Add tamper-evidence: package-DB integrity, self-integrity, dead-man's switch

Answers two hard questions: "what guards the hashes FIM trusts?" and "how do we
make the sensor itself hard to silently disable?" — within the honest limit that
a root attacker who shares your privileges can't be fully stopped on-box, only
made loud.

- pkgdb.py: guards the package DB that `pacman -Qkk` trusts. Anchors a
  fingerprint of /var/lib/pacman/local (refreshed ONLY by the pacman hook) and
  cross-checks pacman.log; a DB change with no logged transaction is flagged
  pkgdb_tamper (CRITICAL, sid 100021) — catches an attacker rewriting a stored
  checksum to mask a modified binary. Verified end-to-end against a simulated
  hash-overwrite.
- selfprotect.py: Sentinel's own binaries/config/units/hook are always in the
  FIM watch set (self-integrity); a heartbeat is written each loop; an external
  `watchdog` command polls a remote dashboard and pushes if the sensor goes
  silent or unreachable — silence becomes the alarm.
- daemon: heartbeat + slow-cadence pkgdb check; DB anchor re-anchored in
  build_fim_baseline so the pacman hook refreshes it after each transaction
- web: /api/status now reports heartbeat_age/stale; dashboard shows it
- cli: pkgdb-check, watchdog (--url/--token/--max-age, bypasses min-severity)
- config: pkgdb_verify/_interval, heartbeat_max_age
- README: threat model (trust-anchor problem) + hardening layers (immutability,
  signed-package + external anchor); reframes "anti-rootkit" as tamper-evidence
- tests: +8 (DB fingerprint, anchor/transaction logic, pacman.log parse,
  heartbeat + watchdog verdicts). 80/80 pass

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

README.md

@@ -239,6 +239,52 @@ notify_ntfy_url   = "https://ntfy.sh"
 notify_ntfy_topic = "enodia-7Hq2x"      # keep this secret — it's the access control
 ```
 
+## Tamper-evidence & self-protection
+
+An attacker's first move against a sensor is to disable or blind it — and on a
+box where they have root, *any* purely-local defense is ultimately defeatable
+(they share your privileges). Sentinel doesn't pretend otherwise. The goal is to
+make tampering **evident** by anchoring trust where the attacker has less
+control, and to make going silent *loud*.
+
+**Package-DB integrity.** `pacman -Qkk` trusts the local package database — so a
+root attacker can modify `/usr/bin/ssh` *and* rewrite its stored checksum, and
+verification passes. Sentinel guards the DB itself: a legitimate change only
+happens during a logged transaction, so it anchors a fingerprint of
+`/var/lib/pacman/local` (refreshed *only* by the pacman hook) and cross-checks
+`pacman.log`. A DB change with **no corresponding transaction** is flagged
+`pkgdb_tamper` (CRITICAL, `sid 100021`) — directly catching the "overwrite the
+hashes" attack.
+
+**Self-integrity.** Sentinel's own binaries, config, systemd units, and pacman
+hook are always in the FIM watch set, so tampering with the watchdog trips the
+watchdog.
+
+**Dead-man's switch.** The daemon writes a heartbeat every loop; the dashboard
+exposes its age. Run an external watcher on another host (over Tailscale) and
+*silence becomes the alarm*:
+
+```bash
+# on a SEPARATE machine — alerts you if the sensor or the whole box goes dark
+enodia-sentinel watchdog --url http://100.x.x.x:8787 --token <T> --max-age 120
+```
+
+**Hardening (the layers beyond on-box detection):**
+
+1. **Immutability** — `chattr +i` Sentinel's binaries, config, baselines, and
+   the pacman hook so even root must visibly clear the flag first.
+2. **Cryptographic anchor (next)** — verify files against the *signed* package
+   in the cache rather than the mutable DB; a maintainer's PGP signature is a
+   root of trust the attacker doesn't hold.
