feat(go): port FIM/pkgdb/rootcheck integrity engines and add go-sidecar dashboard consumer

Adds sidecar-only, --state-dir-gated FIM, package-DB-anchor, and rootcheck
engines to the Go migration sidecar, wired into agent.Sweep/Initialize
behind the existing baseline lifecycle. Adds a read-only, schema-checked
Python dashboard consumer (go_sidecar_state_dir, /api/go-sidecar/*, Sidecar
tab) that never starts, stops, or mutates the Go sidecar's state.

Also fixes drift found while reconciling this work: enodia_sentinel/web.py
had reinvented local schema constants instead of using the canonical
enodia_sentinel/schemas.py catalog (now registers enodia.go.sidecar.v1
there and reuses ALERT_SNAPSHOT_V1/INCIDENT_V1); docs/RULES.md had drifted
from what `rules docs` actually generates for SIDs 100069-100078 (ruleops.py
was missing metadata for four SIDs and had stale drill text for four more),
now back in sync with a regression test pinning them together.

Updates CLAUDE.md, README.md, go-agent/README.md, and docs/{ROADMAP,
GO_PORT_HANDOFF,SURICATA_ASSIMILATION,THREAT_MODEL,OPERATIONS,SCHEMAS,
COMMAND_REFERENCE}.md to reflect the landed work.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NQivSKBqQJsayz1xcYqWzZ

CLAUDE.md

@@ -24,18 +24,23 @@ Primary functions:
 
 ## Current State Snapshot
 
-As of 2026-07-04, the project is a local-first Linux IDS/IPS/EDR agent at
+As of 2026-07-24, the project is a local-first Linux IDS/IPS/EDR agent at
 package version `0.7.0`. The branch has a working stdlib-only daemon, CLI,
 HTTPS management console, incident model, response planner, rootcheck, posture
 checks, file/package integrity checks, push notification backends, and optional
 bcc/eBPF telemetry.
 
-An experimental, non-installing Phase 1 Go sidecar now lives under `go-agent/`.
+An experimental, non-installing Go sidecar now lives under `go-agent/`. It is
-It is stdlib-only, emits `enodia.event.v1` JSONL, captures an injectable process
+stdlib-only, emits `enodia.event.v1` JSONL, and ports all current Python poll
-file-descriptor, and socket view, and currently ports `reverse_shell`,
+detectors, the exec/syscall/typed-host rule engines, opt-in `cilium/ebpf` exec
-`ld_preload`, `deleted_exe`, `input_snooper`, `credential_access`,
+and syscall sources, hot-path plus asynchronous enrichment, and Python-schema-
-`stealth_network`, and `egress`. Python remains the production agent and parity
+compatible incidents/snapshots/hash-chain. A `--state-dir`-gated set of
-oracle; do not describe the Go path as a replacement yet.
+sidecar-only integrity engines (FIM, package-DB anchor, rootcheck) now also
+runs asynchronously off the sweep loop. Python's dashboard has an opt-in,
+explicitly read-only `/api/go-sidecar/*` consumer (`go_sidecar_state_dir`, the
+Sidecar tab) that displays this evidence without starting, stopping, or
+otherwise controlling the Go process. Python remains the production agent and
+parity oracle; do not describe the Go path as a replacement yet.
 
 Implemented detection coverage:
 
@@ -63,9 +68,13 @@ Implemented investigation/response state:
 - The dashboard is HTTPS-only, token-protected off loopback, and read-only. It
   shows status, incidents, timelines, alerts, posture findings,
   integrity/watchdog state, event-rule metadata, event tail, dry-run response
-  plans, and a local Settings menu with persistent themes. Web tests cover the
+  plans, and a local Settings menu with persistent themes. An opt-in Sidecar
-  theme registry, integrity console wiring, and core text/status contrast
+  tab additionally displays the isolated Go migration-sidecar's retained
-  checks.
+  heartbeat, alerts, incidents, and event log when `go_sidecar_state_dir` is
+  configured; this consumer is schema-checked and read-only, and never starts,
+  stops, or controls the Go process. Web tests cover the theme registry,
+  integrity console wiring, sidecar consumer isolation, and core text/status
+  contrast checks.
 - `respond plan <incident-id>` builds read-only containment/recovery plans,
   persists CLI-generated plans under `response-plans/`, and appends
   `response-audit.log`. Dashboard/API plan previews do not write artifacts.
@@ -164,9 +173,11 @@ Start with:
   GUI-free presentation model over `tui.collect_model`; only `gui/app.py`
   (tkinter) and `gui/qt_app.py` (PySide6, `[qt]` extra) import GUI libraries,
   enforced by import-guard tests.
-- `go-agent/` is the isolated Phase 1 sidecar with Go config, process-state,
+- `go-agent/` is the isolated sidecar with Go config, process-state, detector,
-  detector, schema, and sweep-loop packages. It writes JSONL to stdout and
+  schema, and sweep-loop packages, plus `fim/`, `pkgdb/`, and `rootcheck/`
-  must not share or mutate Python daemon state during parity development.
+  sidecar-only integrity engines. It writes JSONL to stdout (or a private
+  retained tree under `--state-dir`) and must not share or mutate Python
+  daemon state during parity development.
 
 ## Current Threat Mapping
 

README.md

@@ -430,6 +430,10 @@ sudo systemctl enable --now enodia-sentinel-web
   API at `/api/status`, `/api/incidents`, `/api/respond/plan/<id>`,
   `/api/posture`, `/api/integrity`, `/api/rules`, `/api/alerts`,
   `/api/alerts/<id>`, `/api/events`.
+- **Optional Go migration evidence**: set `go_sidecar_state_dir` to the
+  sidecar's separate state directory to expose retained heartbeat, snapshots,
+  incidents, and JSONL through `/api/go-sidecar/*`. These endpoints are
+  read-only and never replace Python dashboard data or control the sidecar.
 - **Operator settings**: the self-contained dashboard includes a Settings menu
   with persistent local themes: Console, Paper, Contrast, LGBTQ, Trans, Dracula,
   Solarized Dark, Solarized Light, and Twilight. Static dashboard tests guard

config/enodia-sentinel.toml

@@ -214,3 +214,6 @@ web_token = ""              # bearer token; auto-generated + saved if empty on a
 # point these at your own local/private CA certificate.
 web_tls_cert = ""
 web_tls_key  = ""
+# Optional: expose a separately retained Go validation-sidecar state tree via
+# read-only /api/go-sidecar/* endpoints. Never point this at the Python log_dir.
+go_sidecar_state_dir = ""

docs/COMMAND_REFERENCE.md

@@ -471,6 +471,12 @@ HTTPS is mandatory. If `web_tls_cert` / `web_tls_key` are not configured,
 Sentinel creates a self-signed pair under `log_dir`; add a browser exception for
 that certificate or replace it with a private/local CA certificate.
 
+When `go_sidecar_state_dir` is explicitly configured, the same authenticated
+read-only server also exposes the isolated migration-sidecar evidence at
+`/api/go-sidecar/status`, `/api/go-sidecar/alerts`, `/api/go-sidecar/events`,
+and `/api/go-sidecar/incidents`. These paths never start, stop, or alter the Go
+sidecar, and do not replace the Python daemon's normal API data.
+
 The console exposes incidents, alert snapshots, posture findings,
 integrity/watchdog state, event-rule metadata, event tail, and dry-run response
 plans. It remains read-only; response commands are displayed for review but not

docs/GO_PORT_HANDOFF.md

@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@
 # Go Port Handoff
 
 Saved: 2026-07-22T04:08:40-07:00
+Updated: 2026-07-24T04:45:55-07:00
 Branch: `main`
-Base commit: `a25c73a` (`feat(go): report integrity anchor context`)
+Base commit: `a25c73a` (`feat(go): report integrity anchor context`); the FIM/
-Status: current Go-port state saved in this checkpoint; separate GUI work remains uncommitted
+package-DB/rootcheck engines and the Python go-sidecar dashboard consumer
+described below landed on top of that commit and remain uncommitted.
+Status: items 1 and 2 of "Resume here" are now implemented and green; see the
+updated sections below. Desktop GUI work referenced by the original checkpoint
+has since been committed (`457c760`, `1d1dee7`, and related commits) and is no
+longer part of this checkout's uncommitted state.
 
 ## Worktree warning
 
@@ -14,10 +20,12 @@ continuations. Do not reset, clean, or broadly restage it.
   assurance, asynchronous-enrichment, incident-reader, package-ownership, and
   integrity-anchor tranches are signed commits `f85c2e8`, `538d1d9`,
   `fd2bbba`, `1ab4add`, `eff31b3`, `6355fb4`, `88d7a6e`, and `a25c73a`.
-- At this checkpoint, `git status --short` has 11 entries with untracked
+- On top of that, uncommitted work now adds `go-agent/internal/{fim,pkgdb,
-  directories collapsed.
+  rootcheck}/`, wires them into `agent.Sweep`/`Initialize` behind
-- The Python GUI files and tests are separate pre-existing work. Preserve them
+  `--state-dir`, and adds Python's read-only `/api/go-sidecar/*` consumer
-  while continuing the Go port.
+  (`enodia_sentinel/web.py`, `schemas.GO_SIDECAR_V1`) plus a Sidecar dashboard
+  tab. `git status --short` currently shows this as modified files across both
+  trees plus the three new untracked Go package directories.
 - `build/` is ignored and contains only local build output.
 
 ## Implemented Go surface
@@ -106,15 +114,46 @@ static binary.
 - The asynchronous worker now resolves pacman/dpkg/rpm package-owner strings
   with a two-second bound and cache; ownership lookup never holds a detector
   lock or blocks alert capture.
-- The worker now reports FIM-baseline, package-DB-anchor, and Go hash-chain
+- The worker reports FIM-baseline, package-DB-anchor, and Go hash-chain
-  presence/age. It explicitly marks package verification and rootcheck disabled
+  presence/age, plus the configured `pacman -Qkk` and rootcheck cadences now
-  until their actual engines are ported.
+  that those engines are ported (see below). This remains metadata only:
-- Richer integrity engines and notification fan-out are not yet ported.
+  recording a snapshot never starts integrity work itself.
+- Notification fan-out is not yet ported.
 - `--incidents-list` and `--incident-show <id>` now read the sidecar's isolated
   state without starting the agent. The latter returns `enodia.incident.view.v1`
   with the incident, available snapshots, and time-ordered timeline.
 - No live system service was installed or enabled during development.
 
+### FIM, package-DB anchor, and rootcheck engines (new since the base commit)
+
+- `go-agent/internal/fim` is a sidecar-only engine, gated on `--state-dir`,
+  that persists a SHA-256 security-path baseline as `fim-baseline.json` and
+  performs non-overlapping background comparisons on `fim_scan_interval`,
+  emitting the Python-identical SIDs `100017`-`100019`. `fim_pkg_verify = true`
+  opts into a bounded `pacman -Qkk` verification pass emitting SID `100020`.
+- `go-agent/internal/pkgdb` fingerprints pacman's local checksum database on
+  `pkgdb_interval` and alerts (SID `100021`) only on changes lacking a
+  corresponding transaction-log record; it never refreshes an unexplained
+  changed anchor.
+- `go-agent/internal/rootcheck` bounds PID cross-view probing with
+  `rootcheck_pid_cap`, runs one background comparison per
+  `rootcheck_interval`, and reproduces the Python rootcheck SIDs (hidden
+  process/module/port families, promiscuous mode, module/kernel taint) from
+  procfs, sysfs, `ps`, and socket views.
+- All three run asynchronously off the sweep loop (`agent.Sweep` calls
+  `MaybeStart` before detector evaluation and `Drain` after, so a slow hash
+  tree or `pacman` invocation never delays a sweep) and return alerts through
+  the existing cooldown/snapshot/incident pipeline rather than emitting
+  directly.
+- `enodia_sentinel/web.py` adds a read-only, schema-checked consumer for this
+  evidence: `go_sidecar_state_dir` (config key) exposes `/api/go-sidecar/
+  {status,alerts,incidents,events}` and a dashboard Sidecar tab. It never
+  starts, stops, or writes into the Go sidecar's state directory, and a
+  corrupted retained event log fails the request closed rather than showing a
+  partial stream. The new `enodia.go.sidecar.v1` schema lives in
+  `enodia_sentinel/schemas.py` and is pinned by
+  `tests/test_schema_contracts.py::test_go_sidecar_v1_contract`.
+
 ## Last green verification
 
