5d577b624f
Detects binary/config tampering by content hash — catching a malicious swap even when mtime is preserved (the gap in mtime-based persistence checks). Two engines split by file ownership: - fim.py hash baseline: SHA-256 (+ mode/uid/gid/size) of security-critical files the package manager doesn't track (/usr/local, /etc configs, systemd units, SSH keys). The baseline refreshes ONLY via fim-update / the pacman hook, so a flagged change stays flagged until acknowledged (Tripwire semantics). Alerts: fim_modified 100017 / fim_added 100018 / fim_removed 100019. - package verification: `pacman -Qkk` checks package-owned binaries against the distro's own signed checksums — no baseline to maintain, implicitly current because the package DB updates on every upgrade. fim_pkg_modified 100020. Auto-update on system updates: a pacman PostTransaction hook runs `enodia-sentinel fim-update` after every install/upgrade/remove, so legitimate package changes never alert — no manual `tripwire --update`. - daemon: backgrounded FIM scan + optional pkg-verify on slow cadences, feeding the normal alert/snapshot/push pipeline; baseline loaded/built at startup - cli: fim-baseline / fim-update / fim-check [--packages] - config: fim_enabled, fim_paths, fim_scan_interval, fim_pkg_verify[_interval] - packaging: ship + install the pacman hook (Makefile + PKGBUILD) - tests: +7 (hashing, diff incl. mtime-preserving tamper, pacman -Qkk parse). 72/72 pass. Verified end-to-end: a content swap with preserved mtime is caught. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
9 lines
361 B
Python
9 lines
361 B
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
|
"""Enodia Sentinel — a host intrusion-detection daemon.
|
|
|
|
A poll-based HIDS that runs a set of detectors over live system state and
|
|
captures a forensic snapshot with incident-response guidance whenever a known
|
|
attack signature appears. The Python re-architecture of the bash v0 prototype.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
__version__ = "0.5.0"
|