Adds sidecar-only, --state-dir-gated FIM, package-DB-anchor, and rootcheck
engines to the Go migration sidecar, wired into agent.Sweep/Initialize
behind the existing baseline lifecycle. Adds a read-only, schema-checked
Python dashboard consumer (go_sidecar_state_dir, /api/go-sidecar/*, Sidecar
tab) that never starts, stops, or mutates the Go sidecar's state.
Also fixes drift found while reconciling this work: enodia_sentinel/web.py
had reinvented local schema constants instead of using the canonical
enodia_sentinel/schemas.py catalog (now registers enodia.go.sidecar.v1
there and reuses ALERT_SNAPSHOT_V1/INCIDENT_V1); docs/RULES.md had drifted
from what `rules docs` actually generates for SIDs 100069-100078 (ruleops.py
was missing metadata for four SIDs and had stale drill text for four more),
now back in sync with a regression test pinning them together.
Updates CLAUDE.md, README.md, go-agent/README.md, and docs/{ROADMAP,
GO_PORT_HANDOFF,SURICATA_ASSIMILATION,THREAT_MODEL,OPERATIONS,SCHEMAS,
COMMAND_REFERENCE}.md to reflect the landed work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NQivSKBqQJsayz1xcYqWzZ
18 KiB
Enodia Sentinel Roadmap
This roadmap moves Enodia Sentinel from a single-host IDS/IPS/EDR agent into a fuller host security platform: detect, prevent, verify, investigate, respond, and assure. Dates are intentionally not promised here; the sequence matters more than calendar precision.
Release Tracks
| Track | Goal |
|---|---|
| Sensor | Better host telemetry, event capture, and detection coverage. |
| Prevention | Safe containment and recovery actions that start as dry-run plans and require explicit review before any state change. |
| Integrity | Stronger proof that files, packages, baselines, and Sentinel itself were not silently modified. |
| Incident | Group alerts, build timelines, and export evidence. |
| Response | Add safe, auditable containment and recovery workflows. |
| Fleet | Let multiple hosts report to a small controller without making the local agent dependent on it. |
| Assurance | Move trust anchors off-box or below user space. |
v0.8: Documentation, Posture, and Incident Shape
Purpose: make the current agent easier to operate and create the data model for work that is bigger than single alerts.
- ✅ Add
incident_idgrouping around related alerts (process-lineage first, time-window fallback) while preserving the existing alert JSON —incident_idis added at snapshot-report level. - ✅ Add an incident timeline generator:
incident showbuilds a time-ordered view across an incident's member snapshots (time, severity, signatures, PIDs). Richer sources (package transactions, dedicated FIM-diff lines) can follow. - ✅ Add
enodia-sentinel incident list/show/export. - ✅ Add host posture checks (
enodia-sentinel posture check): SSH root/password/empty-password login, passwordless and writable sudoers, world-writable PATH components, loose sensitive-file permissions, disabled package signatures, and enabled systemd units with writable unit files orExecStartbinaries in writable/unsafe paths. - ✅ Add a machine-readable
status --jsoncommand for automation. - ✅ Update the red-team harness so every current detection has a named drill and
expected
sid(sentinel-redteam --list), with a PASS/MISS verification pass. - ✅ Document incident response runbooks for reverse shells, persistence, trojaned binaries, hidden listeners, and sensor tampering (RUNBOOKS.md).
- ✅ Add Gonzalo/Peopleswar-style behavior coverage: input-device keylogging, credential-store/private-key access, SCTP/DCCP/raw/packet-family traffic, and raw ICMP/special-protocol rootcheck detection.
- ✅ Add process-hiding and memory-obfuscation coverage:
/procvspscross-view checks plus memory-map scans for hide libraries, RWX memory, and executable anonymous/memfd/deleted mappings, plus writable-path executable library mappings that suggest userland process injection. - ✅ Add event-driven memory telemetry for short-lived
mprotect/mmapRWX,memfd_create,ptrace, seccomp, cross-process memory access, and memory locking syscalls.
Exit criteria:
- One alert can become one incident artifact.
- Operators can answer "what changed around this alert?" without reading every raw snapshot manually.
- Posture checks report reviewable findings but do not block daemon startup.
v0.9: Response and Recovery
Purpose: move from "tell me" to "help me act" without unsafe automation.