 Run from the repository root:
@@ -132,7 +171,7 @@ make check-go-service
 git diff --check
 ```
 
-Results at save time:
+Results at original save time (`a25c73a`):
 
 - Python: 377 tests passed.
 - Go unit and race suites: all packages passed through `a25c73a`.
@@ -152,19 +191,44 @@ Results at save time:
   startup/quiet-period retention, process context, and Python dashboard-reader
   compatibility.
 
+Results re-verified 2026-07-24 with the FIM/pkgdb/rootcheck engines and
+go-sidecar dashboard consumer added on top:
+
+- Python: 385 tests passed (`unittest discover`).
+- Go unit and `-race` suites: all packages passed, including the new `fim`,
+  `pkgdb`, and `rootcheck` packages.
+- `go vet` and `go mod verify`: passed.
+- Parity counts are unchanged from the original checkpoint (22/5/7/10/22/3/2),
+  as expected: the new engines are integrity checks outside the poll/exec/
+  syscall/host-rule parity fixture.
+- `systemd-analyze verify` and the three Go sidecar packaging/isolation tests:
+  passed.
+- `git diff --check`: passed (no whitespace errors).
+- Static cross-arch builds were not re-run this pass.
+
 The Python suite prints three expected CLI error lines from negative tests and
 one existing `ResourceWarning` for an implicitly cleaned-up HTTP 401 object;
 the suite still exits successfully.
 
 ## Resume here
 
-1. Port the actual FIM/package-verification/rootcheck engines behind explicit,
+1. ~~Port the actual FIM/package-verification/rootcheck engines behind
-   bounded acceptance gates; do not treat enrichment anchor status as detection
+   explicit, bounded acceptance gates~~ — done: `go-agent/internal/{fim,pkgdb,
-   parity.
+   rootcheck}`, gated on `--state-dir`, tested, and wired into `agent.Sweep`.
-2. Add a read-only management API consumer for isolated Go snapshot/event state
+2. ~~Add a read-only management API consumer for isolated Go snapshot/event
-   while keeping Python authoritative.
+   state while keeping Python authoritative~~ — done: `/api/go-sidecar/*` in
+   `enodia_sentinel/web.py` plus the dashboard Sidecar tab, schema-checked and
+   never controlling the Go process.
 3. Continue broader Phase 3 rule metadata/state parity before considering any
-   default-service or package cutover.
+   default-service or package cutover. This is the remaining item from the
+   original checkpoint.
+4. Notification fan-out for the Go sidecar (item noted above) is still
+   unported; the FIM/pkgdb/rootcheck engines currently return alerts only
+   through the shared JSONL/snapshot/incident pipeline, not push backends.
+5. Consider whether `04-integrity.md` and `05-rootcheck.md` in
+   `docs/behavior/` (currently "planned") should be written now that these
+   engines exist on both sides, so future Go-side changes have the same
+   reviewable behavioral contract as the poll detectors and event rules do.
 
 Keep the validation sidecar opt-in, preserve its separate state tree, and keep
 new attack/event primitives disconnected from destructive response paths.

docs/OPERATIONS.md

@@ -75,7 +75,10 @@ Expected healthy output:
 
 The HTTPS dashboard shows the same posture findings under the Posture tab and
 summarizes FIM/package anchors plus heartbeat freshness under the Integrity tab
-for quick remote review.
+for quick remote review. If the optional `go_sidecar_state_dir` setting points
+at an isolated Go migration-sidecar state directory, a Sidecar tab also shows
+that sidecar's own retained heartbeat, alert snapshots, incidents, and event
+log, read-only and clearly separate from Python's production data.
 
 For SSH/tmux operators, `enodia-sentinel tui` provides a terminal dashboard over
 the same local read-only management state: status, recent alerts, incidents,

docs/ROADMAP.md

@@ -300,9 +300,23 @@ Exit criteria:
   now provide truthful retained counts and basic process context. A private,
   atomic `enodia.incident.v1` index now applies the shared lineage-first/time-
   window grouping, assigns real snapshot `incident_id` values, and persists
-  correlation SID `100080`. The Python service remains the production default
+  correlation SID `100080`. Hot-path enrichment adds bounded process/parent
-  until rich enrichment/assurance, management-console consumers, and broader
+  context, lineage, remote-IP classification, and candidate paths synchronously,
-  subsystem parity land.
+  while a 16-job asynchronous worker adds streamed executable hashes, file
+  metadata, and package-owner strings under a query bound. The sidecar now also
+  has sidecar-only, `--state-dir`-gated FIM (`fim-baseline.json`, SIDs
+  `100017`–`100020`, optional `pacman -Qkk` verification), package-DB anchor
+  (`pkgdb_verify`, SID `100021`), and rootcheck (procfs/sysfs/`ps`/socket/
+  module-taint/kernel-taint/promiscuous-mode cross-view checks) engines that
+  run asynchronously off the sweep loop and return alerts through the same
+  cooldown/snapshot/incident pipeline. Python's dashboard gained a first,
+  explicitly read-only management-console consumer for this migration
+  evidence: an opt-in `go_sidecar_state_dir` setting exposes `/api/go-sidecar/*`
+  endpoints and a Sidecar dashboard tab that display the Go sidecar's retained
+  heartbeat, alert snapshots, incidents, and event log without starting,
+  stopping, or otherwise controlling the Go process. The Python service remains
+  the production default until notification fan-out and broader subsystem
+  parity land.
 
 ## Backlog
 

docs/SCHEMAS.md

@@ -139,6 +139,33 @@ Required fields:
 | `hash_chain` | object | Local append-only hash-chain summary for snapshots and event logs: path, exists flag, record count, and last chain hash. |
 | `read_only` | boolean | Always true for this dashboard API. |
 
+## `enodia.go.sidecar.v1`
+
+Status object returned by `/api/go-sidecar/status`, describing the optional,
+separately configured Go migration-sidecar evidence tree (`go_sidecar_state_dir`).
+This is a read-only view of another process's retained files: the Python web
+process never starts, stops, or probes the Go sidecar, and this schema does not
+appear anywhere in the production Python daemon's own state.
+
+Required fields:
+
+| Field | Type | Meaning |
+|---|---|---|
+| `schema` | string | `enodia.go.sidecar.v1`. |
+| `read_only` | boolean | Always true. |
+| `configured` | boolean | Whether `go_sidecar_state_dir` is set. |
+| `state_dir` | string | The configured path, or `""` if unset. |
+| `available` | boolean | Whether the configured directory currently exists. |
+| `heartbeat` | object | `{"status": "not-configured"\|"missing"\|"fresh"\|"stale", ...}`; `fresh`/`stale` reports also include `timestamp`, `age_seconds`, and `max_age_seconds`. |
+
+The related `/api/go-sidecar/alerts`, `/api/go-sidecar/incidents`, and
+`/api/go-sidecar/events` endpoints replay the Go sidecar's own
+`enodia.alert.snapshot.v1`, `enodia.incident.v1`, and `enodia.event.v1` records
+after schema-checking each one; malformed or unrecognized files are dropped
+(alerts/incidents) or reported as an explicit error rather than partially
+displayed (events), so a damaged retained file cannot be misread as a clean
+evidence stream.
+
 ## `enodia.hash_chain.v1`
 
 JSONL record appended to `hash-chain.jsonl` when Sentinel captures forensic

docs/SURICATA_ASSIMILATION.md

@@ -251,9 +251,13 @@ signature keeps `sid` / `signature` / `classtype` / tests / docs.
   transports. Bounded `enodia.alert.snapshot.v1` JSON/text pairs now retain
   alerts with basic process context and feed truthful status counts. An atomic
   `enodia.incident.v1` index supplies lineage/time grouping, snapshot IDs, and
-  correlation evidence. Rich enrichment/assurance, management-consumer
+  correlation evidence. Hot-path plus asynchronous enrichment (hashes, file
-  integration, and broader parity must land before the bcc/Python runtime
+  metadata, package ownership) now populate snapshots, and sidecar-only,
-  dependency can be dropped.
+  `--state-dir`-gated FIM, package-DB-anchor, and rootcheck integrity engines
+  now run asynchronously off the sweep loop. Python's dashboard has a first
+  read-only management-console consumer (`go_sidecar_state_dir`,
+  `/api/go-sidecar/*`) over this isolated evidence. Broader Phase 3 rule-engine
+  parity must land before the bcc/Python runtime dependency can be dropped.
 - **Phase 3 — Rule-engine parity + assimilation.** `rev`/`reference`/`metadata`,
   statebits (flowbits), thresholding, suppression, and — if rule count warrants
   — the MPM prefilter. `rules list/show/test/docs` parity.

docs/THREAT_MODEL.md

@@ -55,6 +55,26 @@ The default service is hardened and read-mostly. Enabling the bcc eBPF monitor
 requires additional capabilities and memory permissions. That tradeoff is
 explicit: stronger event visibility for a wider runtime permission set.
 
+### Go Migration-Sidecar Evidence Is Isolated and Read-Only
+
+The experimental `go-agent/` sidecar (see `docs/ROADMAP.md`'s Active Migration
+Track) is a separate process with its own state directory, baselines, FIM/
+package-DB/rootcheck engines, and hash-chain. It never shares or mutates the
+Python daemon's `log_dir`, baselines, or anchors, and it is not the production
+agent.
+
+When an operator opts in with `go_sidecar_state_dir`, the Python dashboard adds
+a read-only consumer (`/api/go-sidecar/*`, the Sidecar tab) over that directory.
+It treats the Go sidecar's retained files as untrusted input from another
+process rather than trusted application state: every alert snapshot and
+incident record is schema-checked before display, a corrupted retained event
+log fails the request closed instead of showing a partial stream, and the web
+process never starts, stops, signals, or writes into the Go sidecar's state
+directory. Compromising this consumer therefore requires tampering with the Go
+sidecar's own retained files, which is the same class of local-tampering
+problem `enodia.hash_chain.v1` and the sidecar's own FIM self-watch already
+cover.
+
 ## Detection Assumptions
 
 Sentinel assumes:

enodia_sentinel/config.py

@@ -173,6 +173,11 @@ class Config:
     web_token: str = ""              # bearer token; auto-generated if empty + non-local
     web_tls_cert: str = ""           # "" = auto-generate self-signed cert under log_dir
     web_tls_key: str = ""            # "" = auto-generate private key under log_dir
+    # Optional, read-only Go validation-sidecar evidence tree. This must stay
+    # separate from log_dir so the Python daemon remains the production source
+    # of truth and the dashboard never mistakes migration evidence for Python
+    # alert state.
+    go_sidecar_state_dir: str = ""
 
     # paths
     log_dir: Path = Path("/var/log/enodia-sentinel")

enodia_sentinel/ruleops.py

@@ -58,6 +58,11 @@ def render_markdown(cfg: Config) -> str:
         "Use `enodia-sentinel rules list/show/test` to inspect rules and validate "
         "event fixtures locally.",
         "",
+        "Built-in event-rule fixtures live in `tests/fixtures/sids/` and can be replayed",
+        "with `enodia-sentinel rules test tests/fixtures/sids/<sid>-<slug>.json`.",
+        "Non-event built-in SIDs are covered by safe offline drills in `tests/sid_drills.py`;",
+        "`python3 -m unittest tests.test_sid_coverage -v` verifies the full registry.",
+        "",
     ]
     for rule in list_rules(cfg):
         doc = _RULE_DOCS.get(rule["sid"], {})
@@ -284,33 +289,61 @@ _RULE_DOCS: dict[int, dict[str, Any]] = {
         ],
         "drill": "Use `rules test` with a `listen` event whose `comm` is an interpreter and whose `local_port` is not a common service port.",
     },
+    100069: {
+        "false_positives": [
+            "Installer, configuration-management, or recovery scripts that legitimately write persistence paths from an interpreter.",
+            "Administrative SSH-key or service-unit maintenance performed by a reviewed script.",
+        ],
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with `tests/fixtures/sids/100069-interpreter-persistence-write.json`.",
+    },
+    100070: {
+        "false_positives": [
+            "Package post-install scripts or configuration-management agents adjusting mode/owner on system service, sudoers, cron, or SSH key files.",
+            "Manual recovery work that repairs permissions after a known-good change.",
+        ],
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with `tests/fixtures/sids/100070-persistence-permission-change.json`.",
+    },
+    100071: {
+        "false_positives": [
+            "Reviewed administrative wrappers that intentionally run interpreters across a root UID transition.",
+            "Privileged installer or service-management scripts during maintenance windows.",
+        ],
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with `tests/fixtures/sids/100071-interpreter-setuid-root.json`.",
+    },
+    100072: {
+        "false_positives": [
+            "Reviewed administrative wrappers that intentionally run interpreters across a root GID transition.",
+            "Privileged installer or service-management scripts during maintenance windows.",
+        ],
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with `tests/fixtures/sids/100072-interpreter-setgid-root.json`.",
+    },
     100073: {
         "false_positives": [
             "Developer or diagnostic scripts binding high local ports intentionally.",
             "Short-lived local service wrappers that bind before handing sockets to a supervised process.",
         ],
-        "drill": "Use `rules test` with a `bind` event whose `comm` is an interpreter and whose `local_port` is not a common service port.",
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with `tests/fixtures/sids/100073-interpreter-unusual-bind.json`.",
     },
     100076: {
         "false_positives": [
             "Developer servers or test harnesses accepting inbound public traffic from an interpreter.",
             "Administrative troubleshooting with temporary netcat/socat listeners.",
         ],
-        "drill": "Use `rules test` with an `accept` event whose `comm` is an interpreter, public `peer_ip`, and unusual `local_port`.",
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with `tests/fixtures/sids/100076-interpreter-unusual-accept.json`.",
     },
     100077: {
         "false_positives": [
             "Privileged maintenance scripts that intentionally adjust capabilities during controlled administration.",
             "Container or network lab setup scripts using interpreters to configure namespaces or packet capture.",
         ],
-        "drill": "Use `rules test` with a `capset` event containing a sensitive capability such as `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`.",
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with `tests/fixtures/sids/100077-interpreter-capset-sensitive.json`.",
     },
     100078: {
         "false_positives": [
             "Kernel development labs loading locally built modules from temporary build directories.",
             "Driver troubleshooting sessions that intentionally test an unsigned module from a writable path.",
         ],
-        "drill": "Use `rules test` with a `module_load` event whose `path` is under `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, `/dev/shm`, or `/run/user`.",
+        "drill": "Use `rules test` with `tests/fixtures/sids/100078-module-load-writable-path.json`.",
     },
 }
 

enodia_sentinel/schemas.py

@@ -19,3 +19,4 @@ RESPONSE_PLAN_V1 = "enodia.response.plan.v1"
 RESPONSE_AUDIT_V1 = "enodia.response.audit.v1"
 RECONCILE_V1 = "enodia.reconcile.v1"
 EVENT_V1 = "enodia.event.v1"
+GO_SIDECAR_V1 = "enodia.go.sidecar.v1"

enodia_sentinel/static/dashboard.html

@@ -313,6 +313,7 @@
       <button data-tab="alerts">Alerts</button>
       <button data-tab="posture">Posture</button>
       <button data-tab="integrity">Integrity</button>
+      <button data-tab="sidecar">Sidecar</button>
       <button data-tab="rules">Rules</button>
       <button data-tab="events">Events</button>
     </div>
@@ -320,6 +321,7 @@
     <section id="alertsTab" hidden></section>
     <section id="postureTab" hidden></section>
     <section id="integrityTab" hidden></section>
+    <section id="sidecarTab" hidden></section>
     <section id="rulesTab" hidden></section>
     <section id="eventsTab" hidden></section>
   </main>
@@ -333,7 +335,7 @@
 <script>
 const TOKEN = new URLSearchParams(location.search).get("token") || "";
 const HDR = TOKEN ? {Authorization:"Bearer "+TOKEN} : {};
-const TABS = new Set(["incident","alerts","posture","integrity","rules","events"]);
+const TABS = new Set(["incident","alerts","posture","integrity","sidecar","rules","events"]);
 const THEME_OPTIONS = [
   ["console","Console"],["paper","Paper"],["contrast","Contrast"],
   ["pride","LGBTQ"],["trans","Trans"],["dracula","Dracula"],
@@ -346,7 +348,7 @@ function tabFromHash(){
   const name = location.hash.replace(/^#/,"");
   return TABS.has(name) ? name : "incident";
 }
-const state = {incidents:[], alerts:[], posture:null, integrity:null, rules:null, selected:null, incident:null, plan:null, tab:tabFromHash()};
+const state = {incidents:[], alerts:[], posture:null, integrity:null, rules:null, sidecar:null, selected:null, incident:null, plan:null, tab:tabFromHash()};
 
 async function api(path){
   const r = await fetch(path,{headers:HDR});
@@ -398,10 +400,10 @@ function setSettings(open){
 
 async function refresh(){
   try{
-    const [status, incidents, alerts, posture, integrity, rules, events] = await Promise.all([
+    const [status, incidents, alerts, posture, integrity, rules, events, sidecar] = await Promise.all([
-      api("/api/status"), api("/api/incidents"), api("/api/alerts"), api("/api/posture"), api("/api/integrity"), api("/api/rules"), api("/api/events")
+      api("/api/status"), api("/api/incidents"), api("/api/alerts"), api("/api/posture"), api("/api/integrity"), api("/api/rules"), api("/api/events"), loadSidecar()
     ]);
-    state.incidents = incidents; state.alerts = alerts; state.posture = posture; state.integrity = integrity; state.rules = rules; state.events = events.events || [];
+    state.incidents = incidents; state.alerts = alerts; state.posture = posture; state.integrity = integrity; state.rules = rules; state.events = events.events || []; state.sidecar = sidecar;
     renderStatus(status); renderLists();
     if(!state.selected && incidents.length) await openIncident(incidents[0].id);
     else if(state.selected) await openIncident(state.selected, false);
@@ -409,6 +411,20 @@ async function refresh(){
   }catch(e){ showError(e.message); }
 }
 
+async function loadSidecar(){
+  // The migration evidence tree is optional. A sidecar read failure must not
+  // hide the Python daemon's authoritative console data or break refresh. Keep
+  // its requests separate so a future sidecar-only endpoint cannot accidentally
+  // become a dependency of the production management surface.
+  try{
+    const [status, alerts, incidents, events] = await Promise.all([
+      api("/api/go-sidecar/status"), api("/api/go-sidecar/alerts"),
+      api("/api/go-sidecar/incidents"), api("/api/go-sidecar/events")
+    ]);
+    return {status, alerts, incidents, events, error:null};
+  }catch(e){ return {status:null, alerts:[], incidents:[], events:{events:[]}, error:e.message}; }
+}
+
 function renderStatus(st){
   document.getElementById("dot").className = "dot "+(st.running && !st.heartbeat_stale ? "up" : "");
   let hb = st.heartbeat_age == null ? "no heartbeat" : Math.round(st.heartbeat_age)+"s heartbeat";
@@ -473,6 +489,7 @@ async function openAlert(name){
   box.hidden = false; document.getElementById("incidentTab").hidden = true;
   document.getElementById("postureTab").hidden = true; document.getElementById("rulesTab").hidden = true;
   document.getElementById("integrityTab").hidden = true;
+  document.getElementById("sidecarTab").hidden = true;
   document.getElementById("eventsTab").hidden = true;
   box.innerHTML='<div class="empty">loading snapshot</div>';
   try{
@@ -524,11 +541,13 @@ function renderTab(){
   document.getElementById("alertsTab").hidden = state.tab !== "alerts";
   document.getElementById("postureTab").hidden = state.tab !== "posture";
   document.getElementById("integrityTab").hidden = state.tab !== "integrity";
+  document.getElementById("sidecarTab").hidden = state.tab !== "sidecar";
   document.getElementById("rulesTab").hidden = state.tab !== "rules";
   document.getElementById("eventsTab").hidden = state.tab !== "events";
   if(state.tab === "incident") renderIncident();
   if(state.tab === "posture") renderPosture();
   if(state.tab === "integrity") renderIntegrity();
+  if(state.tab === "sidecar") renderSidecar();
   if(state.tab === "rules") renderRules();
   if(state.tab === "events") renderEvents();
 }
@@ -678,6 +697,76 @@ function renderIntegrity(){
 
   box.append(grid);
 }
+function renderSidecar(){
+  // This is intentionally a read-only ledger, not a second incident workflow.
+  // Operators should not mistake validation-sidecar evidence for Python's
+  // production response plans, acknowledgements, or remediation authority.
+  const box = document.getElementById("sidecarTab");
+  const source = state.sidecar || {status:null, alerts:[], incidents:[], events:{events:[]}};
+  box.innerHTML = "";
+  if(source.error){
+    box.append(el("div","err","Go sidecar evidence is unavailable: "+source.error));
+    return;
+  }
+  const status = source.status || {};
+  if(!status.configured){
+    const empty = el("div","card");
+    empty.append(el("h2",null,"Go sidecar evidence"));
+    empty.append(el("div","fine","No migration evidence tree is configured. Set go_sidecar_state_dir to an isolated Go sidecar state directory; this console will only read its retained heartbeat, snapshots, incidents, and event log."));
+    box.append(empty);
+    return;
+  }
+  const summary = el("div","card");
+  summary.append(el("h2",null,"Go sidecar evidence"));
+  const heartbeat = status.heartbeat || {};
+  summary.append(tags([
+    "read-only", "state "+(status.available ? "available" : "unavailable"),
+    "heartbeat "+(heartbeat.status || "unknown"),
+    "alerts "+(source.alerts||[]).length, "incidents "+(source.incidents||[]).length
+  ]));
+  summary.append(el("div","fine","Migration evidence is shown separately. Python alert, incident, and response-plan data remain authoritative."));
+  box.append(summary);
+
+  const grid = el("div","integrity-grid");
+  const health = el("article","state-card "+(heartbeat.status === "fresh" ? "ok" : "review"));
+  health.append(el("h3",null,"Heartbeat"));
+  addStateLine(health,"status",heartbeat.status || "unknown");
+  addStateLine(health,"age",humanAge(heartbeat.age_seconds));
+  addStateLine(health,"max age",humanAge(heartbeat.max_age_seconds));
+  addStateLine(health,"state dir",status.state_dir);
+  grid.append(health);
+
+  const evidence = el("article","state-card ok");
+  evidence.append(el("h3",null,"Retained evidence"));
+  (source.alerts||[]).slice(0,6).forEach(alert=>{
+    const row = el("div","path-row");
+    row.append(sev(alert.severity));
+    row.append(el("span",null,fmt(alert.time)+" — "+(alert.signatures||[]).join(", ")));
+    evidence.append(row);
+  });
+  if(!(source.alerts||[]).length) evidence.append(el("div","fine","No retained sidecar alert snapshots."));
+  grid.append(evidence);
+
+  const incidents = el("article","state-card ok");
+  incidents.append(el("h3",null,"Incident index"));
+  (source.incidents||[]).slice(0,6).forEach(incident=>{
+    const row = el("div","path-row");
+    row.append(sev(incident.severity));
+    row.append(el("span",null,incident.id+" — "+(incident.signatures||[]).join(", ")));
+    incidents.append(row);
+  });
+  if(!(source.incidents||[]).length) incidents.append(el("div","fine","No retained sidecar incidents."));
+  grid.append(incidents);
+  box.append(grid);
+
+  const events = el("div","card");
+  events.append(el("h3",null,"Retained sidecar events"));
+  const pre = el("pre");
+  const rows = source.events?.events || [];
+  pre.textContent = rows.length ? rows.map(row=>JSON.stringify(row)).join("\n") : "No retained sidecar events.";
+  events.append(pre);
+  box.append(events);
+}
 function renderRules(){
   const box = document.getElementById("rulesTab");
   const catalog = state.rules || {rules:[], by_event:{}, by_severity:{}, by_origin:{}};
@@ -726,6 +815,7 @@ function showError(msg){
   document.getElementById("incidentTab").innerHTML = '<div class="err">'+msg+'</div>';
   document.getElementById("postureTab").innerHTML = '<div class="err">'+msg+'</div>';
   document.getElementById("integrityTab").innerHTML = '<div class="err">'+msg+'</div>';
+  document.getElementById("sidecarTab").innerHTML = '<div class="err">'+msg+'</div>';
   document.getElementById("rulesTab").innerHTML = '<div class="err">'+msg+'</div>';
   document.getElementById("plan").innerHTML = '<div class="err">'+msg+'</div>';
 }

enodia_sentinel/web.py

@@ -175,6 +175,199 @@ def tail_events(cfg: Config, limit: int = 100) -> list[str]:
     return lines[-limit:]
 
 
+# --- isolated Go sidecar evidence (read-only migration consumer) ----------
+
+def _go_sidecar_dir(cfg: Config) -> Path | None:
+    # This is an opt-in evidence boundary, not an alternate runtime root. The
+    # web process only derives paths beneath it and never creates or mutates it.
+    raw = cfg.go_sidecar_state_dir.strip()
+    return Path(raw) if raw else None
+
+
+def go_sidecar_status(cfg: Config, now: float | None = None) -> dict:
+    """Describe the separately configured Go evidence tree without touching it.
+
+    The Python daemon remains authoritative. This endpoint deliberately exposes
+    only whether the optional migration sidecar is configured and whether its
+    retained heartbeat is fresh; it never starts, stops, or probes the service.
+    """
+    directory = _go_sidecar_dir(cfg)
+    report = {
+        "schema": schemas.GO_SIDECAR_V1,
+        "read_only": True,
+        "configured": directory is not None,
+        "state_dir": str(directory) if directory else "",
+        "available": bool(directory and directory.is_dir()),
+        "heartbeat": {"status": "not-configured"},
+    }
+    if directory is None:
+        return report
+    heartbeat = directory / "heartbeat"
+    try:
+        timestamp = int(heartbeat.read_text().strip())
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        report["heartbeat"] = {"status": "missing"}
+        return report
+    ts = time.time() if now is None else now
+    age = max(0.0, ts - timestamp)
+    report["heartbeat"] = {
+        "status": "fresh" if age <= cfg.heartbeat_max_age else "stale",
+        "timestamp": timestamp,
+        "age_seconds": age,
+        "max_age_seconds": cfg.heartbeat_max_age,
+    }
+    return report
+
+
+def _go_snapshot_report(path: Path) -> dict | None:
+    # Sidecar files are retained forensic input, not trusted application data.
+    # Require the expected schema before presenting an arbitrary JSON document
+    # as a Sentinel alert snapshot.
+    try:
+        report = json.loads(path.read_text())
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        return None
+    if not isinstance(report, dict) or report.get("schema") != schemas.ALERT_SNAPSHOT_V1:
+        return None
+    return report
+
+
+def list_go_sidecar_alerts(cfg: Config, limit: int = 200) -> list[dict]:
+    directory = _go_sidecar_dir(cfg)
+    if directory is None:
+        return []
+    alerts = []
+    for path in sorted(directory.glob("alert-*.json"), reverse=True)[:limit]:
+        report = _go_snapshot_report(path)
+        if report is None:
+            continue
+        records = report.get("alerts", [])
+        if not isinstance(records, list):
+            continue
+        alerts.append({
+            "name": path.with_suffix(".log").name,
+            "time": report.get("time", ""),
+            "host": report.get("host", ""),
+            "severity": report.get("severity", ""),
+            "signatures": sorted({a.get("signature", "") for a in records
+                                  if isinstance(a, dict)}),
+            "sids": sorted({a.get("sid", 0) for a in records
+                            if isinstance(a, dict) and a.get("sid")}),
+            "count": len(records),
+            "source": "go-sidecar",
+        })
+    return alerts
+
+
+def get_go_sidecar_alert(cfg: Config, name: str) -> dict | None:
+    if not isinstance(name, str) or not _ALERT_NAME.match(name):
+        return None
+    directory = _go_sidecar_dir(cfg)
+    if directory is None:
+        return None
+    base = directory / name
+    report = _go_snapshot_report(base.with_suffix(".json"))
+    if report is None:
+        return None
+    data = {"json": report, "source": "go-sidecar"}
+    try:
+        if base.is_file():
+            data["text"] = base.read_text()
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+    return data
+
+
+def go_sidecar_events(cfg: Config, limit: int = 100) -> dict:
+    """Return valid retained envelopes, failing closed if either segment corrupts."""
+    directory = _go_sidecar_dir(cfg)
+    result = {"events": [], "source": "go-sidecar", "error": None}
+    if directory is None:
+        return result
+    # Match the Go reader's chronology: the rotated segment precedes its active
+    # successor. Do not return a partial stream after corruption, because that
+    # could make an incomplete evidence chain look authoritative.
+    rows = []
+    for path in (directory / "events.jsonl.1", directory / "events.jsonl"):
+        try:
+            lines = path.read_text().splitlines()
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            continue
+        except OSError as exc:
+            result["error"] = f"cannot read retained events: {exc}"
+            return result
+        for line in lines:
+            if not line:
+                continue
+            try:
+                row = json.loads(line)
+            except ValueError:
+                result["error"] = "retained event log is corrupt"
+                return result
+            if not isinstance(row, dict):
+                result["error"] = "retained event log contains a non-object record"
+                return result
+            rows.append(row)
+    result["events"] = rows[-max(0, limit):] if limit else []
+    return result
+
+
+def list_go_sidecar_incidents(cfg: Config) -> list[dict]:
+    directory = _go_sidecar_dir(cfg)
+    if directory is None:
+        return []
+    try:
+        index = json.loads((directory / "incidents.json").read_text())
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        return []
+    if not isinstance(index, dict):
+        return []
+    # Atomic index replacement protects writers, but retained files can still
+    # be stale or manually damaged; schema filtering keeps this read-only view
+    # from interpreting unrelated JSON as an incident.
+    records = [item for item in index.values()
+               if isinstance(item, dict) and item.get("schema") == schemas.INCIDENT_V1]
+
+    def last_timestamp(item: dict) -> float:
+        try:
+            return float(item.get("last_ts", 0.0))
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            return 0.0
+
+    return sorted(records, key=last_timestamp, reverse=True)
+
+
+def get_go_sidecar_incident(cfg: Config, incident_id: str) -> dict | None:
+    incident = next((item for item in list_go_sidecar_incidents(cfg)
+                     if item.get("id") == incident_id), None)
+    if incident is None:
+        return None
+    snapshots, timeline = [], []
+    for name in incident.get("snapshots", []):
+        if not isinstance(name, str):
+            timeline.append({"snapshot": str(name), "time": "?", "missing": True})
+            continue
+        alert = get_go_sidecar_alert(cfg, name)
+        if alert is None:
+            timeline.append({"snapshot": name, "time": "?", "missing": True})
+            continue
+        report = alert["json"]
+        snapshots.append(report)
+        timeline.append({
+            "snapshot": name,
+            "time": report.get("time", "?"),
+            "severity": report.get("severity", "?"),
+            "signatures": list(dict.fromkeys(
+                row.get("signature", "") for row in report.get("alerts", [])
+                if isinstance(row, dict))),
+            "pids": [row.get("pid") for row in report.get("processes", [])
+                     if isinstance(row, dict) and isinstance(row.get("pid"), int)],
+        })
+    timeline.sort(key=lambda row: row.get("time", ""))
+    return {"schema": schemas.INCIDENT_VIEW_V1, "incident": incident,
+            "timeline": timeline, "snapshots": snapshots, "source": "go-sidecar"}
+
+
 def daemon_status(cfg: Config) -> dict:
     pid_alive = False
     pidfile = cfg.log_dir / "sentinel.pid"
@@ -505,6 +698,21 @@ class _Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
             self._json_or_not_found(alert, send_body=send_body)
         elif path == "/api/events":
             self._json({"events": tail_events(cfg)}, send_body=send_body)
+        elif path == "/api/go-sidecar/status":
+            self._json(go_sidecar_status(cfg), send_body=send_body)
+        elif path == "/api/go-sidecar/alerts":
+            self._json(list_go_sidecar_alerts(cfg), send_body=send_body)
+        elif path.startswith("/api/go-sidecar/alerts/"):
+            alert = get_go_sidecar_alert(cfg, path.rsplit("/", 1)[-1])
+            self._json_or_not_found(alert, send_body=send_body)
+        elif path == "/api/go-sidecar/events":
+            self._json(go_sidecar_events(cfg), send_body=send_body)
+        elif path == "/api/go-sidecar/incidents":
+            self._json(list_go_sidecar_incidents(cfg), send_body=send_body)
+        elif path.startswith("/api/go-sidecar/incidents/"):
+            iid = unquote(path.rsplit("/", 1)[-1])
+            report = get_go_sidecar_incident(cfg, iid)
+            self._json_or_not_found(report, send_body=send_body)
         elif path == "/api/posture":
             self._json(posture_report(cfg), send_body=send_body)
         elif path == "/api/rules":

go-agent/README.md

@@ -20,6 +20,17 @@ Current scope:
 - an opt-in live baseline lifecycle (`--state-dir`) that builds listener/SUID
   baselines, honors the startup grace gate, scans persistence paths, and
   atomically retains `first-seen.json` using the Python-compatible schema;
+- a sidecar-only FIM engine, enabled only with `--state-dir`, that persists a
+  SHA-256 security-path baseline as `fim-baseline.json`, performs
+  non-overlapping background comparisons, and can opt in to a bounded
+  `pacman -Qkk` package verification pass with `fim_pkg_verify = true`;
+- a sidecar-only rootcheck engine that bounds PID cross-view probing with
+  `rootcheck_pid_cap`, runs one background comparison per interval, and checks
+  procfs, sysfs, `ps`, socket, module-taint, kernel-taint, and promiscuous-mode
+  views without blocking the polling loop;
+- a sidecar-only package-DB anchor (`pkgdb_verify`) that fingerprints pacman's
+  local checksum database and alerts only on changes that lack a corresponding
+  transaction-log record; it never refreshes an unexplained changed anchor;
 - pure exec and syscall event models plus replayable rule engines: built-in
   exec SIDs `100001`–`100004`, configured `[[exec_rules]]`, and syscall SIDs
   `100060`–`100066` now emit Python-identical alert envelopes without requiring
@@ -52,10 +63,12 @@ Current scope:
 - a shared fixture checked against the Python detector by
   `scripts/check-go-parity.py`.
 
-It does not yet provide Python's full enrichment, notification fan-out, or
+It does not yet provide Python's full enrichment or notification fan-out, and
-management consumers for those snapshots, and it does not replace
+it does not replace `enodia-sentinel`. Python's optional `/api/go-sidecar/*`
-`enodia-sentinel`. The module requires Go 1.25 or newer; development is currently
+consumer can display this sidecar's isolated retained evidence, but remains
-verified with Go 1.26.5. Run a single terminal-visible stateless sweep:
+read-only and never starts or controls the Go process. The module requires Go
+1.25 or newer; development is currently verified with Go 1.26.5. Run a single
+terminal-visible stateless sweep:
 
