Answers two hard questions: "what guards the hashes FIM trusts?" and "how do we make the sensor itself hard to silently disable?" — within the honest limit that a root attacker who shares your privileges can't be fully stopped on-box, only made loud. - pkgdb.py: guards the package DB that `pacman -Qkk` trusts. Anchors a fingerprint of /var/lib/pacman/local (refreshed ONLY by the pacman hook) and cross-checks pacman.log; a DB change with no logged transaction is flagged pkgdb_tamper (CRITICAL, sid 100021) — catches an attacker rewriting a stored checksum to mask a modified binary. Verified end-to-end against a simulated hash-overwrite. - selfprotect.py: Sentinel's own binaries/config/units/hook are always in the FIM watch set (self-integrity); a heartbeat is written each loop; an external `watchdog` command polls a remote dashboard and pushes if the sensor goes silent or unreachable — silence becomes the alarm. - daemon: heartbeat + slow-cadence pkgdb check; DB anchor re-anchored in build_fim_baseline so the pacman hook refreshes it after each transaction - web: /api/status now reports heartbeat_age/stale; dashboard shows it - cli: pkgdb-check, watchdog (--url/--token/--max-age, bypasses min-severity) - config: pkgdb_verify/_interval, heartbeat_max_age - README: threat model (trust-anchor problem) + hardening layers (immutability, signed-package + external anchor); reframes "anti-rootkit" as tamper-evidence - tests: +8 (DB fingerprint, anchor/transaction logic, pacman.log parse, heartbeat + watchdog verdicts). 80/80 pass Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
132 lines
4.4 KiB
Python
132 lines
4.4 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
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"""Package-database integrity — guard the thing that FIM trusts.
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``pacman -Qkk`` verifies files against the *local package database*. A root
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attacker can defeat that by editing a binary and rewriting its stored checksum
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in the DB. So we also watch the DB itself.
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The defense: a legitimate change to ``/var/lib/pacman/local`` only ever happens
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during a logged pacman transaction. We anchor a fingerprint of the DB, refreshed
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*only* by the pacman PostTransaction hook, and cross-check ``pacman.log``. If the
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DB fingerprint changes with **no corresponding transaction**, the checksum
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database may have been tampered with to mask file modification — which is exactly
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the attack of "overwriting the hashes."
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This is layer 1 (out-of-band detection). It does not stop an attacker who also
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runs `fim-update` or forges a transaction; for that you want the anchor stored
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off-box and verification against signed packages (see README hardening notes).
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import hashlib
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import json
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import os
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import re
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from datetime import datetime
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from .alert import Alert, Severity
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from .config import Config
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DB_DIR = "/var/lib/pacman/local"
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PACMAN_LOG = "/var/log/pacman.log"
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SID_PKGDB = 100021
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_SLOP = 120 # seconds of clock slop allowed between a transaction and the anchor
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_TS_RE = re.compile(r"^\[([0-9T:+\-]+)\]")
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def db_fingerprint(db_dir: str = DB_DIR) -> str | None:
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"""Deterministic SHA-256 over every file in the local package DB."""
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h = hashlib.sha256()
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try:
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files = []
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for dp, _dn, fn in os.walk(db_dir):
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files.extend(os.path.join(dp, f) for f in fn)
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for p in sorted(files):
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h.update(p.encode("utf-8", "replace") + b"\0")
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with open(p, "rb") as fh:
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while chunk := fh.read(1 << 16):
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h.update(chunk)
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except OSError:
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return None
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return h.hexdigest()
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def last_transaction_time(log: str = PACMAN_LOG) -> float | None:
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"""Epoch of the most recent pacman transaction, from the log."""
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ts = None
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try:
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with open(log, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as fh:
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for line in fh:
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if "transaction completed" in line or "transaction started" in line:
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m = _TS_RE.match(line)
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if m:
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ts = m.group(1)
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except OSError:
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return None
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if not ts:
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return None
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try:
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return datetime.fromisoformat(ts).timestamp()
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except ValueError:
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return None
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def _anchor_path(cfg: Config):
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return cfg.log_dir / "pkgdb-anchor.json"
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def save_anchor(cfg: Config, fingerprint: str | None = None) -> None:
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fp = fingerprint or db_fingerprint()
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if fp is None:
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return
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cfg.log_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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_anchor_path(cfg).write_text(json.dumps({"fingerprint": fp, "time": _now()}))
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def load_anchor(cfg: Config) -> dict | None:
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try:
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return json.loads(_anchor_path(cfg).read_text())
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except (OSError, ValueError):
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return None
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def _now() -> float:
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import time
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return time.time()
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def check(cfg: Config,
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_fingerprint=db_fingerprint,
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_last_tx=last_transaction_time) -> Alert | None:
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"""Return a tamper Alert if the DB changed outside a logged transaction.
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Injectable fingerprint / last-transaction functions for testing.
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"""
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cur = _fingerprint()
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if cur is None:
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return None
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anchor = load_anchor(cfg)
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if anchor is None:
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save_anchor(cfg, cur) # first run establishes the anchor
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return None
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if cur == anchor.get("fingerprint"):
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return None # unchanged — fine
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# The DB changed. Legitimate only if a pacman transaction occurred after the
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# anchor was taken (the hook normally refreshes the anchor in that case).
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last_tx = _last_tx()
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if last_tx is not None and last_tx >= anchor.get("time", 0) - _SLOP:
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save_anchor(cfg, cur) # legitimate upgrade; re-anchor
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return None
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return Alert(
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severity=Severity.CRITICAL,
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signature="pkgdb_tamper",
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key="pkgdb:tamper",
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detail=("pacman local DB changed with no corresponding transaction — "
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"the package checksum database may have been altered to mask "
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"file tampering"),
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sid=SID_PKGDB,
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classtype="anti-tamper",
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)
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