+3. **External anchor (next)** — mirror the DB/FIM fingerprints off-box so a
+   local attacker can't refresh the anchor to cover their tracks.
+
+> On "anti-rootkit": the robust version isn't stealth (fragile, and a genuine
+> dual-use rootkit technique) — it's tamper-*evidence*. Don't hide; be
+> un-hideable. The durable defenses move the trust anchor below or outside the
+> attacker: signatures, external monitors, and ultimately the kernel (the eBPF
+> roadmap) rather than userland the attacker can rewrite.
+
 ## File integrity monitoring (Tripwire-style)
 
 Detects tampering with binaries and critical configs by **content hash**, so it
@@ -349,6 +395,10 @@ regression suite for both.
 
 ## Project status
 
+v0.6 — adds **tamper-evidence**: out-of-band package-DB integrity
+(catches rewritten checksums), self-integrity of Sentinel's own footprint, and a
+dead-man's-switch heartbeat with an external watchdog.
+
 v0.5 — adds **file integrity monitoring** (SHA-256 baseline + `pacman -Qkk`
 verification, auto-refreshed by a pacman hook) and **false-positive triage**
 via package-ownership provenance.

config/enodia-sentinel.toml

@@ -67,6 +67,17 @@ fim_paths = []                   # [] = built-in critical set; or your own list
 fim_pkg_verify = false           # run `pacman -Qkk` (thorough but slow)
 fim_pkg_verify_interval = 21600  # seconds between package verifications
 
+# --- tamper-evidence -----------------------------------------------------
+# Detect out-of-band edits to the pacman DB itself (an attacker rewriting a
+# stored checksum to mask a modified binary). The DB anchor is refreshed only
+# by the pacman hook, so a DB change with no logged transaction = tampering.
+pkgdb_verify = true
+pkgdb_interval = 600             # seconds between DB integrity checks
+heartbeat_max_age = 120          # daemon heartbeat older than this = stale/silent
+# Sentinel's own binaries/config/units/hook are always FIM-watched (self-
+# integrity). For real teeth, make them immutable:  chattr +i <path>
+# and run an external `enodia-sentinel watchdog` against this host's dashboard.
+
 # --- eBPF event layer ----------------------------------------------------
 # Event-driven execve monitor: catches short-lived processes the poll loop
 # misses, matched against the Snort-style rule engine. Requires python-bpfcc

enodia_sentinel/__init__.py

@@ -6,4 +6,4 @@ captures a forensic snapshot with incident-response guidance whenever a known
 attack signature appears. The Python re-architecture of the bash v0 prototype.
 """
 
-__version__ = "0.5.0"
+__version__ = "0.6.0"

enodia_sentinel/cli.py

@@ -68,6 +68,13 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
     fc = sub.add_parser("fim-check", help="scan monitored files and report changes")
     fc.add_argument("--packages", action="store_true",
                     help="also verify package-owned files via pacman -Qkk")
+    sub.add_parser("pkgdb-check", help="check the package DB for out-of-band tampering")
+    wd = sub.add_parser("watchdog",
+                        help="poll a remote dashboard and push if Sentinel is silent")
+    wd.add_argument("--url", required=True, help="dashboard base URL")
+    wd.add_argument("--token", default="", help="dashboard bearer token")
+    wd.add_argument("--max-age", type=int, default=120,
+                    help="heartbeat staleness threshold (seconds)")
 
     args = parser.parse_args(argv)
     cfg = Config.load(args.config)
@@ -93,9 +100,38 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
         return 0
     if args.cmd == "fim-check":
         return _cmd_fim_check(cfg, args.packages)
+    if args.cmd == "pkgdb-check":
+        from . import pkgdb
+        alert = pkgdb.check(cfg)
+        if alert:
+            print(f"[CRITICAL] {alert.detail}")
+            return 1
+        print("Package DB: consistent with the anchor (no out-of-band changes).")