 ```bash
 cd go-agent
@@ -118,10 +131,12 @@ process/parent context, lineage, remote-IP classification, and candidate paths
 from already-captured data without new I/O. A 16-job asynchronous worker then
 adds streamed SHA-256 values for regular executables up to 8 MiB, file metadata,
 and pacman/dpkg/rpm package-owner strings with a two-second query bound;
-saturation leaves fields unknown rather than delaying alerts. Richer integrity
+saturation leaves fields unknown rather than delaying alerts. The sidecar also
-engines and notifications remain future parity work. The worker does report
+has separate, bounded FIM/package-verification, package-DB-anchor, and
-truthful FIM-baseline, package-DB-anchor, and Go hash-chain presence/age while
+rootcheck engines; notification fan-out remains future parity work. The worker
-explicitly marking unported package verification and rootcheck as disabled.
+reports truthful FIM-baseline, package-DB-anchor, and Go hash-chain
+presence/age, plus the configured `pacman -Qkk` and rootcheck cadences. This is
+metadata only: recording a snapshot never starts integrity work.
 Snapshot text/JSON
 revisions append synchronized `enodia.hash_chain.v1`
 records to a private local `hash-chain.jsonl`.

go-agent/cmd/enodia-sentinel-go/main.go

@@ -27,9 +27,12 @@ import (
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/ebpfsource"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/eventlog"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/events"
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/fim"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/health"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/incident"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/pkgdb"
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/rootcheck"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/schema"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/sdnotify"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/snapshot"
@@ -203,6 +206,21 @@ func run() error {
 		runner.Lifecycle = baseline.New(cfg, func() []string {
 			return system.ScanSUIDBinaries(*suidRoot, cfg.SUIDScanExtraDirs)
 		})
+		// The FIM engine shares only the sidecar's explicitly selected state
+		// directory. It never reads or rewrites Python's production baseline.
+		if cfg.FIMEnabled {
+			runner.FIM = fim.New(cfg)
+		}
+		if cfg.PackageDBVerify {
+			// The anchor resides in the same selected sidecar tree as its FIM
+			// baseline; it never reads or updates Python's production anchor.
+			runner.PackageDB = pkgdb.New(cfg)
+		}
+		if cfg.RootcheckEnabled {
+			// Rootcheck has no persistent baseline, but remains sidecar-only too:
+			// fixture and parity runs must stay hermetic and free of host probes.
+			runner.Rootcheck = rootcheck.New(cfg)
+		}
 	}
 	if *host != "" {
 		runner.Host = func() (string, error) { return *host, nil }
@@ -265,6 +283,9 @@ func run() error {
 		); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
+		// Persist only settings for actually-attached integrity engines. The slow
+		// enrichment worker remains observational and never runs an engine.
+		snapshotStore.ConfigureIntegrity(cfg, runner.FIM != nil, runner.Rootcheck != nil)
 		snapshotStore.EnableSlowEnrichment()
 		defer snapshotStore.Close()
 	}

go-agent/internal/agent/agent.go

@@ -15,7 +15,10 @@ import (
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/baseline"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/config"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/detectors"
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/fim"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/pkgdb"
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/rootcheck"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/schema"
 )
 
@@ -37,6 +40,18 @@ type Agent struct {
 	// baseline manager so startup grace and durable first-seen state match the
 	// Python oracle without contaminating parity inputs.
 	Lifecycle *baseline.Manager
+	// FIM is optional even when the sidecar is stateful. It owns slow hashing
+	// and package verification and hands completed alerts back to Sweep, which
+	// keeps the existing cooldown and snapshot pipeline authoritative.
+	FIM *fim.Manager
+	// PackageDB watches the mutable package checksum database itself. It is kept
+	// separate from FIM because a package-manager database edit can otherwise
+	// make pacman-based file verification appear clean.
+	PackageDB *pkgdb.Manager
+	// Rootcheck is likewise a sidecar-only asynchronous integrity engine. It
+	// uses the captured socket state but collects independent proc/sys/tool views
+	// outside this sweep's detector and event-output locks.
+	Rootcheck *rootcheck.Manager
 
 	cooldownMu    sync.Mutex
 	cooldowns     map[string]time.Time
@@ -76,6 +91,21 @@ func (a *Agent) Sweep() ([]map[string]any, error) {
 			return nil, err
 		}
 	}
+	if a.FIM != nil {
+		// Scheduling is deliberately before detector evaluation, but FIM itself
+		// runs asynchronously so a large hash tree never delays this sweep.
+		a.FIM.MaybeStart(now)
+	}
+	if a.PackageDB != nil {
+		// Like FIM, DB fingerprinting happens away from detector evaluation. A
+		// completed tamper result still returns through the shared alert pipeline.
+		a.PackageDB.MaybeStart(now)
+	}
+	if a.Rootcheck != nil {
+		// Capture provides the socket view rootcheck compares with procfs and ps;
+		// pass this immutable sweep snapshot to avoid a second full capture.
+		a.Rootcheck.MaybeStart(now, state)
+	}
 	host, err := a.Host()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -131,6 +161,17 @@ func (a *Agent) Sweep() ([]map[string]any, error) {
 			return nil, err
 		}
 	}
+	if a.FIM != nil {
+		// Background engines return results here instead of emitting directly, so
+		// they use this Agent's shared cooldown, snapshot, and event ordering.
+		alerts = append(alerts, a.FIM.Drain()...)
+	}
+	if a.PackageDB != nil {
+		alerts = append(alerts, a.PackageDB.Drain()...)
+	}
+	if a.Rootcheck != nil {
+		alerts = append(alerts, a.Rootcheck.Drain()...)
+	}
 	events, err := a.alertEvents(alerts, now, host, timestamp)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -223,6 +264,22 @@ func (a *Agent) Initialize() error {
 		// otherwise fixed-clock tests could arm against wall time by accident.
 		a.Lifecycle.Now = a.Now
 		a.initializeErr = a.Lifecycle.Initialize(baseline.CaptureFunc(a.Capture))
+		if a.initializeErr != nil {
+			return a.initializeErr
+		}
+	}
+	if a.FIM != nil {
+		// FIM must establish its immutable baseline before its first scheduled
+		// scan. The manager writes only the caller-selected sidecar LogDir.
+		a.initializeErr = a.FIM.Initialize()
+		if a.initializeErr != nil {
+			return a.initializeErr
+		}
+	}
+	if a.PackageDB != nil {
+		// Establishing the anchor precedes monitoring, just as the Python daemon
+		// does. Later unexplained changes deliberately do not refresh it.
+		a.initializeErr = a.PackageDB.Initialize()
 	}
 	return a.initializeErr
 }

go-agent/internal/config/config.go

@@ -53,11 +53,25 @@ var defaultMemoryObfuscationAllowComms = []string{
 // Config mirrors the Phase 1 settings consumed by the Go sweep loop. More
 // fields are added as their detectors are ported.
 type Config struct {
-	SampleInterval                time.Duration
+	SampleInterval   time.Duration
-	Cooldown                      time.Duration
+	Cooldown         time.Duration
-	BaselineGrace                 time.Duration
+	BaselineGrace    time.Duration
-	SUIDRefresh                   time.Duration
+	SUIDRefresh      time.Duration
-	SUIDScanInterval              time.Duration
+	SUIDScanInterval time.Duration
+	// Integrity engines are parsed with the shared configuration for parity,
+	// but main attaches them only to an explicitly stateful Go sidecar. That
+	// preserves Python's production baselines and management authority.
+	FIMEnabled                    bool
+	FIMPaths                      []string
+	FIMScanInterval               time.Duration
+	FIMPackageVerify              bool
+	FIMPackageVerifyInterval      time.Duration
+	PackageDBVerify               bool
+	PackageDBInterval             time.Duration
+	RootcheckEnabled              bool
+	RootcheckInterval             time.Duration
+	RootcheckPIDCap               int
+	RootcheckModuleAllow          map[string]bool
 	HeartbeatMaxAge               int
 	MaxSnapshots                  int
 	MaxSnapshotAgeDays            int
@@ -97,6 +111,17 @@ func Default() Config {
 		BaselineGrace:                 10 * time.Second,
 		SUIDRefresh:                   time.Hour,
 		SUIDScanInterval:              time.Minute,
+		FIMEnabled:                    true,
+		FIMPaths:                      []string{},
+		FIMScanInterval:               5 * time.Minute,
+		FIMPackageVerify:              false,
+		FIMPackageVerifyInterval:      6 * time.Hour,
+		PackageDBVerify:               true,
+		PackageDBInterval:             10 * time.Minute,
+		RootcheckEnabled:              true,
+		RootcheckInterval:             5 * time.Minute,
+		RootcheckPIDCap:               65536,
+		RootcheckModuleAllow:          map[string]bool{},
 		HeartbeatMaxAge:               120,
 		MaxSnapshots:                  300,
 		MaxSnapshotAgeDays:            60,
@@ -192,6 +217,72 @@ func Load(path string) (Config, error) {
 				return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("suid_scan_interval: %w", err)
 			}
 			cfg.SUIDScanInterval = duration
+		case "fim_enabled":
+			enabled, err := boolean(value)
+			if err != nil {
+				return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("fim_enabled: %w", err)
+			}
+			cfg.FIMEnabled = enabled
+		case "fim_paths":
+			paths, err := stringArray(value)
+			if err != nil {
+				return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("fim_paths: %w", err)
+			}
+			cfg.FIMPaths = paths
+		case "fim_scan_interval":
+			duration, err := positiveSeconds(value)
+			if err != nil {
+				return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("fim_scan_interval: %w", err)
+			}
+			cfg.FIMScanInterval = duration
+		case "fim_pkg_verify":
+			enabled, err := boolean(value)
+			if err != nil {
+				return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("fim_pkg_verify: %w", err)
+			}
+			cfg.FIMPackageVerify = enabled
+		case "fim_pkg_verify_interval":
+			duration, err := positiveSeconds(value)
+			if err != nil {
+				return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("fim_pkg_verify_interval: %w", err)
+			}
+			cfg.FIMPackageVerifyInterval = duration
+		case "pkgdb_verify":
+			enabled, err := boolean(value)
+			if err != nil {
+				return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("pkgdb_verify: %w", err)
+			}
+			cfg.PackageDBVerify = enabled
+		case "pkgdb_interval":
+			duration, err := positiveSeconds(value)
+			if err != nil {
+				return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("pkgdb_interval: %w", err)
+			}
+			cfg.PackageDBInterval = duration
+		case "rootcheck_enabled":
+			enabled, err := boolean(value)
+			if err != nil {
+				return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("rootcheck_enabled: %w", err)
+			}
+			cfg.RootcheckEnabled = enabled
+		case "rootcheck_interval":
+			duration, err := positiveSeconds(value)
+			if err != nil {
+				return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("rootcheck_interval: %w", err)
+			}
+			cfg.RootcheckInterval = duration
+		case "rootcheck_pid_cap":
+			cap, err := nonNegativeInt(value)
+			if err != nil {
+				return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("rootcheck_pid_cap: %w", err)
+			}
+			cfg.RootcheckPIDCap = cap
+		case "rootcheck_module_allow":
+			modules, err := stringArray(value)
+			if err != nil {
+				return Config{}, fmt.Errorf("rootcheck_module_allow: %w", err)
+			}
+			cfg.RootcheckModuleAllow = stringSet(modules)
 		case "heartbeat_max_age":
 			age, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
 			if err != nil || age < 0 {