- ✅ Add response plan generation:
enodia-sentinel respond plan <incident-id>. - ✅ Persist CLI-generated dry-run plans under
response-plans/and appendresponse-audit.logrecords for review/handoff. - ✅ Add dry-run first actions for evidence freeze, process freeze/terminate, outbound IP block, systemd stop/disable, suspicious-file quarantine, package-owner lookup, and follow-up verification.
- ✅ Add package reinstall/restore planning for pacman-owned file findings: identify the owning package, verify signed package-cache metadata, reinstall from trusted package media, re-run integrity checks, and re-anchor FIM only after operator review. Debian/RPM support remains future work.
- ✅ Add an explicit apply boundary:
respond apply <plan-ref> --dry-runreloads a saved reviewed plan, prints the exact actions, and appends aresponse_apply_rehearsedaudit record without executing commands. - Require a future explicit execution flag for state changes; default to read-only plans and audited apply rehearsals.
- ✅ Extend response audit logs to the apply boundary with
executed: falserecords. Future state-changing execution must append the same audit trail. - ✅ Add baseline reconciliation: accept legitimate FIM/package/listener/SUID
drift with a mandatory reason via
baseline accept/revoke/list. Acks are fingerprint-bound (content kinds re-alert on further change), support an optional TTL, and are filtered at the daemon chokepoint,fim-check, and the dashboard integrity API. - ✅ Add richer false-positive suppression suggestions that can emit TOML snippets but never modify config automatically.
- ✅ Add recovery checks: "verify package", "re-run rootcheck", "confirm no persistence diff", and "confirm heartbeat/dashboard visible from watchdog".
Exit criteria:
- An operator can go from alert to reviewed response plan with one command.
- Any state-changing action is explicit, logged, reversible where possible, and testable in a safe fixture.
v1.0: Stable Local Platform
Purpose: define a stable single-host product.
- ✅ Commit to stable JSON schemas for alerts, incidents, status, and response audits.
- ✅ Add compatibility tests for schema evolution.
- ✅ Add documentation versioning and manpage-style command reference.
- ✅ Harden packaging for Arch first, then document Debian/RPM install paths.
- ✅ Add signed release artifacts and checksums.
- ✅ Improve dashboard from alert browser to local console: incidents, posture, integrity state, response plans, and watchdog status.
- ✅ Add a local dashboard Settings menu with persistent themes for dark console, light evidence review, high-contrast operation, LGBTQ, Trans, Dracula, Solarized Dark/Light, and Twilight palettes.
- ✅ Add dashboard theme contrast/visual smoke checks so readable text and meaningful status colors are preserved across every palette.
- ✅ Add an optional desktop tray applet (
enodia-sentinel-tray,[tray]extra): dashboard launcher, systemd daemon control, status at a glance, andcheck --jsonquick checks, with GUI-free tested logic modules. - ✅ Add an optional stdlib tkinter desktop dashboard (
enodia-sentinel gui/enodia-sentinel-gui): tabs for status, alerts, incidents, posture, integrity, response plans, and events, plus daemon-control buttons and threaded refresh. All testable logic is GUI-free; onlyapp.pyimports tkinter. - ✅ Add an optional Qt6 desktop dashboard (
enodia-sentinel gui-qt/enodia-sentinel-gui-qt,[qt]extra withPySide6): native tabs and tables, severity row coloring, response-plan detail pane, keyboard shortcuts, and safe threaded background refresh. - Keep the dashboard read-only unless a separate authenticated write path is designed and reviewed.
Exit criteria:
- The local agent can be installed, operated, upgraded, and integrated without reading source code.
- JSON and command contracts are stable enough for downstream automation.
v1.1: Event Coverage and Correlation
Purpose: reduce blind spots and connect related signals.
- ✅ Add the first typed host-event rule family beside exec/syscall rules:
rules testacceptstcp_connectevent JSON and ships SID100067for interpreter egress to unusual public ports, with a replayable fixture. - ✅ Add a second typed host-event rule family for
listenevents: SID100068flags interpreters opening listeners on unusual local ports, with local-port match conditions and a replayable fixture. - ✅ Continue generalizing the rule engine across more typed host events:
file_write,chmod/chown,setuid/setgid,bind,accept,capset, and module-load now have built-in rules, typed event parsing, fixtures, and rule-operation tests. - Keep rules declarative and Snort-like:
sid,msg,severity,classtype,event, and match fields such as process name, parent process, argv regex, path prefix, peer IP/port, UID/GID, package ownership, and lineage. - Add eBPF event sources:
tcp_connect,bind,accept, module load, privilege transitions, and writes to watched persistence paths. - Build process lineage across polling and event sources.