+        return 0
+    if args.cmd == "watchdog":
+        return _cmd_watchdog(cfg, args.url, args.token, args.max_age)
     return _cmd_run(cfg)
 
 
+def _cmd_watchdog(cfg: Config, url: str, token: str, max_age: int) -> int:
+    from . import notify
+    from .selfprotect import poll_status, watchdog_verdict
+    ok, msg = watchdog_verdict(poll_status(url, token), max_age)
+    print(("OK: " if ok else "ALERT: ") + msg)
+    if not ok:
+        n = notify.Notification(
+            severity=notify.Severity.CRITICAL, host=url,
+            signatures=(f"dead-man's-switch — {msg}",), sids=(),
+            snapshot_name="-", count=1, dashboard_url=url)
+        # bypass the min-severity gate — a silent sensor is always worth a page
+        for backend in notify.enabled_backends(cfg):
+            try:
+                backend.send(cfg, n)
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+    return 0 if ok else 1
+
+
 def _cmd_fim_check(cfg: Config, packages: bool) -> int:
     from . import fim
     sentinel = Sentinel(cfg)

enodia_sentinel/config.py

@@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ class Config:
     fim_scan_interval: int = 300             # seconds between hash scans
     fim_pkg_verify: bool = False             # run `pacman -Qkk` (slow; opt-in)
     fim_pkg_verify_interval: int = 21600     # seconds between package verifications
+    # tamper-evidence
+    pkgdb_verify: bool = True                # detect out-of-band package-DB edits
+    pkgdb_interval: int = 600                # seconds between DB integrity checks
+    heartbeat_max_age: int = 120             # heartbeat older than this = stale
 
     # eBPF on-ramp
     capture_execve_bpftrace: bool = False
@@ -119,11 +123,12 @@ class Config:
         return self.log_dir / "fim-baseline.json"
 
     def fim_path_list(self) -> tuple[str, ...]:
-        """Configured FIM paths, defaulting to the built-in critical set."""
+        """FIM paths: the configured/critical set, always plus Sentinel's own
-        if self.fim_paths:
+        footprint so tampering with the watchdog trips the watchdog."""
-            return self.fim_paths
         from .fim import DEFAULT_FIM_PATHS
-        return DEFAULT_FIM_PATHS
+        from .selfprotect import SELF_PATHS
+        base = self.fim_paths or DEFAULT_FIM_PATHS
+        return tuple(base) + SELF_PATHS
 
     # ---- loading ---------------------------------------------------------
     @classmethod

enodia_sentinel/daemon.py

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ class Sentinel:
         self._last_fim_scan = 0.0
         self._fim_pkg_thread: threading.Thread | None = None
         self._last_fim_pkg = 0.0
+        self._last_pkgdb = 0.0
         self._stop = threading.Event()
 
     # -- baselines ---------------------------------------------------------
@@ -90,12 +91,30 @@ class Sentinel:
 
     # -- FIM (off the loop thread) -----------------------------------------
     def build_fim_baseline(self) -> int:
+        from . import pkgdb
         from .fim import scan_paths
         self.fim_baseline = scan_paths(self.cfg.fim_path_list())
         self.cfg.log_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
         self.cfg.fim_baseline.write_text(json.dumps(self.fim_baseline))
+        # Re-anchor the package DB here too, so the pacman hook (which calls
+        # fim-update) refreshes both after every legitimate transaction.