go-agent/internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ func TestDefaultsMatchPython(t *testing.T) {
 	if cfg.SampleInterval != 4*time.Second || cfg.Cooldown != 60*time.Second ||
 		cfg.BaselineGrace != 10*time.Second ||
 		cfg.SUIDRefresh != time.Hour || cfg.SUIDScanInterval != time.Minute ||
+		!cfg.FIMEnabled || cfg.FIMScanInterval != 5*time.Minute ||
+		cfg.FIMPackageVerify || cfg.FIMPackageVerifyInterval != 6*time.Hour ||
+		!cfg.PackageDBVerify || cfg.PackageDBInterval != 10*time.Minute ||
+		!cfg.RootcheckEnabled || cfg.RootcheckInterval != 5*time.Minute ||
+		cfg.RootcheckPIDCap != 65536 || len(cfg.RootcheckModuleAllow) != 0 ||
 		cfg.HeartbeatMaxAge != 120 || cfg.MaxSnapshots != 300 ||
 		cfg.MaxSnapshotAgeDays != 60 || !cfg.IncidentTracking ||
 		cfg.IncidentWindow != 1800 || cfg.IncidentLineageDepth != 8 ||
@@ -33,6 +38,17 @@ cooldown = 30
 baseline_grace = 2.5
 suid_refresh = 120
 suid_scan_interval = 15
+fim_enabled = false
+fim_paths = ["/srv/critical"]
+fim_scan_interval = 25
+fim_pkg_verify = true
+fim_pkg_verify_interval = 300
+pkgdb_verify = false
+pkgdb_interval = 75
+rootcheck_enabled = false
+rootcheck_interval = 40
+rootcheck_pid_cap = 1234
+rootcheck_module_allow = ["vendor_gpu"]
 heartbeat_max_age = 45
 max_snapshots = 25
 max_snapshot_age_days = 7
@@ -72,6 +88,12 @@ unknown_future_key = true
 	if cfg.SampleInterval != 1500*time.Millisecond || cfg.Cooldown != 30*time.Second ||
 		cfg.BaselineGrace != 2500*time.Millisecond ||
 		cfg.SUIDRefresh != 2*time.Minute || cfg.SUIDScanInterval != 15*time.Second ||
+		cfg.FIMEnabled || len(cfg.FIMPaths) != 1 || cfg.FIMPaths[0] != "/srv/critical" ||
+		cfg.FIMScanInterval != 25*time.Second || !cfg.FIMPackageVerify ||
+		cfg.FIMPackageVerifyInterval != 5*time.Minute ||
+		cfg.PackageDBVerify || cfg.PackageDBInterval != 75*time.Second ||
+		cfg.RootcheckEnabled || cfg.RootcheckInterval != 40*time.Second ||
+		cfg.RootcheckPIDCap != 1234 || !cfg.RootcheckModuleAllow["vendor_gpu"] ||
 		cfg.HeartbeatMaxAge != 45 || cfg.MaxSnapshots != 25 || cfg.MaxSnapshotAgeDays != 7 ||
 		cfg.IncidentTracking || cfg.IncidentWindow != 90 || cfg.IncidentLineageDepth != 3 {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected parsed config: %+v", cfg)

go-agent/internal/enrich/enrich.go

@@ -50,6 +50,22 @@ type SlowResult struct {
 	Integrity map[string]any
 }
 
+// IntegritySettings describes engines that are already configured by the
+// sidecar. It is metadata only: CollectSlow must never start a hash scan,
+// package-manager process, or rootcheck while it is enriching an alert.
+//
+// Durations are carried as durations here and converted to integer seconds at
+// the snapshot boundary so the retained JSON stays easy to consume alongside
+// Python's enrichment records.
+type IntegritySettings struct {
+	FIMEnabled            bool
+	FIMScanInterval       time.Duration
+	PackageVerifyEnabled  bool
+	PackageVerifyInterval time.Duration
+	RootcheckEnabled      bool
+	RootcheckInterval     time.Duration
+}
+
 func CollectSlow(processes []Process, paths []string, owner ...func(string) string) SlowResult {
 	result := SlowResult{Processes: map[int]map[string]any{}, Files: map[string]map[string]any{}}
 	packageOwner := func(string) string { return "" }
@@ -71,17 +87,37 @@ func CollectSlow(processes []Process, paths []string, owner ...func(string) stri
 	return result
 }
 
-// IntegrityAnchors reports durable state presence without running FIM, package
+// IntegrityAnchors reports durable state and configured engine cadence without
-// verification, or rootcheck on the alert path. Those engines stay disabled
+// running FIM, package verification, or rootcheck on the alert path. A caller
-// until their own Go parity tranches land.
+// can omit settings for stateless/parity uses; explicit sidecar mode supplies
-func IntegrityAnchors(directory string) map[string]any {
+// them after it has attached the bounded background managers.
-	return map[string]any{
+func IntegrityAnchors(directory string, configured ...IntegritySettings) map[string]any {
-		"fim_baseline":   pathStatus(filepath.Join(directory, "fim-baseline.json")),
+	settings := IntegritySettings{}
-		"pkgdb_anchor":   pathStatus(filepath.Join(directory, "pkgdb-anchor.json")),
+	if len(configured) > 0 {
-		"package_verify": map[string]any{"enabled": false, "sample": 0},
+		settings = configured[0]
-		"rootcheck":      map[string]any{"enabled": false, "interval": 0},
-		"go_assurance":   pathStatus(filepath.Join(directory, "hash-chain.jsonl")),
 	}
+	return map[string]any{
+		"fim_baseline": pathStatus(filepath.Join(directory, "fim-baseline.json")),
+		"pkgdb_anchor": pathStatus(filepath.Join(directory, "pkgdb-anchor.json")),
+		// Go uses pacman -Qkk rather than Python's sampled signed-cache verifier.
+		// Keep sample at zero to make that distinction explicit to consumers.
+		"package_verify": map[string]any{
+			"enabled": settings.PackageVerifyEnabled, "engine": "pacman-qkk",
+			"interval": durationSeconds(settings.PackageVerifyInterval), "sample": 0,
+		},
+		"rootcheck": map[string]any{
+			"enabled":  settings.RootcheckEnabled,
+			"interval": durationSeconds(settings.RootcheckInterval),
+		},
+		"go_assurance": pathStatus(filepath.Join(directory, "hash-chain.jsonl")),
+	}
+}
+
+func durationSeconds(value time.Duration) int64 {
+	if value <= 0 {
+		return 0
+	}
+	return int64(value / time.Second)
 }
 
 func pathStatus(path string) map[string]any {

go-agent/internal/enrich/enrich_test.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
 )
@@ -77,9 +78,16 @@ func TestCollectSlowAddsInjectedPackageOwnership(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestIntegrityAnchorsAreTruthfulAndReadOnly(t *testing.T) {
 	directory := t.TempDir()
-	anchors := IntegrityAnchors(directory)
+	anchors := IntegrityAnchors(directory, IntegritySettings{
+		FIMEnabled: true, FIMScanInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
+		PackageVerifyEnabled: true, PackageVerifyInterval: 6 * time.Hour,
+		RootcheckEnabled: true, RootcheckInterval: 5 * time.Minute,
+	})
 	if anchors["fim_baseline"].(map[string]any)["status"] != "missing" ||
-		anchors["rootcheck"].(map[string]any)["enabled"] != false {
+		anchors["rootcheck"].(map[string]any)["enabled"] != true ||
+		anchors["rootcheck"].(map[string]any)["interval"] != int64(300) ||
+		anchors["package_verify"].(map[string]any)["engine"] != "pacman-qkk" ||
+		anchors["package_verify"].(map[string]any)["interval"] != int64(21600) {
 		t.Fatalf("anchors=%#v", anchors)
 	}
 	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(directory, "hash-chain.jsonl"), []byte("{}\n"), 0o600); err != nil {

go-agent/internal/fim/fim.go

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+// Package fim ports the Python file-integrity engine: a SHA-256 baseline over
+// security-critical paths the package manager does not track, and the diff that
+// turns baseline drift into alerts.
+//
+// Content hashing is the upgrade over mtime checks — it catches a file swapped
+// for a malicious copy even when the timestamp is preserved.
+package fim
+
+import (
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
+)
+
+// SIDs 100017+ are FIM signatures, matching Python.
+const (
+	SIDModified = 100017
+	SIDAdded    = 100018
+	SIDRemoved  = 100019
+	SIDPackage  = 100020
+)
+
+// Entry is one path's integrity record. SHA256 and Link are pointers so that
+// "absent" and "present but empty" stay distinguishable: Python builds these
+// dicts with optional keys and compares them with dict.get, so a regular file
+// carries no link key at all while a symlink may legitimately carry "".
+type Entry struct {
+	Mode   int     `json:"mode"`
+	UID    int     `json:"uid"`
+	GID    int     `json:"gid"`
+	Size   int64   `json:"size"`
+	SHA256 *string `json:"sha256,omitempty"`
+	Link   *string `json:"link,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// Change is one modified path and the fields that differ, in Python's order.
+type Change struct {
+	Path   string   `json:"path"`
+	Fields []string `json:"fields"`
+}
+
+// Result is one baseline-versus-live comparison.
+type Result struct {
+	Added    []string `json:"added"`
+	Removed  []string `json:"removed"`
+	Modified []Change `json:"modified"`
+}
+
+// comparedFields is Python's tuple order and drives the detail string. Size is
+// deliberately absent: a content change already surfaces as a sha256 change.
+var comparedFields = []string{"sha256", "mode", "uid", "gid", "link"}
+
+func sameOptional(a, b *string) bool {
+	if a == nil || b == nil {
+		return a == nil && b == nil
+	}
+	return *a == *b
+}
+
+func changedFields(old, current Entry) []string {
+	changed := make([]string, 0, len(comparedFields))
+	for _, field := range comparedFields {
+		differs := false
+		switch field {
+		case "sha256":
+			differs = !sameOptional(old.SHA256, current.SHA256)
+		case "mode":
+			differs = old.Mode != current.Mode
+		case "uid":
+			differs = old.UID != current.UID
+		case "gid":
+			differs = old.GID != current.GID
+		case "link":
+			differs = !sameOptional(old.Link, current.Link)
+		}
+		if differs {
+			changed = append(changed, field)
+		}
+	}
+	return changed
+}
+
+// Diff compares a baseline against a live scan. Every category is sorted so
+// alert order is stable across runs and matches the Python oracle.
+func Diff(old, current map[string]Entry) Result {
+	added := make([]string, 0)
+	removed := make([]string, 0)
+	shared := make([]string, 0)
+	for path := range current {
+		if _, ok := old[path]; !ok {
+			added = append(added, path)
+		}
+	}
+	for path := range old {
+		if _, ok := current[path]; ok {
+			shared = append(shared, path)
+		} else {
+			removed = append(removed, path)
+		}
+	}
+	sort.Strings(added)
+	sort.Strings(removed)
+	sort.Strings(shared)
+
+	modified := make([]Change, 0)
+	for _, path := range shared {
+		if fields := changedFields(old[path], current[path]); len(fields) > 0 {
+			modified = append(modified, Change{Path: path, Fields: fields})
+		}
+	}
+	return Result{Added: added, Removed: removed, Modified: modified}
+}
+
+// DiffAlerts turns a comparison into alerts, emitting modified, then added,
+// then removed, to match Python's generator order.
+func DiffAlerts(result Result) []model.Alert {
+	alerts := make([]model.Alert, 0, len(result.Modified)+len(result.Added)+len(result.Removed))
+	for _, change := range result.Modified {
+		// Content or permission changes are the ones that let an attacker
+		// substitute or escalate; ownership alone is weaker evidence.
+		severity := "MEDIUM"
+		for _, field := range change.Fields {
+			if field == "sha256" || field == "mode" {
+				severity = "HIGH"
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		alerts = append(alerts, model.Alert{
+			SID: SIDModified, Severity: severity, Signature: "fim_modified",
+			Classtype: "integrity-violation", Key: "fim:mod:" + change.Path,
+			Detail: "integrity change (" + strings.Join(change.Fields, ", ") + "): " + change.Path,
+			PIDs:   []int{},
+		})
+	}
+	for _, path := range result.Added {
+		alerts = append(alerts, model.Alert{
+			SID: SIDAdded, Severity: "MEDIUM", Signature: "fim_added",
+			Classtype: "integrity-violation", Key: "fim:add:" + path,
+			Detail: "new file in monitored path: " + path, PIDs: []int{},
+		})
+	}
+	for _, path := range result.Removed {
+		alerts = append(alerts, model.Alert{
+			SID: SIDRemoved, Severity: "MEDIUM", Signature: "fim_removed",
+			Classtype: "integrity-violation", Key: "fim:del:" + path,
+			Detail: "monitored file removed: " + path, PIDs: []int{},
+		})
+	}
+	return alerts
+}

go-agent/internal/fim/fim_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package fim
+
+import (
+	"reflect"
+	"testing"
+
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
+)
+
+func ptr(value string) *string { return &value }
+
+func TestDiffClassifiesAddedRemovedAndModified(t *testing.T) {
+	old := map[string]Entry{
+		"/etc/passwd":  {Mode: 0o644, UID: 0, GID: 0, Size: 10, SHA256: ptr("aaa")},
+		"/etc/removed": {Mode: 0o644, SHA256: ptr("bbb")},
+	}
+	current := map[string]Entry{
+		"/etc/passwd": {Mode: 0o644, UID: 0, GID: 0, Size: 12, SHA256: ptr("ccc")},
+		"/etc/added":  {Mode: 0o600, SHA256: ptr("ddd")},
+	}
+
+	result := Diff(old, current)
+
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(result.Added, []string{"/etc/added"}) {
+		t.Errorf("added = %v, want [/etc/added]", result.Added)
+	}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(result.Removed, []string{"/etc/removed"}) {
+		t.Errorf("removed = %v, want [/etc/removed]", result.Removed)
+	}
+	want := []Change{{Path: "/etc/passwd", Fields: []string{"sha256"}}}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(result.Modified, want) {
+		t.Errorf("modified = %v, want %v", result.Modified, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// Python reports changed fields in a fixed order and size is deliberately not
+// one of them: a content change already shows up as a sha256 change.
+func TestDiffReportsFieldsInPythonOrderAndIgnoresSize(t *testing.T) {
+	old := map[string]Entry{"/f": {Mode: 0o644, UID: 0, GID: 0, Size: 1, SHA256: ptr("a")}}
+	current := map[string]Entry{"/f": {Mode: 0o755, UID: 1, GID: 2, Size: 999, SHA256: ptr("b")}}
+
+	result := Diff(old, current)
+
+	want := []Change{{Path: "/f", Fields: []string{"sha256", "mode", "uid", "gid"}}}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(result.Modified, want) {
+		t.Errorf("modified = %v, want %v", result.Modified, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// Python compares with dict.get, so an absent hash and a null hash are equal.
+// Getting this wrong would alert on every unreadable file, every scan.
+func TestDiffTreatsAbsentAndNullHashAsEqual(t *testing.T) {
+	old := map[string]Entry{"/f": {Mode: 0o644, SHA256: nil}}
+	current := map[string]Entry{"/f": {Mode: 0o644, SHA256: nil}}
+
+	if got := Diff(old, current).Modified; len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("modified = %v, want none", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// An empty symlink target is not the same as no symlink target at all.
+func TestDiffDistinguishesEmptyLinkFromAbsentLink(t *testing.T) {
+	old := map[string]Entry{"/l": {Mode: 0o777, Link: ptr("")}}
+	current := map[string]Entry{"/l": {Mode: 0o777, Link: nil}}
+
+	want := []Change{{Path: "/l", Fields: []string{"link"}}}
+	if got := Diff(old, current).Modified; !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
+		t.Errorf("modified = %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDiffDetectsSymlinkRetarget(t *testing.T) {
+	old := map[string]Entry{"/l": {Mode: 0o777, Link: ptr("/bin/sh")}}
+	current := map[string]Entry{"/l": {Mode: 0o777, Link: ptr("/tmp/evil")}}
+
+	want := []Change{{Path: "/l", Fields: []string{"link"}}}
+	if got := Diff(old, current).Modified; !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
+		t.Errorf("modified = %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDiffSortsEachCategory(t *testing.T) {
+	old := map[string]Entry{"/z": {Size: 1}, "/a": {Size: 1}}
+	current := map[string]Entry{"/y": {Size: 1}, "/b": {Size: 1}}
+
+	result := Diff(old, current)
+
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(result.Added, []string{"/b", "/y"}) {
+		t.Errorf("added = %v, want sorted [/b /y]", result.Added)
+	}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(result.Removed, []string{"/a", "/z"}) {
+		t.Errorf("removed = %v, want sorted [/a /z]", result.Removed)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDiffEmitsEmptyNotNilSlices(t *testing.T) {
+	result := Diff(map[string]Entry{}, map[string]Entry{})
+
+	if result.Added == nil || result.Removed == nil || result.Modified == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Diff must return empty, non-nil slices, got %+v", result)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDiffAlertsOrdersModifiedThenAddedThenRemoved(t *testing.T) {
+	result := Result{
+		Added:    []string{"/new"},
+		Removed:  []string{"/gone"},
+		Modified: []Change{{Path: "/changed", Fields: []string{"uid"}}},
+	}
+
+	alerts := DiffAlerts(result)
+
+	want := []model.Alert{
+		{
+			SID: 100017, Severity: "MEDIUM", Signature: "fim_modified",
+			Classtype: "integrity-violation", Key: "fim:mod:/changed",
+			Detail: "integrity change (uid): /changed", PIDs: []int{},
+		},
+		{
+			SID: 100018, Severity: "MEDIUM", Signature: "fim_added",
+			Classtype: "integrity-violation", Key: "fim:add:/new",
+			Detail: "new file in monitored path: /new", PIDs: []int{},
+		},
+		{
+			SID: 100019, Severity: "MEDIUM", Signature: "fim_removed",
+			Classtype: "integrity-violation", Key: "fim:del:/gone",
+			Detail: "monitored file removed: /gone", PIDs: []int{},
+		},
+	}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(alerts, want) {
+		t.Errorf("alerts = %+v, want %+v", alerts, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// Content and permission changes are HIGH; ownership-only changes are MEDIUM.
+func TestDiffAlertsEscalatesContentAndModeChanges(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		fields   []string
+		severity string
+		detail   string
+	}{
+		{[]string{"sha256"}, "HIGH", "integrity change (sha256): /f"},
+		{[]string{"mode"}, "HIGH", "integrity change (mode): /f"},
+		{[]string{"sha256", "mode"}, "HIGH", "integrity change (sha256, mode): /f"},
+		{[]string{"uid", "gid"}, "MEDIUM", "integrity change (uid, gid): /f"},
+		{[]string{"link"}, "MEDIUM", "integrity change (link): /f"},
+	}
+	for _, testCase := range cases {
+		alerts := DiffAlerts(Result{Modified: []Change{{Path: "/f", Fields: testCase.fields}}})
+		if len(alerts) != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("%v: got %d alerts, want 1", testCase.fields, len(alerts))
+		}
+		if alerts[0].Severity != testCase.severity {
+			t.Errorf("%v: severity = %s, want %s", testCase.fields, alerts[0].Severity, testCase.severity)
+		}
+		if alerts[0].Detail != testCase.detail {
+			t.Errorf("%v: detail = %q, want %q", testCase.fields, alerts[0].Detail, testCase.detail)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDiffAlertsReturnsEmptySliceForCleanScan(t *testing.T) {
+	if alerts := DiffAlerts(Diff(nil, nil)); len(alerts) != 0 || alerts == nil {
+		t.Errorf("alerts = %v, want empty non-nil slice", alerts)
+	}
+}

