0eb5077551
Closes polling's blind spot (processes that exit between sweeps) with a real
eBPF probe and a declarative, data-driven detection engine — inspired by Snort
(rule language, signature IDs) and OSSEC (host-IDS framing).
New events/ subpackage:
- bcc_source.py : eBPF C tracing execve (filename, argv[1..2], ppid, uid,
parent comm) over a perf buffer, loaded via bcc; lazy import
+ available()/try-except so it fails closed to poll-only when
bcc/root/BTF are absent — a broken probe never downs the daemon
- exec_event.py : the ExecEvent type
- rules.py : ExecRule (sid/msg/severity/classtype + path/exec/parent/argv
conditions) and ExecRuleEngine; 4 shipped rules (fileless exec
100001, reverse-shell argv 100002, web/DB→shell RCE 100003,
curl|sh 100004); operators add more via exec_rules_file TOML
- monitor.py : runs the source on a thread, routes events through the engine
Integration:
- daemon starts the monitor, shares a lock-guarded cooldown with the sweep
loop, and feeds event alerts into the same snapshot pipeline
- Alert gains Snort-style sid + classtype; retrofitted onto all 7 poll
detectors; snapshots and JSON now carry them
- config: ebpf_exec_monitor (default on, degrades), exec_rules_file
- systemd: opt-in ebpf.conf drop-in (relaxes MemoryDenyWriteExecute + widens
caps for bcc's JIT) so the base unit stays hardened for poll-only
- sentinel-redteam: ebpf_exec drill (short-lived /tmp exec + /dev/tcp argv the
poller can't see); footer now uses the Python CLI
Tests: +14 cases for the rule engine (each default rule match/non-match, rule
validation, parent-exclude). 39/39 pass. Graceful non-root degradation verified.
NOTE: the eBPF C follows bcc's execsnoop pattern but could not be run here
(BPF needs root); it wants a root smoke-test on a real host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
38 lines
1.3 KiB
Python
38 lines
1.3 KiB
Python
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
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"""egress — an interpreter holding an outbound connection to a public IP.
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C2 beacons and exfil phone home. A scripting interpreter (bash/python/perl/nc…)
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with an established connection to a globally-routable address — that isn't in
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the operator's trust list — is worth a look.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from collections.abc import Iterator
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from ..alert import Alert, Severity
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from ..config import Config
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from ..netutil import ip_in_cidrs, is_public_ip, split_host_port
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from ..system import SystemState
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def detect(state: SystemState, cfg: Config) -> Iterator[Alert]:
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for s in state.established_sockets():
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if s.comm not in cfg.interpreters:
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continue
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host, port = split_host_port(s.peer)
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if not is_public_ip(host):
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continue
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if ip_in_cidrs(host, cfg.egress_allow_cidrs):
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continue
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yield Alert(
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severity=Severity.HIGH,
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signature="egress",
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key=f"egr:{s.pid}:{host}",
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detail=(
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f"pid={s.pid} comm={s.comm} -> {host}:{port} "
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"(interpreter to public IP)"
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),
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pids=(s.pid,) if s.pid else (),
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sid=100016,
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classtype="c2-exfil",
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)
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