+        pkgdb.save_anchor(self.cfg)
         return len(self.fim_baseline)
 
+    def _maybe_check_pkgdb(self, now: float) -> None:
+        if not self.cfg.pkgdb_verify:
+            return
+        if (now - self._last_pkgdb) < self.cfg.pkgdb_interval:
+            return
+        self._last_pkgdb = now
+        threading.Thread(target=self._check_pkgdb, daemon=True).start()
+
+    def _check_pkgdb(self) -> None:
+        from . import pkgdb
+        alert = pkgdb.check(self.cfg)
+        if alert:
+            self._on_exec_alert(alert)
+
     def load_fim_baseline(self) -> None:
         try:
             self.fim_baseline = json.loads(self.cfg.fim_baseline.read_text())
@@ -195,10 +214,13 @@ class Sentinel:
         sweeps = 0
         while not self._stop.is_set():
             now = time.time()
+            from .selfprotect import write_heartbeat
+            write_heartbeat(self.cfg)   # dead-man's switch
             if (now - self.start_time) >= self.cfg.baseline_grace:
                 self._maybe_scan_suid(now)
                 self._maybe_scan_fim(now)
                 self._maybe_pkg_verify(now)
+                self._maybe_check_pkgdb(now)
             alerts = self.sweep()
             fresh = self.fresh_alerts(alerts, now)
             if fresh:

enodia_sentinel/pkgdb.py

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+"""Package-database integrity — guard the thing that FIM trusts.
+
+``pacman -Qkk`` verifies files against the *local package database*. A root
+attacker can defeat that by editing a binary and rewriting its stored checksum
+in the DB. So we also watch the DB itself.
+
+The defense: a legitimate change to ``/var/lib/pacman/local`` only ever happens
+during a logged pacman transaction. We anchor a fingerprint of the DB, refreshed
+*only* by the pacman PostTransaction hook, and cross-check ``pacman.log``. If the
+DB fingerprint changes with **no corresponding transaction**, the checksum
+database may have been tampered with to mask file modification — which is exactly
+the attack of "overwriting the hashes."
+
+This is layer 1 (out-of-band detection). It does not stop an attacker who also
+runs `fim-update` or forges a transaction; for that you want the anchor stored
+off-box and verification against signed packages (see README hardening notes).
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+from datetime import datetime
+
+from .alert import Alert, Severity
+from .config import Config
+
+DB_DIR = "/var/lib/pacman/local"
+PACMAN_LOG = "/var/log/pacman.log"
+SID_PKGDB = 100021
+_SLOP = 120  # seconds of clock slop allowed between a transaction and the anchor
+
+_TS_RE = re.compile(r"^\[([0-9T:+\-]+)\]")
+
+
+def db_fingerprint(db_dir: str = DB_DIR) -> str | None:
+    """Deterministic SHA-256 over every file in the local package DB."""
+    h = hashlib.sha256()
+    try:
+        files = []
+        for dp, _dn, fn in os.walk(db_dir):
+            files.extend(os.path.join(dp, f) for f in fn)
+        for p in sorted(files):
+            h.update(p.encode("utf-8", "replace") + b"\0")
+            with open(p, "rb") as fh:
+                while chunk := fh.read(1 << 16):
+                    h.update(chunk)
+    except OSError:
+        return None
+    return h.hexdigest()
+
+
+def last_transaction_time(log: str = PACMAN_LOG) -> float | None:
+    """Epoch of the most recent pacman transaction, from the log."""
+    ts = None
+    try:
+        with open(log, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as fh:
+            for line in fh:
+                if "transaction completed" in line or "transaction started" in line:
+                    m = _TS_RE.match(line)
+                    if m:
+                        ts = m.group(1)
+    except OSError:
+        return None
+    if not ts:
+        return None
+    try:
+        return datetime.fromisoformat(ts).timestamp()
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+
+
+def _anchor_path(cfg: Config):
+    return cfg.log_dir / "pkgdb-anchor.json"
+
+
+def save_anchor(cfg: Config, fingerprint: str | None = None) -> None:
+    fp = fingerprint or db_fingerprint()
+    if fp is None:
+        return
+    cfg.log_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    _anchor_path(cfg).write_text(json.dumps({"fingerprint": fp, "time": _now()}))
+
+
+def load_anchor(cfg: Config) -> dict | None:
+    try:
+        return json.loads(_anchor_path(cfg).read_text())
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        return None
+
+
+def _now() -> float:
+    import time
+    return time.time()
+
+
+def check(cfg: Config,
+          _fingerprint=db_fingerprint,
+          _last_tx=last_transaction_time) -> Alert | None:
+    """Return a tamper Alert if the DB changed outside a logged transaction.