go-agent/internal/fim/manager.go

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package fim
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/config"
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
+)
+
+const (
+	baselineFilename = "fim-baseline.json"
+	pacmanTimeout    = 10 * time.Minute
+)
+
+// Manager owns the deliberately separate, slow integrity work. Its scans run
+// in at most one goroutine per engine and only hand completed alerts back to
+// the polling loop. That keeps filesystem hashing and pacman from holding a
+// detector, snapshot, or event-output lock.
+type Manager struct {
+	Config config.Config
+	Now    func() time.Time
+	Scan   func([]string) map[string]Entry
+	Verify func(context.Context) (string, error)
+
+	mu            sync.Mutex
+	baseline      map[string]Entry
+	initialized   bool
+	lastScan      time.Time
+	lastVerify    time.Time
+	scanRunning   bool
+	verifyRunning bool
+	pendingAlerts []model.Alert
+}
+
+// New builds a manager with real host collection. Tests replace Scan or Verify
+// so they never read the host or execute a package manager.
+func New(cfg config.Config) *Manager {
+	return &Manager{
+		Config: cfg,
+		Now:    time.Now,
+		Scan:   ScanPaths,
+		Verify: PacmanVerify,
+	}
+}
+
+// Initialize loads a valid non-empty baseline or builds it once. Like Python,
+// baseline creation is a local operator-state action: regular scans never
+// silently accept a changed file as the new truth. The caller supplies LogDir
+// only in explicit sidecar mode, so this baseline can never share or rewrite
+// the Python service's production state.
+func (m *Manager) Initialize() error {
+	if !m.Config.FIMEnabled {
+		return nil
+	}
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	if m.initialized {
+		m.mu.Unlock()
+		return nil
+	}
+	m.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(m.Config.LogDir, 0o750); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	baseline := loadBaseline(filepath.Join(m.Config.LogDir, baselineFilename))
+	if len(baseline) == 0 {
+		// A missing, unreadable, malformed, or empty baseline has no trustworthy
+		// historical truth. Rebuilding it is safer than treating every file as a
+		// change, and it happens only during initialization—not a later scan.
+		baseline = m.Scan(PathList(m.Config.FIMPaths))
+		if err := writeBaseline(filepath.Join(m.Config.LogDir, baselineFilename), baseline); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	if !m.initialized {
+		m.baseline = baseline
+		m.initialized = true
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// MaybeStart schedules due work and returns immediately. A short interval does
+// not start overlapping scans, which bounds both disk pressure and pacman
+// process count even if a scan takes longer than the configured cadence.
+func (m *Manager) MaybeStart(now time.Time) {
+	if !m.Config.FIMEnabled {
+		return
+	}
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	if !m.initialized {
+		m.mu.Unlock()
+		return
+	}
+	if !m.scanRunning && (m.lastScan.IsZero() || now.Sub(m.lastScan) >= m.Config.FIMScanInterval) {
+		m.scanRunning = true
+		m.lastScan = now
+		// Copy state while protected, then release the mutex before filesystem
+		// I/O. Holding the lock through hashing would block Drain and could make
+		// regular detector sweeps wait behind a large tree.
+		baseline := cloneEntries(m.baseline)
+		paths := append([]string(nil), PathList(m.Config.FIMPaths)...)
+		go m.runScan(baseline, paths)
+	}
+	if m.Config.FIMPackageVerify && !m.verifyRunning &&
+		(m.lastVerify.IsZero() || now.Sub(m.lastVerify) >= m.Config.FIMPackageVerifyInterval) {
+		m.verifyRunning = true
+		m.lastVerify = now
+		go m.runVerify()
+	}
+	m.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) runScan(baseline map[string]Entry, paths []string) {
+	// The baseline intentionally remains immutable after initialization. A
+	// completed scan reports drift; it never turns observed drift into truth.
+	alerts := DiffAlerts(Diff(baseline, m.Scan(paths)))
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	m.pendingAlerts = append(m.pendingAlerts, alerts...)
+	m.scanRunning = false
+	m.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) runVerify() {
+	// pacman can block on its database or a slow disk. Its own deadline keeps
+	// the optional verification feature from accumulating background workers.
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), pacmanTimeout)
+	defer cancel()
+	alerts := VerifyAlerts(func() (string, error) { return m.Verify(ctx) })
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	m.pendingAlerts = append(m.pendingAlerts, alerts...)
+	m.verifyRunning = false
+	m.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
+// Drain returns completed background results once. The caller must route them
+// through the shared Agent cooldown and snapshot paths before exposing them.
+func (m *Manager) Drain() []model.Alert {
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	alerts := append([]model.Alert(nil), m.pendingAlerts...)
+	m.pendingAlerts = nil
+	return alerts
+}
+
+func loadBaseline(path string) map[string]Entry {
+	entries := make(map[string]Entry)
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil || json.Unmarshal(raw, &entries) != nil {
+		return map[string]Entry{}
+	}
+	return entries
+}
+
+func writeBaseline(path string, entries map[string]Entry) error {
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(entries)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	raw = append(raw, '\n')
+	// Write and rename in the same directory so a crash cannot leave a partly
+	// written JSON file at the baseline path. The restrictive mode keeps hashes
+	// and file metadata from becoming world-readable state.
+	temporary := path + ".tmp"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(temporary, raw, 0o640); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := os.Rename(temporary, path); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return os.Chmod(path, 0o640)
+}
+
+func cloneEntries(source map[string]Entry) map[string]Entry {
+	result := make(map[string]Entry, len(source))
+	for path, entry := range source {
+		result[path] = entry
+	}
+	return result
+}

go-agent/internal/fim/manager_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package fim
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/config"
+)
+
+func TestManagerBuildsBaselineAndReportsDriftWithoutReplacingIt(t *testing.T) {
+	directory := t.TempDir()
+	watched := filepath.Join(directory, "watched")
+	writeFile(t, watched, "trusted")
+	state := filepath.Join(directory, "state")
+	cfg := config.Default()
+	cfg.LogDir = state
+	cfg.FIMPaths = []string{watched}
+	manager := New(cfg)
+	if err := manager.Initialize(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	baselineHash := *manager.baseline[watched].SHA256
+	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(state, baselineFilename)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("baseline not persisted: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	writeFile(t, watched, "tampered")
+	manager.runScan(cloneEntries(manager.baseline), PathList(cfg.FIMPaths))
+	alerts := manager.Drain()
+	if len(alerts) != 1 || alerts[0].SID != SIDModified || alerts[0].Severity != "HIGH" {
+		t.Fatalf("alerts = %+v, want one high modified alert", alerts)
+	}
+	if got := *manager.baseline[watched].SHA256; got != baselineHash {
+		t.Fatalf("scan silently replaced baseline %q with %q", baselineHash, got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestManagerPackageVerificationIsBoundedAndDrained(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := config.Default()
+	cfg.LogDir = t.TempDir()
+	cfg.FIMPaths = []string{filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent")}
+	manager := New(cfg)
+	manager.Verify = func(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
+		if deadline, ok := ctx.Deadline(); !ok || time.Until(deadline) > pacmanTimeout {
+			t.Fatal("package verification did not receive a bounded context")
+		}
+		return "openssh: /usr/bin/ssh (SHA256 checksum mismatch)", nil
+	}
+	if err := manager.Initialize(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	manager.runVerify()
+	alerts := manager.Drain()
+	if len(alerts) != 1 || alerts[0].SID != SIDPackage || alerts[0].Severity != "CRITICAL" {
+		t.Fatalf("alerts = %+v, want one critical package alert", alerts)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDisabledManagerDoesNotCreateAStateDirectory(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := config.Default()
+	cfg.FIMEnabled = false
+	cfg.LogDir = filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "state")
+	manager := New(cfg)
+	if err := manager.Initialize(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(cfg.LogDir); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled FIM created state directory: %v", err)
+	}
+}

go-agent/internal/fim/pkgverify.go

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package fim
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"os/exec"
+	"strings"
+
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
+)
+
+// PackageFinding is one meaningful package-manager integrity discrepancy.
+// Package verification is intentionally separate from the FIM baseline: it
+// relies on distribution-owned hashes for files that Sentinel should not
+// silently re-baseline after an upgrade.
+type PackageFinding struct {
+	Package string `json:"package"`
+	Path    string `json:"path"`
+	Reason  string `json:"reason"`
+}
+
+// ParsePacmanVerify mirrors Python's parse_pacman_verify. pacman emits both
+// routine summaries and diagnostics to stdout/stderr; only content, mode, or
+// ownership mismatches are security findings. A timestamp-only difference is
+// deliberately ignored because a harmless touch must not page an operator.
+func ParsePacmanVerify(output string) []PackageFinding {
+	findings := make([]PackageFinding, 0)
+	for _, raw := range strings.Split(output, "\n") {
+		line := strings.TrimSpace(raw)
+		open, close := strings.LastIndex(line, "("), strings.LastIndex(line, ")")
+		if open < 0 || close <= open {
+			continue
+		}
+		reason := strings.TrimSpace(line[open+1 : close])
+		lower := strings.ToLower(reason)
+		if !containsAny(lower, "checksum", "sha", "size", "permission", "ownership", "uid", "gid") {
+			continue
+		}
+		head := strings.TrimSpace(line[:open])
+		packageName, path, ok := strings.Cut(head, ": /")
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		packageName = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(packageName), "warning:"))
+		path = "/" + strings.TrimSpace(path)
+		if packageName == "" || path == "/" {
+			continue
+		}
+		findings = append(findings, PackageFinding{Package: packageName, Path: path, Reason: reason})
+	}
+	return findings
+}
+
+func containsAny(value string, needles ...string) bool {
+	for _, needle := range needles {
+		if strings.Contains(value, needle) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// PackageAlert converts a package-owned integrity discrepancy to the same
+// critical Sentinel alert as Python. The path is the stable cooldown key, so
+// multiple pacman diagnostics for one path do not cause repeated pages.
+func PackageAlert(finding PackageFinding) model.Alert {
+	return model.Alert{
+		SID: SIDPackage, Severity: "CRITICAL", Signature: "fim_pkg_modified",
+		Classtype: "integrity-violation", Key: "fim:pkg:" + finding.Path,
+		Detail: "package file altered (" + finding.Package + ": " + finding.Reason + "): " + finding.Path,
+		PIDs:   []int{},
+	}
+}
+
+// VerifyAlerts executes an injected verification command and turns any
+// parseable output into alerts. A missing package manager or a timeout fails
+// open; a non-zero exit with diagnostics is still parsed because pacman uses
+// that exit status to report changed files.
+func VerifyAlerts(run func() (string, error)) []model.Alert {
+	alerts := make([]model.Alert, 0)
+	if run == nil {
+		return alerts
+	}
+	output, _ := run()
+	for _, finding := range ParsePacmanVerify(output) {
+		alerts = append(alerts, PackageAlert(finding))
+	}
+	return alerts
+}
+
+// PacmanVerify runs pacman without a shell and joins stdout/stderr because the
+// tool may use either stream for discrepancies. The caller supplies a bounded
+// context; this function has no unbounded host operation of its own.
+func PacmanVerify(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
+	command := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "pacman", "-Qkk")
+	output, err := command.CombinedOutput()
+	return string(output), err
+}

go-agent/internal/fim/pkgverify_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package fim
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"reflect"
+	"testing"
+
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
+)
+
+func TestParsePacmanVerifyExtractsPackagePathAndReason(t *testing.T) {
+	output := "coreutils: /usr/bin/ls (Size mismatch)"
+
+	got := ParsePacmanVerify(output)
+
+	want := []PackageFinding{{Package: "coreutils", Path: "/usr/bin/ls", Reason: "Size mismatch"}}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
+		t.Errorf("findings = %+v, want %+v", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParsePacmanVerifyStripsWarningPrefix(t *testing.T) {
+	got := ParsePacmanVerify("warning: openssh: /usr/bin/ssh (SHA256 checksum mismatch)")
+
+	want := []PackageFinding{{Package: "openssh", Path: "/usr/bin/ssh", Reason: "SHA256 checksum mismatch"}}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
+		t.Errorf("findings = %+v, want %+v", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// A `touch` does not alter content, so a modification-time-only mismatch is
+// benign noise that must never reach an operator.
+func TestParsePacmanVerifyIgnoresModificationTimeOnlyMismatches(t *testing.T) {
+	got := ParsePacmanVerify("coreutils: /usr/bin/ls (Modification time mismatch)")
+
+	if len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("findings = %+v, want none", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParsePacmanVerifyKeepsEveryContentAndOwnershipReason(t *testing.T) {
+	reasons := []string{
+		"Size mismatch", "SHA256 checksum mismatch", "Permissions mismatch",
+		"UID mismatch", "GID mismatch", "Ownership mismatch",
+	}
+	for _, reason := range reasons {
+		got := ParsePacmanVerify("pkg: /usr/bin/x (" + reason + ")")
+		if len(got) != 1 {
+			t.Errorf("reason %q: got %d findings, want 1", reason, len(got))
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParsePacmanVerifyMatchesReasonCaseInsensitively(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := ParsePacmanVerify("pkg: /usr/bin/x (size MISMATCH)"); len(got) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("findings = %+v, want 1", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParsePacmanVerifyIgnoresSummaryAndUnownedLines(t *testing.T) {
+	output := `warning: No package owns /usr/local/bin/custom
+coreutils: 468 total files, 0 altered files
+pacman: /usr/bin/pacman (Size mismatch)`
+
+	got := ParsePacmanVerify(output)
+
+	want := []PackageFinding{{Package: "pacman", Path: "/usr/bin/pacman", Reason: "Size mismatch"}}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
+		t.Errorf("findings = %+v, want %+v", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParsePacmanVerifyIgnoresLinesWithoutAnAbsolutePath(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := ParsePacmanVerify("something odd (Size mismatch)"); len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("findings = %+v, want none", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParsePacmanVerifyReadsTheLastParenthesisGroup(t *testing.T) {
+	got := ParsePacmanVerify("pkg: /usr/bin/x (1.0-1) (Size mismatch)")
+
+	if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Reason != "Size mismatch" {
+		t.Errorf("findings = %+v, want reason 'Size mismatch'", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParsePacmanVerifyHandlesEmptyOutput(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := ParsePacmanVerify(""); got == nil || len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("findings = %+v, want empty non-nil slice", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPackageAlertIsCriticalWithDistroReason(t *testing.T) {
+	got := PackageAlert(PackageFinding{Package: "openssh", Path: "/usr/bin/ssh", Reason: "SHA256 checksum mismatch"})
+
+	want := model.Alert{
+		SID: 100020, Severity: "CRITICAL", Signature: "fim_pkg_modified",
+		Classtype: "integrity-violation", Key: "fim:pkg:/usr/bin/ssh",
+		Detail: "package file altered (openssh: SHA256 checksum mismatch): /usr/bin/ssh",
+		PIDs:   []int{},
+	}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
+		t.Errorf("alert = %+v, want %+v", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifyAlertsConvertsEveryFinding(t *testing.T) {
+	run := func() (string, error) {
+		return "a: /usr/bin/a (Size mismatch)\nb: /usr/bin/b (UID mismatch)", nil
+	}
+
+	alerts := VerifyAlerts(run)
+
+	if len(alerts) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("alerts = %+v, want 2", alerts)
+	}
+	if alerts[0].Key != "fim:pkg:/usr/bin/a" || alerts[1].Key != "fim:pkg:/usr/bin/b" {
+		t.Errorf("unexpected alert keys: %s, %s", alerts[0].Key, alerts[1].Key)
+	}
+}
+
+// A host without pacman, or a verification that times out, must degrade to no
+// alerts rather than reporting a false integrity violation.
+func TestVerifyAlertsFailsQuietWhenVerificationCannotRun(t *testing.T) {
+	run := func() (string, error) { return "", errors.New("pacman: not found") }
+
+	alerts := VerifyAlerts(run)
+
+	if len(alerts) != 0 || alerts == nil {
+		t.Errorf("alerts = %+v, want empty non-nil slice", alerts)
+	}
+}
+
+// pacman writes diagnostics to stderr, so a non-zero exit still carries
+// findings that must be parsed rather than discarded.
+func TestVerifyAlertsParsesOutputEvenWithFindingsPresentOnFailureExit(t *testing.T) {
+	run := func() (string, error) {
+		return "openssh: /usr/bin/ssh (Size mismatch)", errors.New("exit status 1")
+	}
+
+	alerts := VerifyAlerts(run)
+
+	if len(alerts) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("alerts = %+v, want 1", alerts)
+	}
+	if alerts[0].Severity != "CRITICAL" {
+		t.Errorf("severity = %s, want CRITICAL", alerts[0].Severity)
+	}
+}

go-agent/internal/fim/scan.go

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package fim
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"io"
+	"io/fs"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"syscall"
+)
+
+// DefaultPaths mirrors Python's DEFAULT_FIM_PATHS: security-critical files the
+// package manager does not track, so package verification cannot cover them.
+var DefaultPaths = []string{
+	"/usr/local/bin", "/usr/local/sbin", "/usr/local/lib",
+	"/etc/systemd/system", "/etc/ld.so.preload", "/etc/ld.so.conf",
+	"/etc/ld.so.conf.d", "/etc/pam.d", "/etc/ssh/sshd_config",
+	"/etc/sudoers", "/etc/sudoers.d", "/etc/profile", "/etc/profile.d",
+	"/etc/bash.bashrc", "/etc/crontab", "/etc/cron.d", "/etc/cron.daily",
+	"/etc/cron.hourly", "/etc/passwd", "/etc/shadow", "/etc/group",
+	"/root/.ssh/authorized_keys", "/root/.bashrc", "/root/.profile",
+}
+
+// SelfPaths mirrors Python's SELF_PATHS. Sentinel's own footprint is always
+// monitored so tampering with the agent trips the agent.
+var SelfPaths = []string{
+	"/usr/bin/enodia-sentinel", "/usr/local/bin/enodia-sentinel",
+	"/usr/bin/sentinel-redteam", "/usr/local/bin/sentinel-redteam",
+	"/usr/lib/enodia-sentinel", "/usr/local/lib/enodia-sentinel",
+	"/etc/enodia-sentinel.toml",
+	"/etc/systemd/system/enodia-sentinel.service",
+	"/etc/systemd/system/enodia-sentinel-web.service",
+	"/usr/lib/systemd/system/enodia-sentinel.service",
+	"/usr/lib/systemd/system/enodia-sentinel-web.service",
+	"/etc/pacman.d/hooks/enodia-sentinel-fim.hook",
+	"/usr/share/libalpm/hooks/enodia-sentinel-fim.hook",
+}
+
+const hashBufferSize = 1 << 16
+
+// PathList returns the configured or default monitored paths plus Sentinel's
+// own footprint, matching Python's Config.fim_path_list.
+func PathList(configured []string) []string {
+	base := configured
+	if len(base) == 0 {
+		base = DefaultPaths
+	}
+	paths := make([]string, 0, len(base)+len(SelfPaths))
+	paths = append(paths, base...)
+	paths = append(paths, SelfPaths...)
+	return paths
+}
+
+// HashFile streams a file's SHA-256. The second return is false when the file
+// cannot be read, which the caller records as an absent hash rather than an
+// alert: an unreadable file is not evidence of tampering by itself.
+func HashFile(path string) (string, bool) {
+	file, err := os.Open(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	defer file.Close()
+
+	digest := sha256.New()
+	if _, err := io.CopyBuffer(digest, file, make([]byte, hashBufferSize)); err != nil {
+		return "", false
+	}
+	return hex.EncodeToString(digest.Sum(nil)), true
+}
+
+// entryFor builds one integrity record, or false for paths that carry no
+// meaningful integrity state (sockets, devices, fifos).
+func entryFor(path string) (Entry, bool) {
+	info, err := os.Lstat(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Entry{}, false
+	}
+	entry := Entry{Size: info.Size()}
+	if stat, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t); ok {
+		// Permission bits alone would drop setuid/setgid/sticky, so take the
+		// same 0o7777 mask Python's stat.S_IMODE applies.
+		entry.Mode = int(stat.Mode & 0o7777)
+		entry.UID = int(stat.Uid)
+		entry.GID = int(stat.Gid)
+	}
+
+	switch {
+	case info.Mode()&fs.ModeSymlink != 0:
+		target, err := os.Readlink(path)
+		if err != nil {
+			target = ""
+		}
+		entry.Link = &target
+	case info.Mode().IsRegular():
+		if hash, ok := HashFile(path); ok {
+			entry.SHA256 = &hash
+		}
+	default:
+		return Entry{}, false
+	}
+	return entry, true
+}
+
+// ScanPaths maps path -> entry for every regular file and symlink under the
+// given roots. Unreadable subtrees are skipped rather than failing the sweep.
+func ScanPaths(paths []string) map[string]Entry {
+	entries := make(map[string]Entry)
+	for _, root := range paths {
+		info, err := os.Lstat(root)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		// Python tests islink() before isdir(), so a symlink handed in
+		// directly is recorded as a link even when it points at a directory.
+		if !info.IsDir() {
+			if entry, ok := entryFor(root); ok {
+				entries[root] = entry
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		walkRoot(root, entries)
+	}
+	return entries
+}
+
+func walkRoot(root string, entries map[string]Entry) {
+	_ = filepath.WalkDir(root, func(path string, dirEntry fs.DirEntry, err error) error {
+		if err != nil {
+			// Matches os.walk(onerror=...) swallowing permission errors.
+			return nil
+		}
+		if dirEntry.IsDir() {
+			return nil
+		}
+		// os.walk classifies with is_dir(), which follows symlinks: a symlink
+		// to a directory is listed as a directory and never scanned as a file.
+		if dirEntry.Type()&fs.ModeSymlink != 0 {
+			if target, err := os.Stat(path); err == nil && target.IsDir() {
+				return nil
+			}
+		}
+		if entry, ok := entryFor(path); ok {
+			entries[path] = entry
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+}