- ✅ Start correlating multi-stage behavior with a read-only incident
correlation engine:
exec_rule.web-rceplus suspicious egress or an unusual listener in a 10-minute incident window raises SID100080correlation.multi_stage_intrusionwhile preserving the raw alerts. - Continue expanding multi-stage behavior: web service spawns shell, shell downloads payload, payload adds persistence, listener appears, and FIM changes.
- Add configurable correlation windows and severity escalation rules, including:
exec_rule.web-rce+ suspicious egress + persistence within 10 minutes → CRITICAL multi-stage intrusion.new_listener+new_suidin the same lineage/window → CRITICAL backdoor with privilege-escalation artifact.fim_modifiedorpkg_signature_mismatch+pkgdb_tamper→ CRITICAL suspected trojaned binary with checksum cover-up.- web/database service spawning shell + tool transfer (
curl|wget|sh) → CRITICAL likely RCE payload staging.
- Add additional high-signal living-off-the-land detections:
curl|wget | sh, Python/perl/bash reverse-shell argv variants,systemctl enablefrom unusual ancestry,chmod +soutside package transactions, and execution from writable directories. - ✅ Add first-seen and rarity tracking for local network behavior:
first public destination per process name and first listening port per
process name are locally baselined in
first-seen.jsonand alert after the initial silent pass. - Continue rarity coverage for: interpreter connections to non-standard ports and long-lived low-byte connections when socket sampling can support it.
- Keep polling as the oracle and fallback.
Exit criteria:
- Short-lived network and persistence actions are visible.
- Related alerts collapse into one incident with a readable timeline.
- Multi-stage correlation raises one higher-confidence incident without hiding the underlying raw alerts.
v1.1.1: Detection Quality and Rule Operations
Purpose: make detection coverage easier to audit, tune, and extend without turning Sentinel into a noisy rules dump.
- ✅ Add
enodia-sentinel rules listandrules show <sid>for built-in and configured rules. - ✅ Add
enodia-sentinel rules test <event-json>so operators can validate custom event rules against captured or fixture events. - ✅ Generate rule documentation from source defaults: SID, signature, classtype, event type, match fields, expected false positives, and drill coverage.
- ✅ Require a fixture or safe red-team drill for every built-in SID, including event-only and correlation SIDs.
- ✅ Add compatibility tests for rule JSON/event schema evolution.
- ✅ Extend triage so false-positive suggestions are tied to SID/classtype and can emit TOML snippets for allowlists, correlation windows, or severity overrides.
- ✅ Add post-alert enrichment consistently across detections: package owner, executable hash, parent/ancestor chain, remote IP classification, file mode/owner, recent writes by same lineage, and current FIM/package/rootcheck status.
Exit criteria:
- Operators can inspect, test, document, and tune detection rules without reading Python source.
- Every shipped detection rule has reproducible fixture/drill coverage and stable operator documentation.
v1.2: Fleet Mode
Purpose: support several personal or small-business Linux hosts without turning the agent into a heavy enterprise platform.
- ✅ Add a fleet collector design note covering optional collector boundaries, per-host enrollment, signed JSON payloads, HTTPS/tailnet transport, and standalone-agent failure semantics (FLEET_DESIGN.md).
- Add an optional collector service.
- Agents push signed JSON events and heartbeats over HTTPS or a tailnet.
- Collector stores host status, alerts, incidents, and package/integrity state.
- Add host enrollment with per-host tokens.
- Add fleet-wide views: stale sensors, repeated signatures, hosts missing package signatures, and integrity drift.
- Preserve local autonomy: detection and evidence capture must continue if the collector is down.
Exit criteria:
- A small fleet can answer "which host is compromised or silent?" from one console.
- The agent still works as a standalone local tool.
v1.3+: Assurance and Hardening
Purpose: make tampering harder to hide from an attacker with high privileges.
- External baseline anchor: mirror FIM and package DB fingerprints off-box with append-only semantics.
- ✅ Hash-chain
events.logand snapshots locally with append-onlyenodia.hash_chain.v1JSONL records, exposed through the integrity report. - Optional snapshot signing with a host key.
- Investigate Linux IMA/EVM and TPM-backed attestation for supported machines.