+
+    Injectable fingerprint / last-transaction functions for testing.
+    """
+    cur = _fingerprint()
+    if cur is None:
+        return None
+    anchor = load_anchor(cfg)
+    if anchor is None:
+        save_anchor(cfg, cur)        # first run establishes the anchor
+        return None
+    if cur == anchor.get("fingerprint"):
+        return None                  # unchanged — fine
+
+    # The DB changed. Legitimate only if a pacman transaction occurred after the
+    # anchor was taken (the hook normally refreshes the anchor in that case).
+    last_tx = _last_tx()
+    if last_tx is not None and last_tx >= anchor.get("time", 0) - _SLOP:
+        save_anchor(cfg, cur)        # legitimate upgrade; re-anchor
+        return None
+
+    return Alert(
+        severity=Severity.CRITICAL,
+        signature="pkgdb_tamper",
+        key="pkgdb:tamper",
+        detail=("pacman local DB changed with no corresponding transaction — "
+                "the package checksum database may have been altered to mask "
+                "file tampering"),
+        sid=SID_PKGDB,
+        classtype="anti-tamper",
+    )

enodia_sentinel/selfprotect.py

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+"""Tamper-evidence for Sentinel itself.
+
+An attacker's first move against a security tool is to disable or blind it. We
+can't make the agent un-killable on a box where the attacker is root — but we
+can make killing or modifying it *loud*:
+
+* **self-integrity** — Sentinel's own binaries, config, units, and pacman hook
+  are added to the FIM watch set, so tampering with the watchdog trips the
+  watchdog.
+* **dead-man's switch** — the daemon writes a heartbeat every loop; an external
+  watcher (on another host, over Tailscale) polls the dashboard and alerts if
+  the heartbeat goes stale or the dashboard becomes unreachable. Silence is the
+  alarm.
+
+The durable posture is tamper-*evidence*, not stealth: don't hide, be
+un-hideable. For real teeth, make these files immutable (`chattr +i`) and keep
+the heartbeat watcher on a separate machine.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import time
+
+from .config import Config
+
+# Sentinel's own on-disk footprint (both /usr and /usr/local installs); missing
+# paths are simply skipped by the FIM scanner.
+SELF_PATHS = (
+    "/usr/bin/enodia-sentinel", "/usr/local/bin/enodia-sentinel",
+    "/usr/bin/sentinel-redteam", "/usr/local/bin/sentinel-redteam",
+    "/usr/lib/enodia-sentinel", "/usr/local/lib/enodia-sentinel",
+    "/etc/enodia-sentinel.toml",
+    "/etc/systemd/system/enodia-sentinel.service",
+    "/etc/systemd/system/enodia-sentinel-web.service",
+    "/usr/lib/systemd/system/enodia-sentinel.service",
+    "/usr/lib/systemd/system/enodia-sentinel-web.service",
+    "/etc/pacman.d/hooks/enodia-sentinel-fim.hook",
+    "/usr/share/libalpm/hooks/enodia-sentinel-fim.hook",
+)
+
+
+def heartbeat_path(cfg: Config):
+    return cfg.log_dir / "heartbeat"
+
+
+def write_heartbeat(cfg: Config) -> None:
+    try:
+        heartbeat_path(cfg).write_text(str(int(time.time())))
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+
+
+def read_heartbeat(cfg: Config) -> int | None:
+    try:
+        return int(heartbeat_path(cfg).read_text().strip())
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        return None
+
+
+def heartbeat_age(cfg: Config) -> float | None:
+    hb = read_heartbeat(cfg)
+    return None if hb is None else max(0.0, time.time() - hb)
+
+
+# --- external dead-man's-switch watcher -----------------------------------
+
+def poll_status(url: str, token: str = "", timeout: int = 8) -> dict | None:
+    """Fetch a remote dashboard's /api/status. None if unreachable."""