go-agent/internal/fim/scan_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package fim
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"syscall"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func writeFile(t *testing.T, path, content string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHashFileStreamsSHA256(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "f")
+	writeFile(t, path, "sentinel")
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte("sentinel"))
+
+	got, ok := HashFile(path)
+
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("HashFile reported failure for a readable file")
+	}
+	if want := hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]); got != want {
+		t.Errorf("hash = %s, want %s", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHashFileReportsFailureForMissingPath(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, ok := HashFile(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent")); ok {
+		t.Error("HashFile reported success for a missing file")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestScanPathsRecordsRegularFileWithHashAndMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "f")
+	writeFile(t, path, "x")
+
+	entries := ScanPaths([]string{path})
+
+	entry, ok := entries[path]
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("no entry for %s, got %v", path, entries)
+	}
+	if entry.SHA256 == nil {
+		t.Error("regular file entry has no hash")
+	}
+	if entry.Link != nil {
+		t.Error("regular file entry must not carry a link target")
+	}
+	if entry.Size != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("size = %d, want 1", entry.Size)
+	}
+	if entry.Mode != 0o644 {
+		t.Errorf("mode = %o, want 644", entry.Mode)
+	}
+}
+
+// Permission bits alone are not enough: losing the setuid bit here would mean
+// a binary silently gaining setuid never trips the baseline.
+func TestScanPathsPreservesSetuidBit(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "suid")
+	writeFile(t, path, "x")
+	// syscall.Chmod takes the raw mode; os.Chmod would need os.ModeSetuid and
+	// silently drops a bare 0o4000.
+	if err := syscall.Chmod(path, 0o4755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	entry := ScanPaths([]string{path})[path]
+
+	if entry.Mode != 0o4755 {
+		t.Errorf("mode = %o, want 4755", entry.Mode)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestScanPathsRecordsSymlinkTargetWithoutHashing(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	target := filepath.Join(dir, "target")
+	link := filepath.Join(dir, "link")
+	writeFile(t, target, "x")
+	if err := os.Symlink(target, link); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	entry, ok := ScanPaths([]string{link})[link]
+
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("no entry for symlink %s", link)
+	}
+	if entry.Link == nil || *entry.Link != target {
+		t.Errorf("link = %v, want %s", entry.Link, target)
+	}
+	if entry.SHA256 != nil {
+		t.Error("symlink entry must not be hashed")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestScanPathsRecordsBrokenSymlink(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	link := filepath.Join(dir, "broken")
+	if err := os.Symlink(filepath.Join(dir, "nowhere"), link); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	if _, ok := ScanPaths([]string{link})[link]; !ok {
+		t.Error("broken symlink was not recorded")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestScanPathsWalksDirectoriesRecursively(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(dir, "top"), "a")
+	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(dir, "sub", "nested"), "b")
+
+	entries := ScanPaths([]string{dir})
+
+	for _, want := range []string{filepath.Join(dir, "top"), filepath.Join(dir, "sub", "nested")} {
+		if _, ok := entries[want]; !ok {
+			t.Errorf("missing %s, got %v", want, entries)
+		}
+	}
+	if _, ok := entries[filepath.Join(dir, "sub")]; ok {
+		t.Error("directories themselves must not be recorded")
+	}
+}
+
+// Python's os.walk classifies with is_dir(), which follows symlinks, so a
+// symlink to a directory lands in dirs and is never scanned as a file.
+func TestScanPathsSkipsSymlinkToDirectoryDuringWalk(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(dir, "real", "f"), "a")
+	if err := os.Symlink(filepath.Join(dir, "real"), filepath.Join(dir, "dirlink")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	entries := ScanPaths([]string{dir})
+
+	if _, ok := entries[filepath.Join(dir, "dirlink")]; ok {
+		t.Error("symlink to a directory must not be recorded during a walk")
+	}
+	if _, ok := entries[filepath.Join(dir, "dirlink", "f")]; ok {
+		t.Error("symlinks to directories must not be followed")
+	}
+}
+
+// At the top level Python checks islink() before isdir(), so the same symlink
+// passed directly as a root IS recorded.
+func TestScanPathsRecordsSymlinkToDirectoryGivenAsRoot(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(dir, "real"), 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	link := filepath.Join(dir, "dirlink")
+	if err := os.Symlink(filepath.Join(dir, "real"), link); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	entry, ok := ScanPaths([]string{link})[link]
+
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("symlink root was not recorded")
+	}
+	if entry.Link == nil {
+		t.Error("symlink root recorded without a link target")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestScanPathsSkipsFifosAndOtherSpecialFiles(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	fifo := filepath.Join(dir, "pipe")
+	if err := syscall.Mkfifo(fifo, 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Skipf("cannot create fifo: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if _, ok := ScanPaths([]string{dir})[fifo]; ok {
+		t.Error("fifo must be skipped")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestScanPathsIgnoresMissingRoots(t *testing.T) {
+	entries := ScanPaths([]string{filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent")})
+
+	if len(entries) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("entries = %v, want empty", entries)
+	}
+}
+
+// A single unreadable file must not abort the sweep — the rest of the tree
+// still has to be recorded.
+func TestScanPathsContinuesPastUnreadableFile(t *testing.T) {
+	if os.Geteuid() == 0 {
+		t.Skip("root can read mode 000 files")
+	}
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	secret := filepath.Join(dir, "secret")
+	writeFile(t, secret, "x")
+	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(dir, "readable"), "y")
+	if err := os.Chmod(secret, 0o000); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	entries := ScanPaths([]string{dir})
+
+	if _, ok := entries[filepath.Join(dir, "readable")]; !ok {
+		t.Error("readable sibling was dropped")
+	}
+	entry, ok := entries[secret]
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("unreadable file must still be recorded via lstat")
+	}
+	if entry.SHA256 != nil {
+		t.Error("unreadable file must record a nil hash, not a bogus one")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestScanPathsReturnsEmptyMapForNoPaths(t *testing.T) {
+	if entries := ScanPaths(nil); entries == nil || len(entries) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("entries = %v, want empty non-nil map", entries)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDefaultPathsCoverCriticalUnpackagedLocations(t *testing.T) {
+	required := []string{"/etc/ld.so.preload", "/root/.ssh/authorized_keys", "/etc/sudoers", "/usr/local/bin"}
+	present := make(map[string]bool, len(DefaultPaths))
+	for _, path := range DefaultPaths {
+		present[path] = true
+	}
+	for _, path := range required {
+		if !present[path] {
+			t.Errorf("DefaultPaths missing %s", path)
+		}
+	}
+}

go-agent/internal/pkgdb/manager.go

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package pkgdb
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/config"
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
+)
+
+// Manager owns the slow package-database fingerprint outside the polling path.
+// One check runs at a time; an unavailable pacman database or log fails open
+// rather than turning an environmental read error into a tamper claim.
+type Manager struct {
+	Config          config.Config
+	Now             func() time.Time
+	Fingerprint     func(string) (string, error)
+	LastTransaction func(string) (time.Time, bool)
+	DBDir           string
+	PacmanLog       string
+
+	mu            sync.Mutex
+	initialized   bool
+	lastRun       time.Time
+	running       bool
+	pendingAlerts []model.Alert
+}
+
+func New(cfg config.Config) *Manager {
+	return &Manager{
+		Config: cfg, Now: time.Now, Fingerprint: Fingerprint,
+		LastTransaction: LastTransactionTime, DBDir: defaultDBDir, PacmanLog: defaultPacmanLog,
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) anchorPath() string {
+	return filepath.Join(m.Config.LogDir, anchorFilename)
+}
+
+// Initialize records the first available fingerprint synchronously. This is a
+// one-time baseline action before events are emitted; subsequent checks stay
+// asynchronous and never rewrite unexplained drift.
+func (m *Manager) Initialize() error {
+	if !m.Config.PackageDBVerify {
+		return nil
+	}
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	if m.initialized {
+		m.mu.Unlock()
+		return nil
+	}
+	m.mu.Unlock()
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(m.Config.LogDir, 0o750); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := m.evaluate(m.Now()); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	m.initialized = true
+	m.mu.Unlock()
+	return nil
+}
+
+// MaybeStart starts a due fingerprint in the background. Setting lastRun
+// before launching makes a stalled disk scan self-throttling instead of
+// spawning one goroutine per polling interval.
+func (m *Manager) MaybeStart(now time.Time) {
+	if !m.Config.PackageDBVerify {
+		return
+	}
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	if !m.initialized || m.running || (!m.lastRun.IsZero() && now.Sub(m.lastRun) < m.Config.PackageDBInterval) {
+		return
+	}
+	m.running, m.lastRun = true, now
+	go m.run(now)
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) run(now time.Time) {
+	_ = m.evaluate(now) // Collection errors are intentionally fail-open.
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	m.running = false
+	m.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) evaluate(now time.Time) error {
+	current, err := m.Fingerprint(m.DBDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	anchor, hasAnchor := loadAnchor(m.anchorPath())
+	transaction, hasTransaction := m.LastTransaction(m.PacmanLog)
+	alert, replacement := check(current, anchor, hasAnchor, transaction, hasTransaction, now)
+	if replacement != nil {
+		if err := saveAnchor(m.anchorPath(), *replacement); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	if alert != nil {
+		m.mu.Lock()
+		m.pendingAlerts = append(m.pendingAlerts, *alert)
+		m.mu.Unlock()
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Drain hands completed findings to Agent, which applies the shared cooldown,
+// snapshot, and event-stream ordering before any finding becomes observable.
+func (m *Manager) Drain() []model.Alert {
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	alerts := append([]model.Alert(nil), m.pendingAlerts...)
+	m.pendingAlerts = nil
+	return alerts
+}

go-agent/internal/pkgdb/pkgdb.go

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+// Package pkgdb ports Sentinel's layer-one pacman database tamper evidence.
+// It does not treat the mutable local database as a root of trust: it records
+// a baseline fingerprint, permits only transaction-correlated change, and
+// retains the old anchor when a change is unexplained.
+package pkgdb
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
+)
+
+const (
+	SIDTamper        = 100021
+	defaultDBDir     = "/var/lib/pacman/local"
+	defaultPacmanLog = "/var/log/pacman.log"
+	anchorFilename   = "pkgdb-anchor.json"
+	transactionSlop  = 120 * time.Second
+)
+
+// Anchor is deliberately compatible with Python's small JSON record. Time is
+// an epoch value so both implementations can compare it with pacman's log
+// timestamp without formatting or local-time ambiguity.
+type Anchor struct {
+	Fingerprint string  `json:"fingerprint"`
+	Time        float64 `json:"time"`
+}
+
+// Fingerprint computes the deterministic SHA-256 used for the local package
+// database. It reads each non-directory entry in lexical walk order; a read
+// failure makes the whole check unavailable rather than producing a partial
+// fingerprint that could become an unsafe new baseline.
+func Fingerprint(directory string) (string, error) {
+	hash := sha256.New()
+	err := filepath.WalkDir(directory, func(path string, entry os.DirEntry, err error) error {
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if entry.IsDir() {
+			return nil
+		}
+		if _, err := io.WriteString(hash, path+"\x00"); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		file, err := os.Open(path)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		_, copyErr := io.Copy(hash, file)
+		closeErr := file.Close()
+		if copyErr != nil {
+			return copyErr
+		}
+		return closeErr
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return hex.EncodeToString(hash.Sum(nil)), nil
+}
+
+// LastTransactionTime returns the final pacman transaction marker. A missing
+// or unparseable log is intentionally inconclusive; it is never treated as a
+// successful transaction that could authorize a changed database.
+func LastTransactionTime(path string) (time.Time, bool) {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return time.Time{}, false
+	}
+	var latest time.Time
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(string(raw), "\n") {
+		if !strings.Contains(line, "transaction completed") && !strings.Contains(line, "transaction started") {
+			continue
+		}
+		end := strings.IndexByte(line, ']')
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(line, "[") || end < 2 {
+			continue
+		}
+		stamp := line[1:end]
+		for _, layout := range []string{time.RFC3339, "2006-01-02T15:04:05-0700"} {
+			if parsed, err := time.Parse(layout, stamp); err == nil {
+				latest = parsed
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return latest, !latest.IsZero()
+}
+
+func tamperAlert() model.Alert {
+	return model.Alert{
+		SID: SIDTamper, Severity: "CRITICAL", Signature: "pkgdb_tamper",
+		Classtype: "anti-tamper", Key: "pkgdb:tamper", PIDs: []int{},
+		Detail: "pacman local DB changed with no corresponding transaction — the package checksum database may have been altered to mask file tampering",
+	}
+}
+
+func loadAnchor(path string) (Anchor, bool) {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Anchor{}, false
+	}
+	var anchor Anchor
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &anchor); err != nil || anchor.Fingerprint == "" || anchor.Time <= 0 {
+		return Anchor{}, false
+	}
+	return anchor, true
+}
+
+func saveAnchor(path string, anchor Anchor) error {
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(anchor)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	raw = append(raw, '\n')
+	temporary := path + ".tmp"
+	if err := os.WriteFile(temporary, raw, 0o640); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := os.Rename(temporary, path); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return os.Chmod(path, 0o640)
+}
+
+// check returns an alert only for changed state that no later pacman
+// transaction can explain. It deliberately returns a replacement anchor only
+// for first observation or a transaction-correlated change.
+func check(current string, anchor Anchor, hasAnchor bool, transaction time.Time, hasTransaction bool, now time.Time) (*model.Alert, *Anchor) {
+	if !hasAnchor {
+		fresh := Anchor{Fingerprint: current, Time: float64(now.Unix())}
+		return nil, &fresh
+	}
+	if current == anchor.Fingerprint {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	if hasTransaction && !transaction.Before(time.Unix(int64(anchor.Time), 0).Add(-transactionSlop)) {
+		fresh := Anchor{Fingerprint: current, Time: float64(now.Unix())}
+		return nil, &fresh
+	}
+	alert := tamperAlert()
+	return &alert, nil
+}

go-agent/internal/pkgdb/pkgdb_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package pkgdb
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/config"
+)
+
+func write(t *testing.T, path, contents string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o750); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(contents), 0o640); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFingerprintIsDeterministicAndChangesWithContent(t *testing.T) {
+	directory := t.TempDir()
+	write(t, filepath.Join(directory, "b", "desc"), "second")
+	write(t, filepath.Join(directory, "a", "desc"), "first")
+	first, err := Fingerprint(directory)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	again, err := Fingerprint(directory)
+	if err != nil || first != again {
+		t.Fatalf("fingerprints %q %q err=%v", first, again, err)
+	}
+	write(t, filepath.Join(directory, "a", "desc"), "changed")
+	changed, err := Fingerprint(directory)
+	if err != nil || changed == first {
+		t.Fatalf("changed fingerprint %q original %q err=%v", changed, first, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLastTransactionTimeAcceptsPacmanTimestampLayouts(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "pacman.log")
+	write(t, path, "[2026-07-24T10:00:00-0700] [ALPM] transaction started\n[2026-07-24T10:01:00-07:00] [ALPM] transaction completed\n")
+	got, ok := LastTransactionTime(path)
+	if !ok || got.Format(time.RFC3339) != "2026-07-24T10:01:00-07:00" {
+		t.Fatalf("transaction=%v ok=%v", got, ok)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestManagerPreservesUnexplainedChangedAnchorAndAcceptsTransaction(t *testing.T) {
+	directory := t.TempDir()
+	database := filepath.Join(directory, "pacman-db")
+	write(t, filepath.Join(database, "pkg", "desc"), "trusted")
+	cfg := config.Default()
+	cfg.LogDir = filepath.Join(directory, "state")
+	manager := New(cfg)
+	manager.DBDir = database
+	now := time.Date(2026, 7, 24, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	manager.Now = func() time.Time { return now }
+	manager.LastTransaction = func(string) (time.Time, bool) { return time.Time{}, false }
+	if err := manager.Initialize(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	initial, ok := loadAnchor(manager.anchorPath())
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("missing initial anchor")
+	}
+	write(t, filepath.Join(database, "pkg", "desc"), "tampered")
+	if err := manager.evaluate(now.Add(time.Minute)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	alerts := manager.Drain()
+	if len(alerts) != 1 || alerts[0].SID != SIDTamper || alerts[0].Severity != "CRITICAL" {
+		t.Fatalf("alerts=%+v", alerts)
+	}
+	afterTamper, _ := loadAnchor(manager.anchorPath())
+	if afterTamper.Fingerprint != initial.Fingerprint {
+		t.Fatal("unexplained change silently replaced anchor")
+	}
+	manager.LastTransaction = func(string) (time.Time, bool) { return now.Add(time.Minute), true }
+	if err := manager.evaluate(now.Add(2 * time.Minute)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	afterTransaction, _ := loadAnchor(manager.anchorPath())
+	if afterTransaction.Fingerprint == initial.Fingerprint {
+		t.Fatal("transaction-correlated change did not refresh anchor")
+	}
+}

