45f8acb24a
Poll-based host intrusion-detection daemon modeled on freeze-watcher's sample→trigger→snapshot→classify loop, with security signatures instead of performance ones: - reverse_shell (interpreter with a network socket on stdio) - ld_preload (/etc/ld.so.preload or LD_PRELOAD in writable dirs) - deleted_exe (process running from a deleted/memfd binary) - new_listener (listening port absent from startup baseline) - new_suid (new SUID/SGID binary; critical in writable dirs) - persistence (cron/systemd/authorized_keys/rc-file changes) - suspicious_egress (interpreter holding an outbound public connection) Each capture writes a forensic snapshot with per-signature incident- response guidance. Includes a safe, self-cleaning red-team harness (sentinel-redteam), hardened systemd unit, config, Makefile, and Arch packaging. Tested on Arch: detectors fire on drills, no false positives on a clean sweep, sweep cost optimized from ~15s to ~1s via batched syscalls and a gated filesystem-wide SUID scan. This bash implementation is retained as the regression oracle for the forthcoming Python rewrite. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
29 lines
895 B
Desktop File
29 lines
895 B
Desktop File
[Unit]
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Description=Enodia Sentinel - host intrusion detection daemon
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After=network.target
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Documentation=https://github.com/Enodia/enodia-sentinel
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[Service]
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Type=simple
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ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/sentinel.sh
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Restart=on-failure
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RestartSec=5
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# Needs to read every process's /proc, sockets, and SUID inventory, so it runs
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# as root — but with the surface area locked down. It only ever READS the system
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# and WRITES to its own log dir.
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ProtectSystem=strict
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ReadWritePaths=/var/log/enodia-sentinel
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ProtectHome=read-only
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NoNewPrivileges=yes
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ProtectKernelTunables=yes
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ProtectControlGroups=yes
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RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
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MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
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LockPersonality=yes
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# CAP_SYS_PTRACE: read other processes' /proc; CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH: read
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# root-owned files (authorized_keys, ld.so.preload) regardless of perms.
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AmbientCapabilities=CAP_SYS_PTRACE CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
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[Install]
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WantedBy=multi-user.target
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