+    import json
+    import urllib.request
+    base = url.rstrip("/")
+    api = base if base.endswith("/api/status") else base + "/api/status"
+    req = urllib.request.Request(api)
+    if token:
+        req.add_header("Authorization", f"Bearer {token}")
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
+            return json.loads(resp.read())
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+
+
+def watchdog_verdict(status: dict | None, max_age: float) -> tuple[bool, str]:
+    """Return (ok, message). Runs on the *watcher* side, against poll_status()."""
+    if status is None:
+        return False, "Sentinel UNREACHABLE — dashboard down or host offline"
+    if not status.get("running"):
+        return False, "Sentinel daemon NOT running on the target host"
+    age = status.get("heartbeat_age")
+    if age is not None and age > max_age:
+        return False, f"Sentinel heartbeat STALE ({int(age)}s > {int(max_age)}s)"
+    return True, "ok"

enodia_sentinel/static/dashboard.html

@@ -100,8 +100,14 @@ async function refresh(){
     document.getElementById("host").textContent = st.host || "";
     document.getElementById("ver").textContent = "v"+st.version;
     document.getElementById("ebpf").textContent = "eBPF: "+(st.ebpf||"?");
-    document.getElementById("status").textContent =
+    let hb = "";
-      st.running ? "daemon running" : "daemon NOT running";
+    if (st.heartbeat_age != null)
+      hb = st.heartbeat_stale
+        ? `  ⚠ heartbeat STALE (${Math.round(st.heartbeat_age)}s) — possible tampering`
+        : `  ♥ ${Math.round(st.heartbeat_age)}s ago`;
+    const st_el = document.getElementById("status");
+    st_el.textContent = (st.running ? "daemon running" : "daemon NOT running") + hb;
+    st_el.style.color = (st.running && !st.heartbeat_stale) ? "" : "var(--crit)";
     const c = st.counts||{};
     const cards = document.getElementById("cards"); cards.innerHTML="";
     for(const [lbl,key] of [["CRITICAL","crit"],["HIGH","high"],["MEDIUM","med"]]){

enodia_sentinel/web.py

@@ -141,6 +141,8 @@ def daemon_status(cfg: Config) -> dict:
         if "eBPF exec monitor:" in line:
             ebpf = line.split("eBPF exec monitor:", 1)[1].strip()
             break
+    from .selfprotect import heartbeat_age
+    age = heartbeat_age(cfg)
     return {
         "version": __version__,
         "running": pid_alive,
@@ -149,6 +151,8 @@ def daemon_status(cfg: Config) -> dict:
         "last_alert": alerts[0]["time"] if alerts else None,
         "ebpf": ebpf,
         "host": os.uname().nodename,
+        "heartbeat_age": age,
+        "heartbeat_stale": (age is not None and age > cfg.heartbeat_max_age),
     }
 
 

packaging/PKGBUILD

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Maintainer: Enodia
 pkgname=enodia-sentinel
-pkgver=0.5.0
+pkgver=0.6.0
 pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc="Host intrusion-detection daemon — signature-based detection of reverse shells, LD_PRELOAD rootkits, fileless malware, and persistence tampering"
 arch=('any')

pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "enodia-sentinel"
-version = "0.5.0"
+version = "0.6.0"
 description = "Host intrusion-detection daemon — signature-based detection of reverse shells, LD_PRELOAD rootkits, fileless malware, and persistence tampering"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.11"

tests/test_tamper.py

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+"""Tests for package-DB tamper detection and the dead-man's-switch watchdog."""
