5d577b624f
Detects binary/config tampering by content hash — catching a malicious swap even when mtime is preserved (the gap in mtime-based persistence checks). Two engines split by file ownership: - fim.py hash baseline: SHA-256 (+ mode/uid/gid/size) of security-critical files the package manager doesn't track (/usr/local, /etc configs, systemd units, SSH keys). The baseline refreshes ONLY via fim-update / the pacman hook, so a flagged change stays flagged until acknowledged (Tripwire semantics). Alerts: fim_modified 100017 / fim_added 100018 / fim_removed 100019. - package verification: `pacman -Qkk` checks package-owned binaries against the distro's own signed checksums — no baseline to maintain, implicitly current because the package DB updates on every upgrade. fim_pkg_modified 100020. Auto-update on system updates: a pacman PostTransaction hook runs `enodia-sentinel fim-update` after every install/upgrade/remove, so legitimate package changes never alert — no manual `tripwire --update`. - daemon: backgrounded FIM scan + optional pkg-verify on slow cadences, feeding the normal alert/snapshot/push pipeline; baseline loaded/built at startup - cli: fim-baseline / fim-update / fim-check [--packages] - config: fim_enabled, fim_paths, fim_scan_interval, fim_pkg_verify[_interval] - packaging: ship + install the pacman hook (Makefile + PKGBUILD) - tests: +7 (hashing, diff incl. mtime-preserving tamper, pacman -Qkk parse). 72/72 pass. Verified end-to-end: a content swap with preserved mtime is caught. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
116 lines
5.7 KiB
TOML
116 lines
5.7 KiB
TOML
# Enodia Sentinel configuration (TOML).
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# Read at startup from /etc/enodia-sentinel.toml (or $ENODIA_CONFIG).
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# Restart after editing: sudo systemctl restart enodia-sentinel.service
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#
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# Every key is optional; omitted keys keep their built-in default.
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# --- timing --------------------------------------------------------------
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sample_interval = 4.0 # seconds between detector sweeps
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cooldown = 60 # min seconds before re-alerting the same signature
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baseline_grace = 10 # seconds after start before new-listener/suid arm
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suid_refresh = 3600 # seconds between SUID baseline refreshes
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suid_scan_interval = 60 # seconds between (backgrounded) SUID filesystem scans
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# --- detectors (omit one to disable it) ----------------------------------
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detectors = [
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"reverse_shell", "ld_preload", "deleted_exe",
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"new_listener", "new_suid", "persistence", "egress",
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]
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# --- tuning --------------------------------------------------------------
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# Process names treated as "interpreters" for reverse-shell / egress checks.
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interpreters = [
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"bash", "sh", "dash", "zsh", "ksh", "ash", "nc", "ncat", "netcat",
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"socat", "telnet", "python", "python2", "python3", "perl", "ruby",
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"php", "lua", "awk",
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]
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# Trusted public CIDRs that should NOT trip the egress detector
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# (your VPS, VPN exit, monitoring endpoints, …).
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egress_allow_cidrs = []
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# Listener ports that never alert even if they appear after baseline.
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listener_allow_ports = []
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# Listeners owned by these process names never alert (e.g. P2P clients that
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# churn ports: qbittorrent, transmission, nicotine, kdeconnectd, syncthing…).
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listener_allow_comms = []
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# Suppress new_listener when the listening binary ships with an installed
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# package (strong provenance signal). The single best knob for a desktop /
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# seedbox that runs lots of legitimate networked apps. Off by default so the
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# detector stays honest; turn on if new_listener is noisy.
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suppress_package_owned_listeners = false
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# Dirs where any SUID binary is treated as CRITICAL (attacker-writable).
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suid_hot_dirs = ["/tmp", "/dev/shm", "/var/tmp", "/home", "/run/user"]
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# Writable dirs always scanned for SUID even if on a separate filesystem
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# (a tmpfs /tmp would otherwise be skipped by the on-device walk).
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suid_scan_extra_dirs = ["/tmp", "/dev/shm", "/var/tmp", "/run/user"]
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# Persistence files/dirs watched for modification.
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watch_persistence = [
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"/etc/cron.d", "/etc/crontab", "/etc/cron.daily", "/etc/cron.hourly",
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"/etc/cron.weekly", "/var/spool/cron", "/etc/systemd/system",
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"/etc/ld.so.preload", "/etc/passwd", "/etc/sudoers", "/etc/sudoers.d",
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"/root/.ssh/authorized_keys", "/root/.bashrc", "/root/.profile",
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]
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# --- file integrity monitoring (FIM) ------------------------------------
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# SHA-256 baseline of security-critical files the package manager doesn't track
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# (configs, /usr/local, systemd units, keys). A pacman PostTransaction hook runs
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# `enodia-sentinel fim-update` after every upgrade, so package changes never
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# alert. Package-owned binaries are instead verified against the distro's own
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# checksums via `pacman -Qkk` (fim_pkg_verify).
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fim_enabled = true
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fim_scan_interval = 300 # seconds between hash scans
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fim_paths = [] # [] = built-in critical set; or your own list
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fim_pkg_verify = false # run `pacman -Qkk` (thorough but slow)
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fim_pkg_verify_interval = 21600 # seconds between package verifications
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# --- eBPF event layer ----------------------------------------------------
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# Event-driven execve monitor: catches short-lived processes the poll loop
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# misses, matched against the Snort-style rule engine. Requires python-bpfcc
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# and root; degrades gracefully to polling otherwise.
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ebpf_exec_monitor = true
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# Optional path to a TOML file of extra [[exec_rules]] (sid/msg/severity/
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# classtype + path_prefixes/exec_comm/parent_comm/argv_regex).
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exec_rules_file = ""
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# Add a 3s bpftrace execve trace to each snapshot (requires the bpftrace pkg).
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capture_execve_bpftrace = false
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# --- retention -----------------------------------------------------------
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max_snapshots = 300 # auto-delete oldest beyond this count (0 = no cap)
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max_snapshot_age_days = 60 # auto-delete older than this (0 = no age cap)
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# --- notifications: desktop ---------------------------------------------
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notify_users = [] # e.g. ["luna"] — desktop notify-send on alert
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notify_urgency = "critical" # low / normal / critical
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# --- notifications: phone push ------------------------------------------
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# A backend turns on when its required keys are set. Only alerts at or above
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# notify_min_severity are pushed.
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notify_min_severity = "HIGH" # MEDIUM / HIGH / CRITICAL
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# ntfy (open-source, self-hostable). Install the ntfy app and subscribe to the
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# topic; keep the topic name secret — it is the only access control on ntfy.sh.
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notify_ntfy_url = "" # e.g. "https://ntfy.sh" or your own server
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notify_ntfy_topic = "" # e.g. "enodia-<random>"
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notify_ntfy_token = "" # optional Bearer token (protected topics)
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# Pushover
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notify_pushover_token = "" # application token
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notify_pushover_user = "" # user/group key
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# Generic webhook — receives the alert JSON via POST (Discord/Slack/your own).
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notify_webhook_url = ""
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# Optional dashboard base URL embedded in pushes (e.g. your Tailscale URL).
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dashboard_url = ""
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# --- web dashboard (read-only) ------------------------------------------
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web_bind = "" # "" = auto-detect Tailscale IP; or an explicit address
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web_port = 8787
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web_token = "" # bearer token; auto-generated + saved if empty on a
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# non-loopback bind. Set explicitly to keep the unit
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# fully read-only.
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