go-agent/internal/rootcheck/collect.go

@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package rootcheck
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"syscall"
+
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
+)
+
+const (
+	procRoot = "/proc"
+	sysRoot  = "/sys"
+)
+
+// Collect obtains the independent local views used by Check. Every source is
+// best-effort: unavailable procfs/sysfs files or a missing ps binary remove
+// only that comparison, never turn a collection error into a rootkit alert.
+func Collect(ctx context.Context, state model.State, pidCap int) Views {
+	visible := procPIDs()
+	ps, psAvailable := psPIDs(ctx)
+	return Views{
+		VisiblePIDs:       visible,
+		AlivePIDs:         alivePIDs(ctx, pidCap),
+		PSPIDs:            ps,
+		PSAvailable:       psAvailable,
+		PIDAlive:          pidAlive,
+		ProcPIDExists:     procPIDExists,
+		ProcModules:       procModules(),
+		SysLiveModules:    sysLiveModules(),
+		ModuleTaints:      moduleTaints(),
+		KernelTaint:       kernelTaint(),
+		ProcTCPPorts:      procTCPPorts(),
+		SSTCPPorts:        ssTCPPorts(state),
+		ProcUDPPorts:      procUDPPorts(),
+		SSUDPPorts:        ssUDPPorts(state),
+		ProcRawProtocols:  procRawProtocols(),
+		SSRawProtocols:    ssRawProtocols(state),
+		ProcProtocolKinds: procProtocolKinds(),
+		SSProtocolKinds:   ssProtocolKinds(state),
+		PromiscuousIfaces: promiscuousIfaces(),
+	}
+}
+
+// Run collects a bounded live view then evaluates it against operator policy.
+func Run(ctx context.Context, state model.State, pidCap int, allowed map[string]bool) []model.Alert {
+	return Check(Collect(ctx, state, pidCap), Options{AllowedModules: allowed})
+}
+
+func procPIDs() map[int]bool {
+	result := map[int]bool{}
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(procRoot)
+	if err != nil {
+		return result
+	}
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		if pid, err := strconv.Atoi(entry.Name()); err == nil && pid >= 0 {
+			result[pid] = true
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func alivePIDs(ctx context.Context, cap int) map[int]bool {
+	// kill(pid, 0) asks the kernel whether a PID exists without signalling it;
+	// that is intentionally independent of the procfs directory view. Limit
+	// the sweep because pid_max may be very large, and return partial results on
+	// cancellation rather than delaying every other integrity comparison.
+	result := map[int]bool{}
+	if cap <= 0 {
+		return result
+	}
+	maximum := cap
+	if raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(procRoot, "sys/kernel/pid_max")); err == nil {
+		if value, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(raw))); err == nil && value < maximum {
+			maximum = value
+		}
+	}
+	for pid := 1; pid <= maximum; pid++ {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return result
+		default:
+		}
+		err := syscall.Kill(pid, 0)
+		if err == nil || errors.Is(err, syscall.EPERM) {
+			result[pid] = true
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func pidAlive(pid int) bool {
+	// EPERM still proves that the kernel knows about the PID; it only means the
+	// sidecar lacks permission to inspect or signal that process.
+	err := syscall.Kill(pid, 0)
+	return err == nil || errors.Is(err, syscall.EPERM)
+}
+
+func procPIDExists(pid int) bool {
+	// Keep this separate from pidAlive: rootcheck alerts on disagreement between
+	// kernel process lookup and the procfs namespace it is expected to expose.
+	_, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(procRoot, strconv.Itoa(pid)))
+	return err == nil
+}
+
+func psPIDs(ctx context.Context) (map[int]bool, bool) {
+	// ps provides a third, userspace view. A missing or failing command disables
+	// only this comparison because an unavailable tool is not evidence of a
+	// hidden process.
+	command := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "ps", "-e", "-o", "pid=")
+	raw, err := command.Output()
+	if err != nil {
+		return map[int]bool{}, false
+	}
+	result := map[int]bool{}
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(string(raw), "\n") {
+		if pid, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(line)); err == nil {
+			result[pid] = true
+		}
+	}
+	return result, true
+}
+
+func procModules() map[string]bool {
+	result := map[string]bool{}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(procRoot, "modules"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return result
+	}
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(string(raw), "\n") {
+		if fields := strings.Fields(line); len(fields) > 0 {
+			result[fields[0]] = true
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func sysLiveModules() map[string]bool {
+	result := map[string]bool{}
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(filepath.Join(sysRoot, "module"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return result
+	}
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(sysRoot, "module", entry.Name(), "initstate"))
+		if err == nil && strings.TrimSpace(string(raw)) == "live" {
+			result[entry.Name()] = true
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func moduleTaints() map[string]string {
+	result := map[string]string{}
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(filepath.Join(sysRoot, "module"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return result
+	}
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(sysRoot, "module", entry.Name(), "taint"))
+		taint := strings.TrimSpace(string(raw))
+		if err == nil && taint != "" && taint != "0" {
+			result[entry.Name()] = taint
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func kernelTaint() int {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(procRoot, "sys/kernel/tainted"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0
+	}
+	value, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(string(raw)))
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0
+	}
+	return value
+}
+
+func procTCPPorts() map[int]bool {
+	return unionInts(readSocketPorts("net/tcp", true), readSocketPorts("net/tcp6", true))
+}
+func procUDPPorts() map[int]bool {
+	return unionInts(readSocketPorts("net/udp", false), readSocketPorts("net/udp6", false))
+}
+func procRawProtocols() map[int]bool {
+	return unionInts(readSocketPorts("net/raw", false), readSocketPorts("net/raw6", false))
+}
+
+func readSocketPorts(relative string, listenOnly bool) map[int]bool {
+	// /proc/net/{tcp,udp,raw} encodes the local endpoint as hex ADDRESS:PORT.
+	// TCP's 0A state is LISTEN; UDP and raw entries have no equivalent listener
+	// state, so callers retain every bound protocol/port for comparison.
+	result := map[int]bool{}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(procRoot, relative))
+	if err != nil {
+		return result
+	}
+	lines := strings.Split(string(raw), "\n")
+	for _, line := range lines[1:] {
+		fields := strings.Fields(line)
+		if len(fields) < 4 || (listenOnly && fields[3] != "0A") {
+			continue
+		}
+		_, portText, ok := strings.Cut(fields[1], ":")
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		port, err := strconv.ParseInt(portText, 16, 32)
+		if err == nil && port != 0 {
+			result[int(port)] = true
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func procProtocolKinds() map[string]bool {
+	checks := map[string][]string{
+		"sctp": {"net/sctp/eps", "net/sctp/assocs", "net/sctp/remaddr"},
+		"dccp": {"net/dccp", "net/dccp6"}, "packet": {"net/packet"},
+		"tipc": {"net/tipc/socket"}, "xdp": {"net/xdp"},
+	}
+	result := map[string]bool{}
+	for kind, paths := range checks {
+		for _, path := range paths {
+			if socketRows(path) {
+				result[kind] = true
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func socketRows(relative string) bool {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(procRoot, relative))
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	lines := strings.Split(string(raw), "\n")
+	for _, line := range lines[1:] {
+		if strings.TrimSpace(line) != "" {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func ssTCPPorts(state model.State) map[int]bool {
+	result := map[int]bool{}
+	for _, socket := range state.Sockets {
+		if socket.State == "LISTEN" {
+			if port, ok := endpointPort(socket.Local); ok {
+				result[port] = true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+func ssUDPPorts(state model.State) map[int]bool {
+	result := map[int]bool{}
+	for _, socket := range state.Sockets {
+		if socket.State == "UNCONN" || socket.State == "ESTAB" {
+			if port, ok := endpointPort(socket.Local); ok {
+				result[port] = true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+func ssRawProtocols(state model.State) map[int]bool {
+	result := map[int]bool{}
+	for _, socket := range state.Sockets {
+		if socket.Kind == "raw" {
+			if protocol, ok := endpointProtocol(socket.Local); ok {
+				result[protocol] = true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+func ssProtocolKinds(state model.State) map[string]bool {
+	result := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, socket := range state.Sockets {
+		if socket.Kind != "" {
+			result[socket.Kind] = true
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func endpointPort(value string) (int, bool) {
+	index := strings.LastIndex(value, ":")
+	if index < 0 {
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	tail := value[index+1:]
+	port, err := strconv.Atoi(tail)
+	return port, err == nil
+}
+func endpointProtocol(value string) (int, bool) {
+	index := strings.LastIndex(value, ":")
+	if index < 0 {
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	tail := value[index+1:]
+	tail = strings.ToLower(strings.Trim(tail, "[]"))
+	if value, err := strconv.Atoi(tail); err == nil {
+		return value, true
+	}
+	protocol, ok := rawProtocolNames[tail]
+	return protocol, ok
+}
+
+func promiscuousIfaces() []string {
+	result := make([]string, 0)
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(filepath.Join(sysRoot, "class/net"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return result
+	}
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(sysRoot, "class/net", entry.Name(), "flags"))
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		flags, err := strconv.ParseInt(strings.TrimSpace(string(raw)), 0, 64)
+		if err == nil && flags&0x100 != 0 {
+			result = append(result, entry.Name())
+		}
+	}
+	return result
+}
+func unionInts(left, right map[int]bool) map[int]bool {
+	result := map[int]bool{}
+	for value := range left {
+		result[value] = true
+	}
+	for value := range right {
+		result[value] = true
+	}
+	return result
+}

go-agent/internal/rootcheck/manager.go

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package rootcheck
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/config"
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
+)
+
+const runTimeout = 30 * time.Second
+
+// Manager schedules the expensive cross-view collection independently from
+// polling. One bounded check may run at a time; completed alerts return to the
+// Agent's existing cooldown, incident, and snapshot path on the next sweep.
+type Manager struct {
+	Config config.Config
+	Now    func() time.Time
+	Run    func(context.Context, model.State) []model.Alert
+
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	lastRun time.Time
+	running bool
+	pending []model.Alert
+}
+
+func New(cfg config.Config) *Manager {
+	manager := &Manager{Config: cfg, Now: time.Now}
+	manager.Run = func(ctx context.Context, state model.State) []model.Alert {
+		return Run(ctx, state, cfg.RootcheckPIDCap, cfg.RootcheckModuleAllow)
+	}
+	return manager
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) MaybeStart(now time.Time, state model.State) {
+	if !m.Config.RootcheckEnabled {
+		return
+	}
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	if m.running || (!m.lastRun.IsZero() && now.Sub(m.lastRun) < m.Config.RootcheckInterval) {
+		return
+	}
+	// Record the start before launching the goroutine. This prevents a fast
+	// polling loop from scheduling duplicates while collection is still running
+	// or while a timed-out external command unwinds.
+	m.running, m.lastRun = true, now
+	go m.run(state)
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) run(state model.State) {
+	// Rootcheck compares several host views and may invoke ps; its deadline
+	// makes that diagnostic work bounded even on a degraded host.
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), runTimeout)
+	defer cancel()
+	alerts := m.Run(ctx, state)
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	m.pending = append(m.pending, alerts...)
+	m.running = false
+	m.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (m *Manager) Drain() []model.Alert {
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	alerts := append([]model.Alert(nil), m.pending...)
+	m.pending = nil
+	return alerts
+}

go-agent/internal/rootcheck/manager_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package rootcheck
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/config"
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
+)
+
+func TestManagerRunsAtMostOneBoundedCheckAndDrainsResults(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := config.Default()
+	cfg.RootcheckInterval = time.Hour
+	manager := New(cfg)
+	started := make(chan struct{})
+	release := make(chan struct{})
+	var calls atomic.Int32
+	var sawDeadline atomic.Bool
+	manager.Run = func(ctx context.Context, state model.State) []model.Alert {
+		_, ok := ctx.Deadline()
+		sawDeadline.Store(ok)
+		calls.Add(1)
+		close(started)
+		<-release
+		return []model.Alert{{SID: SIDHiddenModule, Key: "rk:test", PIDs: []int{}}}
+	}
+	now := time.Date(2026, 7, 22, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	manager.MaybeStart(now, model.State{})
+	<-started
+	manager.MaybeStart(now.Add(2*time.Hour), model.State{})
+	if got := calls.Load(); got != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("concurrent checks = %d, want 1", got)
+	}
+	close(release)
+	for deadline := time.Now().Add(time.Second); time.Now().Before(deadline); {
+		if alerts := manager.Drain(); len(alerts) == 1 {
+			if !sawDeadline.Load() {
+				t.Fatal("rootcheck did not receive a bounded context")
+			}
+			if alerts[0].SID != SIDHiddenModule {
+				t.Fatalf("alerts = %+v", alerts)
+			}
+			return
+		}
+		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	t.Fatal("completed rootcheck result was not drained")
+}
+
+func TestDisabledManagerNeverSchedules(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := config.Default()
+	cfg.RootcheckEnabled = false
+	manager := New(cfg)
+	var calls atomic.Int32
+	manager.Run = func(context.Context, model.State) []model.Alert { calls.Add(1); return nil }
+	manager.MaybeStart(time.Now(), model.State{})
+	if calls.Load() != 0 {
+		t.Fatal("disabled rootcheck scheduled work")
+	}
+}

go-agent/internal/rootcheck/rootcheck.go

@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+// Package rootcheck ports Sentinel's user-space anti-rootkit cross-view
+// checks. It cannot prove a kernel free of a rootkit: a sufficiently capable
+// implant can lie consistently to every local view. It does catch common
+// hiding faults by comparing independently collected kernel, procfs, sysfs,
+// socket-tool, and interface views.
+package rootcheck
+
+import (
+	"sort"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
+)
+
+const (
+	SIDHiddenProcess        = 100022
+	SIDHiddenModule         = 100023
+	SIDHiddenPort           = 100024
+	SIDPromiscuous          = 100025
+	SIDKnownRootkitModule   = 100028
+	SIDTaintedModule        = 100029
+	SIDKernelTainted        = 100030
+	SIDHiddenUDPPort        = 100031
+	SIDHiddenRawSocket      = 100034
+	SIDRawICMPSocket        = 100035
+	SIDHiddenProtocolSocket = 100037
+	SIDPSHiddenProcess      = 100038
+)
+
+var knownModules = map[string]bool{
+	"adore": true, "adore_ng": true, "azazel": true, "diamorphine": true,
+	"ipsecs_kbeast": true, "kbeast": true, "knark": true, "reptile": true,
+	"suterusu": true, "syslogk": true,
+}
+
+var taintFlags = map[int]string{
+	0: "proprietary-module", 1: "forced-module-load", 2: "unsafe-smp",
+	3: "forced-module-unload", 4: "machine-check", 5: "bad-page",
+	6: "user-tainted", 7: "kernel-died-recently", 8: "acpi-override",
+	9: "kernel-warning", 10: "staging-driver", 11: "firmware-workaround",
+	12: "out-of-tree-module", 13: "unsigned-module", 14: "soft-lockup",
+	15: "live-patched", 16: "auxiliary-taint", 17: "randstruct-plugin",
+}
+
+var highRiskTaintBits = map[int]bool{1: true, 3: true, 7: true, 12: true, 13: true}
+var rawProtocolNames = map[string]int{"icmp": 1, "ipv6-icmp": 58, "icmp6": 58, "sctp": 132}
+
+// Views contains independently collected host observations. The two PID
+// callbacks preserve Python's race checks: a hidden-process candidate must
+// still be alive through the kernel while remaining absent from procfs; a
+// ps-only candidate must still be present in procfs.
+type Views struct {
+	VisiblePIDs       map[int]bool
+	AlivePIDs         map[int]bool
+	PSPIDs            map[int]bool
+	PSAvailable       bool
+	PIDAlive          func(int) bool
+	ProcPIDExists     func(int) bool
+	ProcModules       map[string]bool
+	SysLiveModules    map[string]bool
+	ModuleTaints      map[string]string
+	KernelTaint       int
+	ProcTCPPorts      map[int]bool
+	SSTCPPorts        map[int]bool
+	ProcUDPPorts      map[int]bool
+	SSUDPPorts        map[int]bool
+	ProcRawProtocols  map[int]bool
+	SSRawProtocols    map[int]bool
+	ProcProtocolKinds map[string]bool
+	SSProtocolKinds   map[string]bool
+	PromiscuousIfaces []string
+}
+
+// Options supplies explicit operator policy. The PID cap is enforced by the
+// collector; Check is deliberately pure so parity tests do not touch a host.
+type Options struct {
+	AllowedModules map[string]bool
+}
+
+// Check turns a captured set of cross-views into Python-compatible alerts.
+func Check(views Views, options Options) []model.Alert {
+	alerts := make([]model.Alert, 0)
+	confirmed := make([]int, 0)
+	for _, pid := range sortedIntDifference(views.AlivePIDs, views.VisiblePIDs) {
+		alive := views.PIDAlive == nil || views.PIDAlive(pid)
+		hidden := views.ProcPIDExists == nil || !views.ProcPIDExists(pid)
+		if alive && hidden {
+			confirmed = append(confirmed, pid)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(confirmed) > 0 {
+		shown := confirmed
+		if len(shown) > 20 {
+			shown = shown[:20]
+		}
+		alerts = append(alerts, model.Alert{SID: SIDHiddenProcess, Severity: "CRITICAL",
+			Signature: "rootkit_hidden_process", Classtype: "rootkit-hidden-process",
+			Key:    "rk:hidproc:" + itoa(shown[0]),
+			Detail: "process(es) alive but hidden from /proc: " + joinInts(shown), PIDs: shown})
+	}
+
+	if views.PSAvailable {
+		missing := make([]int, 0)
+		for _, pid := range sortedIntDifference(views.VisiblePIDs, views.PSPIDs) {
+			if views.ProcPIDExists == nil || views.ProcPIDExists(pid) {
+				missing = append(missing, pid)
+			}
+		}
+		if len(missing) > 0 {
+			shown := missing
+			if len(shown) > 20 {
+				shown = shown[:20]
+			}
+			alerts = append(alerts, model.Alert{SID: SIDPSHiddenProcess, Severity: "HIGH",
+				Signature: "rootkit_ps_hidden_process", Classtype: "rootkit-hidden-process",
+				Key:    "rk:pshidproc:" + itoa(shown[0]),
+				Detail: "process(es) visible in /proc but missing from ps output (process tool may be hooked): " + joinInts(shown), PIDs: shown})
+		}
+	}
+
+	for _, module := range sortedStringDifference(views.SysLiveModules, views.ProcModules) {
+		alerts = append(alerts, alert(SIDHiddenModule, "CRITICAL", "rootkit_hidden_module", "rootkit-hidden-module", "rk:hidmod:"+module,
+			"kernel module live in /sys/module but hidden from /proc/modules: "+module))
+	}
+	allModules := unionStrings(views.ProcModules, views.SysLiveModules)
+	known := map[string]bool{}
+	for module := range allModules {
+		if knownModules[normalizeModule(module)] {
+			known[module] = true
+			alerts = append(alerts, alert(SIDKnownRootkitModule, "CRITICAL", "rootkit_known_module", "rootkit-known-module", "rk:knownmod:"+module,
+				"known LKM rootkit module name loaded or visible: "+module))
+		}
+	}
+	for _, module := range sortedKeysString(views.ModuleTaints) {
+		if moduleAllowed(options.AllowedModules, module) || known[module] {
+			continue
+		}
+		taint := views.ModuleTaints[module]
+		alerts = append(alerts, alert(SIDTaintedModule, "HIGH", "rootkit_tainted_module", "rootkit-tainted-module", "rk:taintmod:"+module,
+			"kernel module has taint marker '"+taint+"' (out-of-tree/proprietary/unsigned module): "+module))
+	}
+	if views.KernelTaint != 0 {
+		severity := "MEDIUM"
+		for bit := range highRiskTaintBits {
+			if views.KernelTaint&(1<<bit) != 0 {
+				severity = "HIGH"
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		flags := decodeTaint(views.KernelTaint)
+		label := strings.Join(flags, ", ")
+		if label == "" {
+			label = "unknown"
+		}
+		alerts = append(alerts, alert(SIDKernelTainted, severity, "kernel_tainted", "kernel-integrity", "rk:ktaint:"+itoa(views.KernelTaint),
+			"kernel taint value "+itoa(views.KernelTaint)+" ("+label+") — may indicate unsigned/out-of-tree modules, forced loads, or kernel faults"))
+	}
+
+	alerts = appendPortAlert(alerts, sortedIntDifference(views.ProcTCPPorts, views.SSTCPPorts), SIDHiddenPort, "rootkit_hidden_port", "rk:hidport:",
+		"listening port(s) in /proc/net/tcp not reported by ss (tool may be hooked): ", "rootkit-hidden-port")
+	alerts = appendPortAlert(alerts, sortedIntDifference(views.ProcUDPPorts, views.SSUDPPorts), SIDHiddenUDPPort, "rootkit_hidden_udp_port", "rk:hidudp:",
+		"UDP port(s) in /proc/net/udp not reported by ss (tool may be hooked): ", "rootkit-hidden-port")
+	raw := sortedIntDifference(views.ProcRawProtocols, views.SSRawProtocols)
+	alerts = appendPortAlert(alerts, raw, SIDHiddenRawSocket, "rootkit_hidden_raw_socket", "rk:hidraw:",
+		"raw socket protocol(s) in /proc/net/raw not reported by ss (tool may be hooked): ", "rootkit-hidden-socket")
+	icmp := make([]int, 0)
+	for _, protocol := range sortedKeys(views.ProcRawProtocols) {
+		if protocol == 1 || protocol == 58 {
+			icmp = append(icmp, protocol)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(icmp) > 0 {
+		alerts = append(alerts, alert(SIDRawICMPSocket, "HIGH", "raw_icmp_socket", "raw-socket-backdoor", "rk:rawicmp:"+itoa(icmp[0]),
+			"persistent raw ICMP socket protocol(s) visible in /proc/net/raw: "+joinInts(icmp)+" — validate authorized ping/monitoring tools or ICMP knockers"))
+	}
+	protocols := sortedStringDifference(views.ProcProtocolKinds, views.SSProtocolKinds)
+	if len(protocols) > 0 {
+		alerts = append(alerts, alert(SIDHiddenProtocolSocket, "HIGH", "rootkit_hidden_protocol_socket", "rootkit-hidden-socket", "rk:hidproto:"+protocols[0],
+			"special protocol socket family present in /proc/net but absent from ss output (tool may be hooked): "+strings.Join(protocols, ", ")))
+	}
+	for _, iface := range sortedStrings(views.PromiscuousIfaces) {
+		alerts = append(alerts, alert(SIDPromiscuous, "MEDIUM", "promiscuous_interface", "network-sniffer", "rk:promisc:"+iface,
+			"interface in promiscuous mode (possible sniffer): "+iface))
+	}
+	return alerts
+}
+
+func appendPortAlert(alerts []model.Alert, values []int, sid int, signature, keyPrefix, detailPrefix, class string) []model.Alert {
+	if len(values) == 0 {
+		return alerts
+	}
+	return append(alerts, alert(sid, "HIGH", signature, class, keyPrefix+itoa(values[0]), detailPrefix+joinInts(values)))
+}
+
+func alert(sid int, severity, signature, class, key, detail string) model.Alert {
+	return model.Alert{SID: sid, Severity: severity, Signature: signature, Classtype: class, Key: key, Detail: detail, PIDs: []int{}}
+}
+
+func normalizeModule(value string) string {
+	return strings.ReplaceAll(strings.ToLower(value), "-", "_")
+}
+
+func moduleAllowed(allowed map[string]bool, module string) bool {
+	for name := range allowed {
+		if normalizeModule(name) == normalizeModule(module) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+func itoa(value int) string { return strconv.Itoa(value) }
+
+func sortedIntDifference(left, right map[int]bool) []int {
+	values := make([]int, 0)
+	for value := range left {
+		if !right[value] {
+			values = append(values, value)
+		}
+	}
+	sort.Ints(values)
+	return values
+}
+func sortedStringDifference(left, right map[string]bool) []string {
+	values := make([]string, 0)
+	for value := range left {
+		if !right[value] {
+			values = append(values, value)
+		}
+	}
+	sort.Strings(values)
+	return values
+}
+func sortedKeys[V any](source map[int]V) []int {
+	values := make([]int, 0, len(source))
+	for value := range source {
+		values = append(values, value)
+	}
+	sort.Ints(values)
+	return values
+}
+func sortedStrings(values []string) []string {
+	result := append([]string(nil), values...)
+	sort.Strings(result)
+	return result
+}
+func sortedKeysString[V any](source map[string]V) []string {
+	values := make([]string, 0, len(source))
+	for value := range source {
+		values = append(values, value)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(values)
+	return values
+}
+func unionStrings(left, right map[string]bool) map[string]bool {
+	result := map[string]bool{}
+	for value := range left {
+		result[value] = true
+	}
+	for value := range right {
+		result[value] = true
+	}
+	return result
+}
+func decodeTaint(value int) []string {
+	keys := make([]int, 0, len(taintFlags))
+	for bit := range taintFlags {
+		keys = append(keys, bit)
+	}
+	sort.Ints(keys)
+	values := make([]string, 0)
+	for _, bit := range keys {
+		if value&(1<<bit) != 0 {
+			values = append(values, taintFlags[bit])
+		}
+	}
+	return values
+}
+func joinInts(values []int) string {
+	rendered := make([]string, len(values))
+	for i, value := range values {
+		rendered[i] = itoa(value)
+	}
+	return strings.Join(rendered, ", ")
+}