- Replace bcc with a libbpf + CO-RE agent if the event layer becomes core to the product.
- Explore minimal kernel-side enforcement hooks for response actions, while keeping the default product inspect-only.
Exit criteria:
- A local root attacker has to tamper with both the host and an external or hardware-backed trust anchor to hide compromise.
Active Migration Track
- Suricata model assimilation design is complete, and Phase 0's additive
enodia.event.v1Python reference contract is implemented. - Phase 1 under
go-agent/now has a stdlib-only parallel sweep loop, injectable process/file-descriptor/socket state, and all current Python poll detectors ported:reverse_shell,ld_preload,deleted_exe,input_snooper,credential_access,stealth_network,egress,memory_obfuscation,first_seen,new_listener,persistence, andnew_suid. The shared fixture andscripts/check-go-parity.pycheck Go output against the Python oracle. A newprovenancepackage provides pacman/dpkg/rpm ownership queries so the Gonew_listenerdetector can mirror Python's package-owned-listener suppression. Opt-in--state-dirmode now builds listener/SUID baselines, applies the shared startup grace gate, scans persistence paths, and retains first-seen network state. The Go sidecar also has offline-replay parity for the exec rule family (built-ins100001–100004plus configured[[exec_rules]]) and syscall rules100060–100066, plus all typed host rules, the active rule catalog, mixed-event JSONL routing, correlation SID100080, and sweep cooldown. The first Phase 2 transports have landed as an opt-incilium/ebpfexecve tracepoint source plus a filtered raw-syscall source for SIDs100060–100066, both with CO-RE parent lookup, shared cooldown/emission, and fail-open probe status. The syscall source also routessetuid/setgidinto typed-host SIDs100071/100072and permission/ownership changes into SID100070, including relative-path resolution. Confirmed interpreterwrite/writev/pwritevariants, successful TCP connect/bind/listen/accept calls,capset, andfinit_modulenow feed typed-host SIDs100069,100067/100073/100068/100076,100077, and100078. Phase 2 now also includes an opt-in hardened systemd validation unit, static build/install path, isolated baseline state, and journal JSONL. A bounded rotating JSONL copy provides isolated retained event history, and an atomic heartbeat gives external watchdogs a non-journal liveness signal. Bounded Python-schema-compatible JSON/text alert snapshots now provide truthful retained counts and basic process context. A private, atomicenodia.incident.v1index now applies the shared lineage-first/time- window grouping, assigns real snapshotincident_idvalues, and persists correlation SID100080. Hot-path enrichment adds bounded process/parent context, lineage, remote-IP classification, and candidate paths synchronously, while a 16-job asynchronous worker adds streamed executable hashes, file metadata, and package-owner strings under a query bound. The sidecar now also has sidecar-only,--state-dir-gated FIM (fim-baseline.json, SIDs100017–100020, optionalpacman -Qkkverification), package-DB anchor (pkgdb_verify, SID100021), and rootcheck (procfs/sysfs/ps/socket/ module-taint/kernel-taint/promiscuous-mode cross-view checks) engines that run asynchronously off the sweep loop and return alerts through the same cooldown/snapshot/incident pipeline. Python's dashboard gained a first, explicitly read-only management-console consumer for this migration evidence: an opt-ingo_sidecar_state_dirsetting exposes/api/go-sidecar/*endpoints and a Sidecar dashboard tab that display the Go sidecar's retained heartbeat, alert snapshots, incidents, and event log without starting, stopping, or otherwise controlling the Go process. The Python service remains the production default until notification fan-out and broader subsystem parity land.
Backlog
Useful ideas that need design before implementation:
- Policy-as-code for host posture.
- YARA-compatible scanning for selected paths.
- Sigma-like host event rules.
- SBOM and package provenance reporting.
- Offline evidence bundle for outside analysis.
- Dashboard import of exported incident bundles.
- Support for non-pacman package managers in signed-package verification.
- Dedicated Debian/RPM packaging.
- Installer preflight checks and health diagnostics.
Roadmap Rules
- Do not add dependencies to the base daemon without a specific security or operator value that cannot be achieved with stdlib.
- Prefer read-only detection and dry-run response until the command contract is tested and documented.
- Every new detector or response action needs a safe drill or fixture.
- Do not build stealth or self-hiding behavior.
- Keep the local agent useful without a dashboard, collector, or network.