+import tempfile
+import time
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from enodia_sentinel import pkgdb, selfprotect
+from enodia_sentinel.alert import Severity
+from enodia_sentinel.config import Config
+
+
+def cfg_with_dir(tmp: Path) -> Config:
+    c = Config()
+    c.log_dir = tmp
+    return c
+
+
+class TestPkgdbFingerprint(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_fingerprint_changes_with_content(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            db = Path(d)
+            (db / "pkgA").mkdir()
+            (db / "pkgA" / "desc").write_text("sha256 = AAAA")
+            f1 = pkgdb.db_fingerprint(str(db))
+            self.assertIsNotNone(f1)
+            (db / "pkgA" / "desc").write_text("sha256 = BBBB")  # attacker rewrites hash
+            self.assertNotEqual(f1, pkgdb.db_fingerprint(str(db)))
+
+
+class TestPkgdbCheck(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.d = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.cfg = cfg_with_dir(Path(self.d.name))
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self.d.cleanup()
+
+    def test_first_run_establishes_anchor(self):
+        v = pkgdb.check(self.cfg, _fingerprint=lambda: "FP1", _last_tx=lambda: None)
+        self.assertIsNone(v)
+        self.assertEqual(pkgdb.load_anchor(self.cfg)["fingerprint"], "FP1")
+
+    def test_unchanged_is_silent(self):
+        pkgdb.check(self.cfg, _fingerprint=lambda: "FP1", _last_tx=lambda: None)
+        v = pkgdb.check(self.cfg, _fingerprint=lambda: "FP1", _last_tx=lambda: None)
+        self.assertIsNone(v)
+
+    def test_change_with_no_transaction_is_tamper(self):
+        pkgdb.check(self.cfg, _fingerprint=lambda: "FP1", _last_tx=lambda: None)
+        v = pkgdb.check(self.cfg, _fingerprint=lambda: "FP2", _last_tx=lambda: None)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(v)
+        self.assertEqual(v.severity, Severity.CRITICAL)
+        self.assertEqual(v.sid, pkgdb.SID_PKGDB)
+
+    def test_change_with_recent_transaction_is_legit(self):
+        pkgdb.check(self.cfg, _fingerprint=lambda: "FP1", _last_tx=lambda: None)
+        future = time.time() + 10  # a transaction occurred after the anchor
+        v = pkgdb.check(self.cfg, _fingerprint=lambda: "FP2", _last_tx=lambda: future)
+        self.assertIsNone(v)  # re-anchored, no alert
+        self.assertEqual(pkgdb.load_anchor(self.cfg)["fingerprint"], "FP2")
+
+
+class TestPacmanLogParse(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_last_transaction_time(self):
+        with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", suffix=".log", delete=False) as f:
+            f.write("[2026-05-30T10:00:00-0700] [ALPM] transaction completed\n")
+            f.write("[2026-05-31T12:34:56-0700] [ALPM] transaction completed\n")
+            f.write("[2026-05-31T12:35:00-0700] [ALPM] upgraded foo (1 -> 2)\n")
+            path = f.name
+        ts = pkgdb.last_transaction_time(path)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(ts)
+        Path(path).unlink()
+
+
+class TestHeartbeatWatchdog(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_heartbeat_roundtrip(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            cfg = cfg_with_dir(Path(d))
+            selfprotect.write_heartbeat(cfg)
+            self.assertLess(selfprotect.heartbeat_age(cfg), 5)
+
+    def test_watchdog_verdicts(self):
+        ok, _ = selfprotect.watchdog_verdict({"running": True, "heartbeat_age": 5}, 120)
+        self.assertTrue(ok)
+        bad, msg = selfprotect.watchdog_verdict(None, 120)
+        self.assertFalse(bad)
+        self.assertIn("UNREACHABLE", msg)
+        bad2, _ = selfprotect.watchdog_verdict({"running": False}, 120)
+        self.assertFalse(bad2)
+        bad3, msg3 = selfprotect.watchdog_verdict(
+            {"running": True, "heartbeat_age": 9999}, 120)
+        self.assertFalse(bad3)
+        self.assertIn("STALE", msg3)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()