self, cpu, data, size) -> None:
event = self._bpf["events"].event(data)
argv = tuple(
a for a in (_decode(event.arg1), _decode(event.arg2)) if a
)
ev = ExecEvent(
pid=event.pid,
ppid=event.ppid,
uid=event.uid,
parent_comm=_decode(event.parent_comm),
filename=_decode(event.filename),
argv=argv,
)
try:
self._on_event(ev)
except Exception:
# one bad event must not kill the poll loop
pass
def _decode(raw) -> str:
if isinstance(raw, bytes):
return raw.split(b"\x00", 1)[0].decode("utf-8", "replace")
return str(raw)