go-agent/internal/rootcheck/rootcheck_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package rootcheck
+
+import (
+	"reflect"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func setInts(values ...int) map[int]bool {
+	result := map[int]bool{}
+	for _, value := range values {
+		result[value] = true
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func setStrings(values ...string) map[string]bool {
+	result := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, value := range values {
+		result[value] = true
+	}
+	return result
+}
+
+func TestCheckIsQuietWhenCrossViewsAgree(t *testing.T) {
+	alerts := Check(Views{
+		VisiblePIDs: setInts(1, 2), AlivePIDs: setInts(1, 2),
+		PSPIDs: setInts(1, 2), PSAvailable: true,
+		PIDAlive: func(int) bool { return true }, ProcPIDExists: func(int) bool { return true },
+		ProcModules: setStrings("ext4"), SysLiveModules: setStrings("ext4"),
+	}, Options{})
+	if len(alerts) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("alerts = %+v, want none", alerts)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCheckReportsRootkitCrossViewSignalsInPythonOrder(t *testing.T) {
+	alerts := Check(Views{
+		VisiblePIDs: setInts(1), AlivePIDs: setInts(1), PSPIDs: setInts(1), PSAvailable: true,
+		PIDAlive: func(int) bool { return true }, ProcPIDExists: func(int) bool { return true },
+		ProcModules: setStrings("ext4"), SysLiveModules: setStrings("ext4", "diamorphine"),
+		ModuleTaints: map[string]string{"vendor_gpu": "OE"}, KernelTaint: (1 << 12) | (1 << 13),
+		ProcTCPPorts: setInts(22, 31337), SSTCPPorts: setInts(22),
+		ProcUDPPorts: setInts(53, 4444), SSUDPPorts: setInts(53),
+		ProcRawProtocols: setInts(1, 58), SSRawProtocols: setInts(58),
+		ProcProtocolKinds: setStrings("sctp", "packet"), SSProtocolKinds: setStrings("packet"),
+		PromiscuousIfaces: []string{"eth0"},
+	}, Options{})
+	got := make([]int, len(alerts))
+	for index, alert := range alerts {
+		got[index] = alert.SID
+	}
+	want := []int{SIDHiddenModule, SIDKnownRootkitModule, SIDTaintedModule, SIDKernelTainted,
+		SIDHiddenPort, SIDHiddenUDPPort, SIDHiddenRawSocket, SIDRawICMPSocket,
+		SIDHiddenProtocolSocket, SIDPromiscuous}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
+		t.Fatalf("SIDs = %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+	if alerts[0].Severity != "CRITICAL" || alerts[1].Signature != "rootkit_known_module" ||
+		alerts[3].Severity != "HIGH" || alerts[7].Key != "rk:rawicmp:1" {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected alert detail: %+v", alerts)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCheckRechecksProcessCandidatesAndLimitsRenderedPIDs(t *testing.T) {
+	alive := map[int]bool{}
+	for pid := 1; pid <= 25; pid++ {
+		alive[pid] = true
+	}
+	alerts := Check(Views{AlivePIDs: alive, VisiblePIDs: map[int]bool{},
+		PIDAlive: func(pid int) bool { return pid != 1 }, ProcPIDExists: func(int) bool { return false },
+	}, Options{})
+	if len(alerts) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("alerts = %+v, want one", alerts)
+	}
+	if len(alerts[0].PIDs) != 20 || alerts[0].PIDs[0] != 2 || alerts[0].PIDs[19] != 21 {
+		t.Fatalf("pids = %v, want [2..21]", alerts[0].PIDs)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCheckHonorsNormalizedModuleAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
+	alerts := Check(Views{ModuleTaints: map[string]string{"vendor-gpu": "OE"}}, Options{
+		AllowedModules: setStrings("vendor_gpu"),
+	})
+	if len(alerts) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("alerts = %+v, want none", alerts)
+	}
+}

go-agent/internal/snapshot/store.go

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/assurance"
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/config"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/correlation"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/enrich"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/incident"
@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ type Store struct {
 	Incidents    *incident.Store
 	LineageDepth int
 	Assurance    *assurance.Chain
+	Integrity    enrich.IntegritySettings
 
 	slowJobs   chan slowJob
 	slowClosed bool
@@ -152,6 +154,21 @@ func (s *Store) ConfigureIncidents(enabled bool, window, lineageDepth int) error
 	return nil
 }
 
+// ConfigureIntegrity copies settings for engines main actually attached into
+// retained snapshot metadata. This does not attach an engine or perform
+// collection: `--snapshot-dir` alone must not make default config values look
+// like active FIM/rootcheck managers.
+func (s *Store) ConfigureIntegrity(cfg config.Config, fimActive, rootcheckActive bool) {
+	s.Integrity = enrich.IntegritySettings{
+		FIMEnabled:            fimActive,
+		FIMScanInterval:       cfg.FIMScanInterval,
+		PackageVerifyEnabled:  fimActive && cfg.FIMPackageVerify,
+		PackageVerifyInterval: cfg.FIMPackageVerifyInterval,
+		RootcheckEnabled:      rootcheckActive,
+		RootcheckInterval:     cfg.RootcheckInterval,
+	}
+}
+
 // EnableSlowEnrichment starts one bounded worker. It deliberately never runs
 // package-manager commands: queue saturation or collector failure only leaves
 // fields unknown and can never delay or reject an alert event.
@@ -291,7 +308,7 @@ func (s *Store) applySlowEnrichment(job slowJob) {
 	processes := enrichmentProcesses(report.Processes)
 	paths := enrichmentPaths(report.Enrichment)
 	updates := enrich.CollectSlow(processes, paths, provenance.PackageOwner)
-	updates.Integrity = enrich.IntegrityAnchors(s.Dir)
+	updates.Integrity = enrich.IntegrityAnchors(s.Dir, s.Integrity)
 
 	// All slow I/O has completed. Take the lock only to merge into the newest
 	// same-second report, so a concurrent alert capture never loses evidence.

go-agent/internal/snapshot/store_test.go

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/assurance"
+	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/config"
 	"codeberg.org/anassaeneroi/enodia-sentinal/go-agent/internal/model"
 )
 
@@ -182,6 +183,50 @@ func TestSlowEnrichmentAddsBoundedHashAndFileMetadata(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestSlowEnrichmentReportsConfiguredIntegrityWithoutRunningIt(t *testing.T) {
+	store, err := New(t.TempDir(), "/unused", 10, 30)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg := config.Default()
+	cfg.FIMPackageVerify = true
+	store.ConfigureIntegrity(cfg, true, true)
+	store.EnableSlowEnrichment()
+	defer store.Close()
+	store.Collect = func(pid int) ProcessDetail { return ProcessDetail{PID: pid, FDs: map[string]string{}} }
+	if _, err := store.CaptureEvent(alertEvent("2026-07-22T10:11:12Z", model.Alert{
+		SID: 1, Severity: "HIGH", Signature: "test", Classtype: "test", Key: "integrity", Detail: "test", PIDs: []int{42},
+	})); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	store.FlushSlow()
+	report, err := LoadReport(filepath.Join(store.Dir, "alert-20260722-101112.json"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	integrity, ok := report.Enrichment["integrity"].(map[string]any)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("integrity=%#v", report.Enrichment["integrity"])
+	}
+	if integrity["package_verify"].(map[string]any)["enabled"] != true ||
+		integrity["rootcheck"].(map[string]any)["enabled"] != true {
+		t.Fatalf("integrity=%#v", integrity)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigureIntegrityDoesNotReportUnattachedManagers(t *testing.T) {
+	store, err := New(t.TempDir(), "/unused", 10, 30)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	cfg := config.Default()
+	cfg.FIMPackageVerify = true
+	store.ConfigureIntegrity(cfg, false, false)
+	if store.Integrity.FIMEnabled || store.Integrity.PackageVerifyEnabled || store.Integrity.RootcheckEnabled {
+		t.Fatalf("inactive managers reported as configured: %#v", store.Integrity)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestRetentionPrunesCountAndAgeAsPairs(t *testing.T) {
 	store, err := New(t.TempDir(), "/unused", 2, 1)
 	if err != nil {

tests/test_ruleops.py

@@ -195,6 +195,14 @@ exec_comm = ["id"]
         self.assertIn("Drill or fixture:", text)
         self.assertIn("`argv_regex`", text)
 
+    def test_checked_in_rules_md_matches_generator(self):
+        # docs/RULES.md is a checked-in copy of `rules docs` output; a mismatch
+        # here means someone hand-edited the doc, or a rule's metadata, without
+        # updating the other.
+        repo_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+        checked_in = (repo_root / "docs" / "RULES.md").read_text()
+        self.assertEqual(ruleops.render_markdown(Config()), checked_in)
+
 
 class TestRulesCli(unittest.TestCase):
     def setUp(self):

tests/test_schema_contracts.py

@@ -220,6 +220,20 @@ class TestSchemaContracts(unittest.TestCase):
             "read_only": bool,
         })
 
+    def test_go_sidecar_v1_contract(self):
+        report = web.go_sidecar_status(self.cfg, now=100.0)
+        self.assertEqual(report["schema"], schemas.GO_SIDECAR_V1)
+        _assert_types(self, report, {
+            "schema": str,
+            "read_only": bool,
+            "configured": bool,
+            "state_dir": str,
+            "available": bool,
+            "heartbeat": dict,
+        })
+        self.assertTrue(report["read_only"])
+        self.assertFalse(report["configured"])
+
     def test_hash_chain_v1_contract(self):
         artifact = self.tmp / "artifact.json"
         artifact.write_text("{}")

tests/test_web.py

@@ -37,6 +37,19 @@ def _write_alert(tmp: Path, name: str, severity: str, sigs):
     (tmp / f"{name}.log").write_text(f"=== ENODIA SENTINEL ALERT ===\n{severity}\n")
 
 
+def _write_go_alert(tmp: Path, name: str = "alert-20260722-101112"):
+    (tmp / f"{name}.json").write_text(json.dumps({
+        "schema": "enodia.alert.snapshot.v1",
+        "time": "2026-07-22T10:11:12Z", "host": "go-host", "severity": "HIGH",
+        "incident_id": "inc-go-1",
+        "alerts": [{"sid": 100017, "severity": "HIGH", "signature": "fim_modified",
+                    "classtype": "integrity-violation", "key": "fim:mod:/etc/passwd",
+                    "detail": "changed", "pids": []}],
+        "processes": [{"pid": 42}], "enrichment": {"source": "enodia-sentinel-go"},
+    }))
+    (tmp / f"{name}.log").write_text("go sidecar alert\n")
+
+
 def _incident_alert(sig: str, pids=()):
     return Alert(Severity.CRITICAL, sig, f"k:{sig}", f"{sig} detail",
                  tuple(pids), sid=100010, classtype="test")
@@ -133,6 +146,39 @@ class TestDataLayer(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(st["ebpf_exec"], "enabled")
         self.assertEqual(st["ebpf_syscall"], "disabled (not running as root)")
 
+    def test_go_sidecar_data_is_separate_read_only_evidence(self):
+        sidecar = self.tmp / "go-state"
+        sidecar.mkdir()
+        self.cfg.go_sidecar_state_dir = str(sidecar)
+        (sidecar / "heartbeat").write_text("1000\n")
+        _write_go_alert(sidecar)
+        (sidecar / "incidents.json").write_text(json.dumps({
+            "inc-go-1": {"schema": "enodia.incident.v1", "id": "inc-go-1",
+                         "last_ts": 1000.0, "snapshots": ["alert-20260722-101112.log"]},
+        }))
+        (sidecar / "events.jsonl.1").write_text('{"sequence": 1}\n')
+        (sidecar / "events.jsonl").write_text('{"sequence": 2}\n')
+
+        status = web.go_sidecar_status(self.cfg, now=1010)
+        self.assertTrue(status["configured"])
+        self.assertEqual(status["heartbeat"]["status"], "fresh")
+        alerts = web.list_go_sidecar_alerts(self.cfg)
+        self.assertEqual(alerts[0]["source"], "go-sidecar")
+        self.assertEqual(web.get_go_sidecar_alert(self.cfg, "../../etc/passwd"), None)
+        self.assertEqual(web.go_sidecar_events(self.cfg)["events"][-1]["sequence"], 2)
+        incident_view = web.get_go_sidecar_incident(self.cfg, "inc-go-1")
+        self.assertEqual(incident_view["source"], "go-sidecar")
+        self.assertEqual(incident_view["timeline"][0]["pids"], [42])
+
+    def test_go_sidecar_events_fail_closed_on_corruption(self):
+        sidecar = self.tmp / "go-state"
+        sidecar.mkdir()
+        self.cfg.go_sidecar_state_dir = str(sidecar)
+        (sidecar / "events.jsonl").write_text("not json\n")
+        report = web.go_sidecar_events(self.cfg)
+        self.assertEqual(report["events"], [])
+        self.assertIn("corrupt", report["error"])
+
     def test_incident_and_response_plan_data(self):
         _write_alert(self.tmp, "alert-20260531-000001", "CRITICAL", ["reverse_shell"])
         iid = incident.record(self.cfg, "alert-20260531-000001.log",
@@ -267,6 +313,14 @@ class TestDataLayer(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn('function renderIntegrity()', html)
         self.assertIn('Integrity state', html)
 
+    def test_dashboard_has_sidecar_evidence_console(self):
+        html = (web._STATIC / "dashboard.html").read_text()
+        self.assertIn('data-tab="sidecar"', html)
+        self.assertIn('id="sidecarTab"', html)
+        self.assertIn('function renderSidecar()', html)
+        self.assertIn('/api/go-sidecar/status', html)
+        self.assertIn('Migration evidence is shown separately', html)
+
 
 class TestNetworkHelpers(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_is_loopback(self):
@@ -371,6 +425,17 @@ class TestAuth(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("anchors", data)
         self.assertTrue(data["read_only"])
 
+    def test_go_sidecar_endpoints(self):
+        sidecar = self.tmp / "go-state"
+        sidecar.mkdir()
+        self.cfg.go_sidecar_state_dir = str(sidecar)
+        (sidecar / "heartbeat").write_text("1000\n")
+        _write_go_alert(sidecar)
+        status = json.loads(self._get("/api/go-sidecar/status", token="secret-token").read())
+        self.assertTrue(status["configured"])
+        alerts = json.loads(self._get("/api/go-sidecar/alerts", token="secret-token").read())
+        self.assertEqual(alerts[0]["source"], "go-sidecar")
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()